Battle of Al Khafji Gulf War
In the early evening of 29 January 1991, Iraqi armor and mechanized infantry in eastern and southern Kuwait attacked US Marine Forces, Central Command (MARCENT) and Arab Joint Forces Command-East (JFC-East) units at several points along the Kuwaiti-Saudi Arabian border. The Iraqi offensive lasted a little over four days, continuing until 2 February. Known collectively as the Battle of Khafji, the series of engagements between Iraqi forces and the US-led anti-Iraq coalition represented the first significant ground action of the Gulf War.
At the time it was fought, the Battle of Khafji was viewed as a small and relatively inconsequential attack on an abandoned Saudi border town. In fact, Khafji was a very significant engagement, since described in one highly regarded study as the “defining moment” of Op eration Desert Storm. Other than Scud attacks, Khafji was the only major Iraqi offensive of the war and its outcome demonstrated the impotence of the Iraqi army in the face of Coalition (primarily American) airpower.1
The Battle of Khafji was preeminently an airpower victory. Coalition air furnished offensive and defensive support to friendly ground forces and, by effectively isolating the battlefield, prevented the reinforcement of engaged Iraqi units. Although the Iraqis achieved tactical surprise and may have initially achieved certain limited objectives, in the end the Battle of Khafji was a devastating defeat for the army of Saddam Hussein. When the battle ended on 2 February, Coalition forces had stopped elements of three
Iraqi divisions, forcing two of them to retreat in disarray back to Kuwait and never allowing the third even an opportunity to properly form), destroyed in the vicinity of 600 enemy vehicles, and recovered all lost territory with minimal friendly losses. In each of these outcomes, airpower was the decisive element. 2
Impressive in themselves, these “facts-on-the-ground” were transcended by the larger strategic-operational effects of Coalition air strikes. Exploiting an unprecedented detection-targeting-strike capability based on the new joint surveillance target attack radar system (JSTARS), Coalition air wreaked havoc on enemy follow-on forces forming north of the Kuwaiti border and imposed on the Iraqis a grim view of their military prospects. Denied the ability to maneuver on the battlefield even at night, the Iraqi army of occupation in Kuwait was left with three bleak alternatives: fight and most likely die,surrender, or retreat.
In hopes of stimulating additional research on an important airpower victory, this paper traces the major events associated with the battle and offers a preliminary analysis of the role and impact of airpower. Three issues are considered in some detail: the apparent influence of airpower on Iraqi strategy and military behavior in the days before the battle; close air support (CAS) operations along the Kuwaiti-Saudi border; and most importantly, the use of airpower to isolate the battlefield and attack Iraqi follow-on forces. Finally, some consideration is given to the implications of the Khafji battle for professional airmen.
Based on a number of postbattle assessments, it appears that Iraqi plans called for their 3rd Armored Division and 5th Mechanized Division to make the actual attack while the 1st Mechanized Division handled the task of guarding the attacking units’ western flanks. The 3rd Armored Division’s mission was to cross the Saudi-Kuwaiti border due south of Wafra and then turn east to attack the Saudi port of Mis’hab on the Persian Gulf (see map). Moving out of its positions about 30 miles to the west, the 1st Mechanized Division would head south-southwest and serve as a screening force between the “elbow” and the “heel” of Kuwait where that country’s border with Saudi Arabia angles northwest. Simultaneous with these movements, the 5th Mechanized Division would attack straight down the coast, rout Saudi forces posted on the border, and press due south with the presumed intention of linking up with the 3rd Armored in the vicinity of Mis’hab. In support of the 5th Mechanized Division, an Iraqi commando force would move south along the coast by boat with orders to infiltrate and create havoc in the Coalition’s rear.
Once the battle was joined, reinforcements would proceed south to follow up and exploit the initial successes achieved by the lead battalions. With the ground battle under way, the Iraqis presumably planned to retire behind their defenses inthe southern Kuwaiti theater of operations (KTO) and draw American ground forces after them into killing zones where Iraqi artillery and counterattacks would impose massive 12 casualties.
The 5th Mechanized Division’s attack route pointed directly at Ra’s al Khafji, a Saudi oil and resort town on the shore of the Persian Gulf about eight miles below the Kuwaiti border. Khafji was all but deserted at the time of Iraqi incursion. Because the town was located within range of Iraqi artillery in southern Kuwait, the Saudi government had evacuated its 15,000 inhabitants on the first day of the war.13
Coalition forces along this portion of the front consisted of troops from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United States. JFC-East had primary responsibility for the eastern portion of the Coalition line. Defense of the coastal road leading to Khafji was entrusted to one battalion of the Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG) and a Qatari tank battalion. By late January small US Navy and Marine reconnaissance units and Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO) teams were also reconnoitering the area around Khafji. About 30 miles to the west, the 2d Marine Light Armored Infantry (LAI) Battalion, 2d Marine Division, was screening the area south of Wafra. The 2nd LAI’s base of operations was observation post 2 (OP-2), one of a series of old Saudi police posts located at about 15-mile intervals along the Kuwaiti border. Some 30 miles further west, units assigned to Task Force Shepherd, a battalion-sized Marine LAI screening force drawn from the 1st Marine Division, occupied OP-4 in the Umm Hjul sector below the heel of Kuwait.
Another smaller Task Force Shepherd contingent was based 30 miles beyond at OP-6 near the elbow of Kuwait.”4
The Iraqis crossed the border in three columns, battalion sized or larger, on theevening of 29 January. The westernmost column consisted of a T-62 tank battalion and armored personnel carriers (APC) drawn from the 1st Mechanized Division. Proceeding directly toward the area occupied by the marines of Task Force Shepherd. Elements of the 3rd Armored Division constituted the central column, which came due south from Wafra.
Composed of about 50 tanks and 30 APCs, this spearhead made little progress before colliding at OP-2 with the marines backed up by coalition airpower. The eastern column of 40 or more tanks and APCs proceeded directly down the coastal road toward Khafji. In support of the eastern task force, the Iraqis dispatched the aforementioned commando force to conduct seaborne raids behind Coalition lines. In the event, soon after departing Kuwait in 15 small patrol boats, the commando force was sighted and destroyed or scattered by US Navy and British Royal Navy fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters. It should be noted that air support for the Iraqis was totally absent due to the Coalition’s early and complete success in winning air superiority. 15
The Battle of Khafji began at approximately 2000 hours local time on the evening of 29 January, soon after the marines at OP-4 sighted advance elements of the Iraqi 1st Mechanized Division approaching out of the darkness. The lightly armed marines promptly engaged the Iraqis with TOW antitank missiles and called for air support. 16
Marine and Air Force CAS began to arrive in front of OP-4 by 2130 local time. By 2300, three AC-130 gunships, two F-15Es, two LANTIRN-equipped17 F-16Cs, and A-10s had joined the battle at OP-4.
(Two additional A-1Os were placed on alert at King Fahd International Airport, outside Riyadh.) The fighting at OP-4 continued for several hours before the Iraqis broke off the action and retreated northward into Kuwait. This initial response notwithstanding, it apparently took the US Air Force, Central Command (CENTAF) Tactical Air Control Center (TACC) at least four hours to realize that a significant engagement was developing along the Kuwaiti-Saudi border. Absorbed with SCUD suppression, the Republican Guards, and the demands of executing an intricate air tasking order (ATO), TACC personnel were described by one source as initially exhibiting a “business as usual” attitude.
The same source reports that attitude lasted only as long as it took Lt Gen Charles A. Homer, the CENTCOM joint force air component commander (JFACC), to arrive on the scene. When he reached the TACC shortly after midnight, Homer quickly sensed an opportunity was at hand to attack Iraqi forces in the open and promptly ordered additional diversions of theater air to support the Marine and Air Force “shooters” already attacking the Iraqi columns.1 8
Another smaller Task Force Shepherd contingent was based 30 miles beyond at OP-6 near the elbow of Kuwait.”4
The Iraqis crossed the border in three columns, battalion sized or larger, on the evening of 29 January. The westernmost column consisted of a T-62 tank battalion and armored personnel carriers (APC) drawn from the 1st Mechanized Division. Proceeding southwest out of the area between the elbow and the heel of Kuwait, this force headed directly toward the area occupied by the marines of Task Force Shepherd.
Elements of the 3rd Armored Division constituted the central column, which came due south from Wafra. Composed of about 50 tanks and 30 APCs, this spearhead made little progress before colliding at OP-2 with the marines backed up by coalition airpower. The eastern column of 40 or more tanks and APCs proceeded directly down the coastal road toward Khafji. In support of the eastern task force, the Iraqis dispatched the aforementioned commando force to conduct seaborne raids behind Coalition lines. In the event, soon after departing Kuwait in 15 small patrol boats, the commando force was sighted and destroyed or scattered by US Navy and British Royal Navy fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters.
It should be noted that air support for the Iraqis was totally absent due to the Coalition’s early and complete success in winning air superiority. 15
CENTCOM leaders initially viewed the Iraqi incursion as a feint presaging a larger attack. ARCENT feared a more ambitious follow-on strike aimed at the repositioning VII Corps while MARCENT was worried about an assault on its exposed logistics base at Kibrit. To provide real-time indications and warning, Homer’s solution was to give ARCENT 20 minutes of JSTARS coverage for every 40 minutes spent orbiting the MARCENT AO. 19
Well-conducted air strikes during the night of 29/30 January were essential to repulsing the Iraqi attacks on OP-4. The victory at OP-4 was marred, though, when two Marine light armored vehicles (LAV) were destroyed by “friendly fire.”
One LAV was hit by friendly surface fire; the other was struck by a malfunctioning Maverick missile fired by an A-10. A total of 11 marines died in the first case of coalition fratricide in Desert Storm.
Soon after the attack began on OP-4, advance elements of the Iraqi 3rd Armored Division proceeded out of Wafra and descended on OP-2. Like their comrades at OP-4, the marines at OP-2 responded with TOW missiles, automatic cannon fire, and a call for air support. Shortly before 2240 hours word reached the TACC that some 50 Iraqi tanks were approaching the besieged outpost. Marine F/A-18s, A-6s, and AH-ls and Air Force
A-10s and F-16s were vectored into the area. Beginning about 2300 and for the next three hours Air Force and Marine air attacked the Iraqi forces in front of OP-2. The Iraqis broke off the engagement shortly after 0200 and straggled back toward Wafra.21
Off to the northwest, OP-6 came under fire shortly after 0100. Giving way to about a dozen Iraqi tanks and APCs, the commander of the single LAV company at the outpost requested air support. Marine and Air Force CAS drove off the attackers during the night.
By daylight only the residue of battle remained: destroyed Iraqi armor and surrendering enemy troops.
The marines at OP-2 and OP-6 faced no further threats, but fighting at OP-4 flared up sporadically throughout the night and repeated strikes were flown against enemy concentrations massing in the nearby heel of Kuwait. An Iraqi armored force consisting of an estimated 15 tanks reappeared before OP-4 at 0720 to attempt a final assault. Several flights of A-10s and a flight of Marine F/A-18s arrived a few minutes later. For the next hour a combination of air and antitank missiles imposed mounting losses on the enemy. Deciding at last to withdraw, the retreating Iraqis were subjected to an even more intense level of fire for several hours as they made their way back to Kuwait.
When the shooting finally stopped, Marine ground troops counted a total of 22 destroyed tanks, and they spent the next several days rounding up several hundred prisoners of war.23
Although the Coalition decisively repulsed the Iraqis’ western and central columns, the 5th Mechanized Division’s eastern thrust down the coast road proved more successful. Shortly after it crossed the Saudi border at approximately 2300, elements of this force were engaged by an AC-130 gunship and Marine AH-1 helicopters. The Iraqis lost some 13 vehicles but encountered only light opposition on the ground from screening elements of the 2nd SANG. By 0030 the Iraqis had reached the outskirts of Khafji and proceeded to occupy the town. A continuing series of engagements over the next three days consisted of Iraqi efforts to reinforce their troops in Khafji and of Coalition efforts to repulse those reinforcements, attack Iraqi units in defensive positions along the border, and reoccupy the town of Khafji. Khafji remained under enemy control until the afternoon of 31 January when, effectively isolated by continuous air strikes on units attempting to come to their relief, the beleaguered Iraqis surrendered to Saudi and Qatari ground forces.
CAS at Khafji
As noted above, the lightly armed Marine screening forces at the various OPs began calling for air support almost immediately after they sighted the Iraqi advance elements coming across the border. Coalition air continued to provide extensive CAS for engaged ground units throughout the four-day battle.
Command and control procedures for CAS operations proved generally effective.
These arrangements provided for a fire support coordination line (FSCL) well north of the Saudi-Kuwaiti border. As is customary, aircraft striking targets inside the FSCL had to work under the direction of forward air controllers (FAC). The distant FSCL was intended to ensure an ample margin of safety for FACs and ANGLICO teams workingtargets along the border. However, during the battle of Khafji the FSCL was moved back to the Saudi border and on one occasion brought down below it. This resulted in a free-fire zone along the border, a situation which enabled the coalition to increase the number of strikes in areas where the Iraqis had concentrated their forces. 25
Together with Air Force and Marine fixed wing and Marine rotary wing aircraft, the new JSTARS system proved a vital asset in beating back the Iraqi attacks. An airborne radar that could monitor enemy vehicle traffic at night with impressive clarity, JSTARS was an indispensable element in ensuring the efficient and effective use of coalition aircraft. Then in a prototype configuration, JSTARS conveyed an accurate picture of Iraqi troop dispositions on the night of 29/30 January and, in conjunction with the airborne battlefield command and control center (ABCCC), redirected strike aircraft against them. JSTARS repeatedly demonstrated its value during the days that followed. By furnishing a real-time, theater-wide “picture” of Iraqi movements along the Kuwaiti-Saudi border, JSTARS enabled commanders to formulate strategies and allocate sorties with animpressive understanding of where they would do the most good. As commanders learned during the Battle of Khafji, there was an interesting reciprocal dimension to JSTARS- derived information. Although JSTARS’ major function was to report where enemy traffic was moving
Coalition leaders found it could be no less useful to know where the enemy was not moving.26
Although the coalition had a large number of CAS assets, many of these aircraft- USAF A-10s in particular-had limited capability at night. Close coordination with ground and airborne FACs helped mitigate the problem, but not without difficulty.
Limited night capability certainly contributed to several fratricide incidents. As mentioned earlier, during the first hours of the battle of Khafji, so-called friendly air-to- ground fire claimed the lives of seven marines at OP-4.27
A few tragic mishaps notwithstanding, well-coordinated air strikes during the night of 29/30 January were critical to the success of US Marine Corps and Saudi units in meeting and stopping larger and heavier Iraqi forces. At General Homer’s behest, in the early morning hours of 30 January air planners began retasking a growing number of strike sorties to perform CAS on behalf of Coalition ground forces.
By 31 January approximately 260 sorties had been flown in and around the town of Khafji alone.
Most of the CAS flown in the immediate area of the town of Khafji was performed by Marine Corps air. Khafji was located in an area controlled by the Marine direct air support center (DASC) and, as General Homer later explained, Marine controllers “were more comfortable working with their Marine assets.” For its part, the Air Force concentrated on interdicting Iraqi follow-on forces in southern Kuwait, which prevented reinforcements from relieving the battalion-sized force occupying the besieged town. So intense and deadly did the Air Force attacks become that Iraqi forces caught north of Khafji soon were reduced to firing antitank rockets skyward in a frantic effort to defend themselves.
As much for political as for military reasons, the Iraqi occupation of Khafji was a matter of intense concern to the Saudis. Already angered by the failure of the Marine Corps to furnish CAS to JFC-East units during the initial Iraqi attacks on 29 January, General Horner in the CENTAF TACC at 1500 on 30 January and personally requested air support for a planned counterattack on Khafji. After an hour passed and the promised
strike aircraft still had not appeared, Khaled angrily threatened to withdraw all Saudi air rom Coalition control. Immediately thereafter the aircraft Horner already had diverted arrived to support the Saudi-Qatari assault. The first JFC-East counterattack on Khafji was launched at 1800 on 30 January. That attack failed but a second assault succeeded, and the Saudis retook Khafji the following afternoon.