Indian regulars in the US Army in the 1890s
by David McCormick
It was in September 1894, while visiting Mount Vernon Barracks, Alabama, when Capt. Marion P. Maus caught sight of the Apache warrior Natchez among a number of other men from his tribe. Natchez had fought fiercely against Maus eight years earlier during the Sierra Madre campaign. Natchez, now in his U.S. Army uniform with its first sergeant stripes, impressed Maus with his skillful handling of the Indians of Company I, 12th Infantry.1 What had brought about this transformation of former enemies, now united in a common effort? The end of hostilities between Indians and the U.S. Army came about in the early 1890s, but that was not necessarily a good thing for the Indians who had been partnered with the U.S. Army. For more than twenty-five years, the Apache, Sioux, Kiowa, Cheyenne, and other tribes had been valuable assets to the U.S. Army, but the cessation of hostilities brought an end to military employment for most of these Indian scouts and police. A small number of Indians were retained to fill the ranks of scout companies in Arizona and on the Northern Plains, but many of the Indians, now unemployed, faced a sudden emptiness in their lives. As chance would have it, just as the Indians were released from service as scouts, the Army faced lagging enlistments in its soldier ranks. In order to reverse the enlistment problem, the War Department ordered the recruitment of a maximum of 1,485 Indians to serve in the regular Army. This not only beefed up the Army ranks, but also took the sting out of Indian unemployment.2 Maj. William H. Powell first proposed the idea of enlisting Indians to serve as soldiers in the Army.
In 1898, he wrote that there were “some noble qualities in the Indian character, as well as in that of the white man, and through the influence of a soldier’s life these qualities would naturally be developed, and the Sioux. Powell recorded the scene he had witnessed twenty-one years earlier and recalled when the Sioux had approached the fort in formation. He exclaimed, “No troops could have moved with more regularity, or have been tactically better handled than these Indians. The sight was beautiful to look at, and reminded us of old war times.”6 Powell received such a favorable response to his first article that he wrote a second, “The Indian as a Soldier.” He proposed enlisting Indians as soldiers on a trial basis, noting that there were only two objections to his plan: the language barriers between the various tribes, and the Indians’ “barbarous customs which would have to be obliterated.”7
Powell believed both could be addressed easily. The initial concern could be surmounted by enlisting the graduates of the Indian schools, who were fluent in English, as sergeants within the Indian units, where they could act as translators. Also, white officers could pick up the basics of sign language from them. As for the second objection, Powell believed that and they themselves be made to feel that they were a part and parcel of the government.”3
Powell felt strong enough in his convictions to pen three articles for United Service, a monthly periodical reporting on military affairs. In his first piece, “Soldier or Granger?,” he proposed that American Indians be recruited into the U.S. Army as regular soldiers, not as scouts—who essentially were Army contractors—as most officers viewed their limited role in the Army. He stressed that the Indians possessed a warlike disposition and were extremely partial to all of the trappings of war, wanting nothing to do with tilling the soil. He disputed the fact that they could be coaxed into farming, as they were acclimated to a wholly dissimilar manner of life. Powell suggested instead that the Army should “educate them to our ways by employing them in that which is the most acceptable to their instincts and tastes—that is, make soldiers of them.”4
Powell added that “the physical endurance of the Indian was unequaled, with the ability to cover lengthy distances by foot.”5 He also noted the demoralizing effect of keeping young warriors dependent on allotments that, to them, were nothing more than handouts. Powell felt that they would like to be in the fray, imitating their fierce ancestors. He noted that he was present at Fort Laramie in 1868, when Red Cloud of the Oglala Sioux, with three thousand of his clan, arrived to place his mark on the treaty that would end hostilities between the United States “contact with civilization in time removes . . . elements of barbarism.”8
Powell’s third United Service article, “The Indian Problem,” echoed his previously published sentiments on enlisting Indians into the U.S. Army.9
Powell was not the lone voice in the wilderness; he drew strong declarations of support from those who lived and worked alongside the potential new recruits. James McLaughlin, an Office of Indian Affairs agent at the Standing Rock Sioux Reservation of the Dakotas, voiced his support, touting it “a grand thing for the Indians. They are warriors from their childhood, and would make the very best of soldiers.”10
M. R. Wyman, agent at the Crow Reservation in Montana, weighed in, saying of the Crow warriors, “They are the finest kind of horsemen . . . and, in my opinion, would make the finest body of light cavalry in the country.”11 Finally, Powell made the f inancial argument, citing the War Department’s own numbers. It had spent about $2 million in quelling the Ghost Dance and Messiah Craze among the Sioux of South Dakota in 1890–1891.12 Noted artist Frederic Remington also agreed with Powell, adding that military service could be the federal government’s best tool in aiding the Indians, to bridge the chasm between their culture and the white man’s world. The warrior culture was all they had known for generations—agriculture would not do.13
Powell argued that a senior officer such as Maj. Gen. George R. Crook backed his Indian soldier scheme. When Crook discussed his use of Indian scouts in the campaign against Apaches in Arizona, he stated, “During the entire campaign, from f irst to last, without any exception, every successful encounter with the hostiles was due exclusively to the exertions of Indian scouts.”14 Powell must have misconstrued Crook’s approval of the Indians as scouts as meaning that he favored the idea of them as regular Army soldiers, because Crook wasted little time in voicing his opposition to Powell’s plan. On 24 February 1890, he wrote to Army Adjutant General Brig. Gen. John C. Kelton stating his case against the proposal. Crook believed Indians served well as scouts and reservation policemen, but being thrown into the world of the Army, with its rigid discipline and its units of soldiers fighting in unison, would be too much for their individuality to overcome. Crook felt fondness and sympathy for the Indians, and he did not want to see them fail in this endeavor, which might further demean them in the eyes of the white man. At least one other senior Army officer spoke out against Powell’s proposal.
In his 1890 annual report, Brig. Gen. Benjamin H. Grierson signaled his agreement with General Crook’s assessment.15 However, there were advocates of recruiting Indians for the Army as regular soldiers. One was Frank C. Armstrong, an inspector for the Indian Service. He had enlisted 120 Cheyenne Dog soldiers as Army scouts in 1885, when there was a threat of an outbreak of violence in Oklahoma. T he Cheyenne warriors proved effective in foiling the action.
Armstrong was convinced they would be successful as Indian soldiers. But Armstrong differed from Powell in a key way: he supported assimilating the Indians into white companies instead of keeping them set apart in individual units.16 Both Powell and Armstrong were looking for other senior officers who were willing to test the waters. Brig. Gen. John R. Brooke, commanding the Department of the Platte, perceived the endeavor as “an effectual means of civilization for a certain class of Indians that cannot it seems be reached in any other practical means.”17 Brooke backed Powell’s recommendation of structuring the Indian soldiers into separate companies under the leadership of white officers, seasoned by the rigors of the frontier.
He felt posting them far from their reservations was key to successful results. Secretary of War Redfield Proctor and Maj. Gen. John M. Schofield, the Army’s commanding general, saw merit in Powell’s stratagem, but still had reservations. They elected to assess how strong a commitment the Indians possessed to enlist in the Army in greater numbers.
T hey determined that expanding the scout program might offer an insight. In the spring of 1890, the War Department issued orders for the enlistment of two 100-man scout companies. One of the companies, assigned The Washington Sketch Book Supplement to Fort Keogh, Montana, was commanded by 1st Lt. Edward W. Casey, 22d Infantry. The unit, composed of Cheyenne from Montana, became Company A, Department of Dakota.
Also known as “Casey’s Scouts,” this unit served during the 1890–1891 campaign in South Dakota. The second company enlisted Comanche and Kiowa warriors from the Southern Plains. This unit was under the command of 1st Lt. Homer W. Wheeler, 5th Cavalry, and assigned to Fort Reno, Indian Territory (Oklahoma).18 T he success of Casey’s and Wheeler’s 200 scouts—combined with the 800 Sioux and Cheyenne scouts recruited to aid in the 1890–1891 campaign to quell the Messiah Craze—convinced Schofield and Proctor there was a place for Indians in the regular Army. Schofield saw this scheme as a win-win situation: “First, to diminish by that number the braves who might otherwise become enemies, and to increase to the same extent the number of United States troops.”19
Schofield was savvy; the young warriors wanted rifles in their hands, not hoes. Schofield touted the young warriors as “natural soldiers.”
The Indians had lined up to enlist as scouts, and their proficiency as such had been demonstrated time and again. But would they be as quick to enlist on a more permanent basis—three or more years instead of three months?20 Before going ahead, Schofield decided to query the officers commanding scout companies to see if there was interest among the Indian scouts in enlisting in the Army for a term of five years.
The scouts balked at a commitment of that duration. One of those officers, Col. William R. Shafter, found that the Indians most objected to being infantrymen. They wanted no part of trudging along the ground. Second Lt. Guy H. Preston, commanding Company A, Sioux Scouts, at Pine Ridge, South Dakota, reported that both the Oglala Sioux and neighboring Brulé Sioux were “horse Indians and among them all I cannot find a man who is willing to leave the reservation as an infantry soldier . . . the idea of going afoot and carrying the heavy rifle is repugnant to them also.”21 Preston also added another barrier to the program.
These warrior horsemen valued their horses above all else and would not go marching off to battle without them. These results aside, Schofield was not disheartened and remained unwavering in his support. On 7 March 1891, he remarked that, “so novel a proposition as the enlistment for a term of years as regular soldiers, rather than as scouts for a short period, could not be expected to be at first acceptable to the Indians.”22 Rather than giving up on the plan, Schofield was convinced the solution to the lack of enthusiasm was to restrict the Indians from enlisting as scouts, leaving joining as regular soldiers as the only option open to them. Proctor was in agreement.
Two days later, on 9 March, General Kelton issued General Order U.S. Army 28 to execute the plan. This order was not for the 3,000 Indian enlistees initially asked for, above the Army’s 25,000-man cap, but only 2,000 enlistees within the 25,000-man force.23 General Order 28 specified the need for eight troops of Indian cavalry as well as nineteen companies of Indian infantry, one attached to each regiment posted west of the Mississippi River, excluding Negro units. Each troop and company would enlist fifty-five Indians, and whenever possible, they would be posted near home. Also, the rule for being f luent in English was abandoned. Lastly, to have a better chance of enticing Indians into enlisting as regular soldiers, the number of Army scouts was cut back. The maximum number of scouts allowed for the entire Army had been set at 1000—it was now drastically cut to 150.24 General Brooke and Maj. Gen. Nelson A. Miles, commander of the Military Division of the Missouri, balked at this last stipulation. Brooke, commanding the Department of the Platte, called for an exception to this abrupt cutback in the number of scouts.
He argued that the term his scouts signed up for during the Messiah Craze movement was still in effect. To them, being discharged earlier without cause would be considered a betrayal of their loyalty. It certainly would not endear them to the idea of joining the Army as soldiers. General Miles had even more reason to wish to be excluded from this requirement, which, he reported, would definitely weaken his operations. His Sioux, Crow, and Cheyenne scouts were serving as “secret police, and in such service, they are very valuable in discovering and securing arms.”25 In both cases, the Indian scouts were allowed to complete their enlistments that Library of Congress General Schofield would end by July. Miles concluded that to let them finish their terms of service might encourage them to reenlist—this time as regular Army.26
General Brooke opined that it might befit the Army to assign a number of prominent Indians at Pine Ridge as sergeants and corporals to the proposed Indian company he was establishing. Brooke trusted that these new noncommissioned Indian officers had the respect of fellow warriors who would follow them into the ranks. General Order 28 allowed department commanders to make these appointments if they wished to do so.27 In the spring of 1891, enlistment personnel, working for judiciously selected officers, initiated recruitment on the reservations. Before thirty days had passed, Lt. Edward Dravo of the 6th Cavalry had recruited Sioux warriors from the Rosebud Reservation, South Dakota. T hey filled the ranks of Troop L, stationed at Fort Niobrara, Nebraska.
Some of these enlistees had fought bravely against the U.S. Cavalry in previous conflicts. During the following six months, several more Indian units were established. Troop L, 1st Cavalry, at Fort Custer, Montana, was composed of Crow; Troop L, 2d Cavalry, at Fort Wingate, New Mexico, was mostly made up of Navajo; Company I, 8th Infantry, at Fort Washakie, Wyoming, consisted of several different tribes; Company I, 3d Infantry, was stationed at Fort Sully, South Dakota, and was recruited from the ranks of the Cheyenne River Sioux; Company I, 20th Infantry, stationed at Camp Poplar River, Montana, was made up of Assiniboine and Sioux warriors; Company I, 22d Infantry, was assigned to Fort Yates in North Dakota and would be filled with Sioux from the Standing Rock Reservation.28
Company I, 9th Infantry, posted at Fort Whipple, Arizona, was composed of Apaches from the San Carlos Reservation.29 They soon demonstrated their skills to Lt. Charles W. Dodge Jr. After arriving at Fort Whipple, he led them on a fifty-mile trek and reported they were “as fine a set of young men as were ever recruited for the U.S. Army.” Dodge went on to say, “They showed total obedience to orders and a compelling desire to become Courtesy of Dave Ayers Edward Dravo, shown here as a colonel of recruiting for Troop L, 7th Cavalry,
1st Lt. Hugh L. Scott, a strong advocate for the Indian soldier experiment, spoke out against this limit on married Indians. He explained that it was characteristic of Indians to wed at a young age. As a result, there were very few unmarried Indians on the Kiowa reservation with whom to fill a cavalry troop. This was not an isolated incident—other recruiting officers made similar complaints. 1st Lt. John Library of Congress good soldiers.”30 Company I, 10th Infantry, at Fort Apache, Arizona, also included Apaches. Company I, 12th Infantry, was formed at Mount Vernon Barracks, Alabama. This last unit was made up of Apache prisoners as well as warriors from the San Carlos Reservation, Arizona.
From all reports, the f irst six months of this experiment appeared successful, which had everything to do with the immense efforts of the Army officers involved.31 Despite the recent killing of so many Sioux at Wounded Knee, the Army’s recruiting personnel successfully enlisted a significant number of Sioux warriors from their reservation in South Dakota. Of the eleven Indian units formed within the Departments of Dakota and the Platte, six were composed of Sioux Indians. But it was not an easy venture.
Capt. Richard H. Pratt, superintendent of the Indian School at Carlisle, Pennsylvania—and an early supporter of Indian enlistments—visited the Pine Ridge Agency during the summer of 1891. He found that preliminary attempts to recruit the Army scouts there as regular soldiers for Company I, 2d Infantry, had been unsuccessful. He was not surprised because he knew why it failed. He reasoned that the recruiting efforts should wait until the “scouts are discharged and after their money is gone.” The commander of the 2d Infantry concurred, replying, “money and food are now more abundant with the Sioux Indians than for years; this fact retards enlistments.”32
One curious problem occurred at the Fort Hall Indian Agency in Idaho. When 1st Lt. William H. Johnston Jr. was attempting to enlist Bannock Indians to serve in Company I, 16th Infantry, he discovered that the war chief of the tribe bitterly opposed his efforts because of the directive that all recruits be vaccinated for smallpox. The chief mistakenly thought that his warriors were being branded so that they could be recognized if they later deserted. Johnston explained to the chief that all soldiers—black, Indian, and white—were to be inoculated to prevent smallpox and nothing more, but the chief would not be persuaded. Johnston relayed that he foresaw “no hope of obtaining a single recruit at Fort Hall.”
This enlistment endeavor, once transferred to the Rosebud Reservation, was successful in filling the ranks.33 Another looming issue was the requirement of General Order 28 that no more than ten married Indians could be enlisted in each troop or company. The man in charge of recruiting for Troop L, 7th Cavalry, 1st Lt. Hugh L. Scott, a strong advocate for the Indian soldier experiment, spoke out against this limit on married Indians. He explained that it was characteristic of Indians to wed at a young age. As a result, there were very few unmarried Indians on the Kiowa reservation with whom to fill a cavalry troop. This was not an isolated incident—other recruiting officers made similar complaints. 1st Lt. John H. Kinzie, recruiting at Pine Ridge, gave an account of his dilemma in enlisting warriors for the 2d Infantry. He found very few Indians over eighteen years of age who were unmarried.
Further, the married soldiers who were interested in enlisting did not want to leave their families behind, though, according to Kinzie, “even if they could take their families, they could not support them on their pay.”34
As a result of all of these factors, Secretary Proctor permitted recruiters to waive the limit on married soldiers. However, Kinzie and Scott were directed by Proctor not to lessen their efforts in recruiting as many single Indians as possible. They were also instructed to notify the married Indians that they could claim “no special privileges because of their married status.”35 While it was not the intent of the Army to move the Indians away from their reservations, the crucial objective of this experiment was to meld the Indian forces into a steadfast “military force of the United States,” which could be called on whenever and wherever they were needed.36
When Proctor released his annual report for 1891, it revealed that the first year of the Indian enlistment experiment was a “total success.”37
Three troops of cavalry and four companies of infantry had been filled. Seven more had been filled in part. The secretary decided to visit some of the Indian units and appeared to be enthusiastic over the conditions he found. He commented: When it is considered, that a short time ago many of these Indian soldiers were “blanket Indians,” that few of them had ever had on a suit of clothes, slept under a roof, ate at a table, used a knife and fork, wore shoes, or had their hair cut, the transformation is indeed remarkable. . . . It is not only an important step toward their civilization, self-support and control, but is the cheapest and best insurance against further Indian troubles.38 Not everyone saw the merit in the Indian soldier endeavor, however. Stories of Indians’ drunkenness were played up in the press. Maj. Theodore Shawan, assistant adjutant general, decided to look into the allegations at Fort Whipple. He found the basis of these reports—that the entire troop of Indians was drunk and on a rampage— was, in fact, only one intoxicated Indian soldier.39 Nevertheless, an irate citizen assailed the War Department for placing weapons in the hands of savages.40 There was also opposition within the Army.
An anonymous officer voiced disapproval in an editorial printed in the 16 May 1891 issue of the Army and Navy Journal. In the piece, he ascribed the fall of ancient Greece, Carthage, and Rome to their dependence on “barbaric mercenaries.” He followed with the warning that “the utilization of Indian soldiers would undermine the moral f iber of America.”41
Another soldier who took issue in the Army and Navy Journal opined, “The establishment of these Indian regiments is a dangerous innovation. Experience of other governments with mercenaries is not a happy one.”42 Even Captain Pratt, having earlier recommended a program akin to this present one, was now decidedly an opponent of the experiment. When Pratt corresponded with the War Department in the summer of 1891, he conveyed his dissatisfaction and hoped that the secretary of war “would let his Indian enlistment scheme die.”
Oddly, in spite of his disapproving view, Pratt still suggested a number of his Indian school graduates for noncommissioned officer posts.43 Proponents of the program had, from the start, anticipated hostility from the Department of Interior’s Office of Indian Affairs, but this was not the case. Secretary of the Interior John W. Noble’s annual report for the f irst year of the experiment was surprisingly supportive.
Noble stated that “every possible encouragement and help” was accorded to the recruiting efforts on the reservations. He added, “Much good will result . . . no less to the Indians enlisted than to the peace and quiet of the settlements in the vicinity of the reservations, by enlisting the young men who would otherwise be idle, and possibly restless.”44 In reporting on his recruiting trips to the various reservations, Capt. Robert Lee, who had the job of overseeing
Indian recruitment for the Departments of the Dakota and the Platte, confirmed that the Indian agents were cooperative and helpful, at least in the early stages.45 Despite these varying accounts, General Schofield assessed the results of enlisting Indians as soldiers as “very satisfactory” in his September 1892 report, and he advocated for the experiment to be carried forward.46
By the following month, a number of Indian units had progressed to the point that two of them were cherrypicked to be symbols of the Army at the 1893 Columbian Exposition dedication in Chicago. Indian soldiers were selected out of Troop L, 3d Cavalry, from Fort Meade, South Dakota, and Troop L, 6th Cavalry, of Fort Niobrara. The Indian troopers, all of whom were Sioux warriors, garnered significant attention from fairgoers and the press. It was not lost on the attendees that the Indian troopers had, up until a short while ago, been the adversary. As a Chicago Tribune headline stated, “Lots of People Visit the Indian Soldiers’ Camp.”47
The paper took special note of the fact that the 3d Cavalry troop included many followers of Big Foot, who had survived the carnage at Wounded Knee. Two Indians who had been shot and wounded at the hands of the U.S. Cavalry were now enlisted in the 3d Cavalry. The Tribune identified the warrior named Drops Two as one of them: “He claims that he killed two soldiers [at Wounded Knee] and immediately took this name.”48 According to the new secretary of war, Stephen B. Elkins, the Indian enlistment experiment was “essentially philanthropic and not military.”49
During 1892, the scheme seemed likely to develop into a permanent program, and Elkins believed the endeavor must do so “without imposing a burden upon the limited resources set aside exclusively for the regular military establishment” and without adversely affecting “the efficiency of the Army.”50 To ensure this measure, Elkins endorsed the passage of a new bill (S. 2083) that was introduced by now Senator Redfield Proctor. The bill sought congressional approval to enlist up to 3,000 Indians.
T he measure, advanced on 8 February 1892, stipulated that the Indian enrollments would be above and separate from the official enlisted force of the Army.51 But the bill died on the vine, never making it out of committee to reach the floor for congressional debate.52 During 1893, chinks began to appear in the Indian soldier program as Indian satisfaction with Army life began to wane. Fewer men enlisted. Four Indian companies that had not attained their full complement of men were disbanded, and the Indians were discharged.
One particularly disheartening episode concerned Company I, 22d Infantry, at Fort Yates, which was disbanded despite its ranks National Archives being full. The Army had been planning on moving this company from the Standing Rock Reservation due to the unit’s supposed drunkenness and the fact that agent James McLaughlin deemed the men of the 22d a bad influence on other Indians of his agency.
When the Company I soldiers balked at the proposed relocation, they were given the option of transferring to another company or being discharged. As a group, they decided on discharge, and on 30 April 1893, they were mustered out. Though Schofield remained by-and-large content with the results of the experiment, he admitted that the situation with the 22d had been “wholly unsuccessful.”53 These were not the only instances of Indian soldiers wanting out. Indian soldiers could secure their release from the Army following one or more years of service. A number of Sioux—Troops L of the 3d and 6th Cavalries—opted out of the army after their terms of service were complete. Company I, 21st Infantry, at Fort Sidney, Nebraska, however, was a case in the extreme. In the fall of 1893, the whole company appealed to be relieved of their military obligation.
The reasons behind their request were explained thus: “When we were enlisted, we were told that ten men might be connected with the company and keep their families with them. But nineteen married men were enlisted. Part of us left our families at home and part have them with us, but we find neither way satisfactory. . . . We want to go back home where we can look after our families.” They had to wait until the following year to gain their discharges.54 With the number of disillusioned Indian soldiers mounting, dissatisfaction with the Indian soldier program also was rising within the War Department. The adjutant general informed General Schofield that it was “becoming more and more apparent that many intricate and perplexing questions connected with the companies of Indian soldiers will be presented to the Department for action.”55
He advised that the Indian troops and companies, should be “systematically examined,” in order to keep Schofield and the secretary of war “in possession of full and complete information concerning their condition.” But Schofield himself was not ready to throw in the towel on the trial. To him, the plan had proved successful to this point—two main aims had been attained. First, a number of young warriors “who were generally dissatisfied and liable at any time to become hostile” were kept busy rather than being dangerously idle. Second, the value of “the warlike tribes of Indians as part of the military strength of the United States” had not yet been appraised. Schofield believed it “too early to reach a final conclusion upon this question.
Results vary from one extreme to the other. In some cases, the Indian troops have proved highly satisfactory. In others, less so.” Schofield conveyed one relatively unexpected and woeful observation: a number of Indian soldiers from warlike clans had ceded their “military character” and had become too “docile” due to interaction with the white man. Schofield concluded that the Indians “may be counted as of no military consequence either for or against the United States.”56 Despite these negative reports, the Indian soldiers effectively accomplished numerous military assignments, participated successfully in combat training, and were commended for their progress. Several individual units were involved in and completed security assignments. One such detail was handled by Troop L of the 7th Cavalry in July 1894, when it served as the armed escort for Army paymaster Maj. Charles McClure. The unit was solely responsible for safely delivfor 1894, the writing was on the wall. The Indian units remaining numbered only six cavalry troops and four infantry companies—a total of 547 men.
In July 1893, Lamont gave orders to muster out the three Indian units at Fort Wingate, Walla Walla, and Spokane.61 An accounting of the demise of the experiment appeared in the 3 March 1894 issue of Army and Navy Journal, wherein it was stated there was “little doubt among officers of the Army. . . . that the experiment of enlisting Indians for soldiers was a failure.” It was also believed that within just a few months, the troops and companies would be “skeletonized,” leading to the disappearance of the units within two years.62 ering the soldiers’ payroll from Fort Sill to Rush Springs, Indian Territory.57 In another successful assignment, which took place in January 1892, eleven of “Casey’s Scouts” from Fort Keogh were ordered to capture the errant warrior Walks-in-the-Night.
The Indian troopers returned to the fort with their man in tow to stand trial. In 1894, rioters from “Coxey’s Army”—a large group of unemployed workers who were protesting economic conditions in the U.S.—were sent in to take over the trains, but Troop L, 8th Cavalry, was sent to Forsyth, Montana, and derailed them. This incident was also unusual in that it was the only instance in which the U.S. Army deployed Indian troops against white Americans.58 With the election of S. Grover Cleveland as president, there was a changing of the guard at the War Department.
In November 1893, Daniel S. Lamont of New York became the new secretary of war. Secretary Lamont was not as enthusiastic as Proctor or even Elkins had been about the idea of Indian soldiers in the Army. But he did note that there were several opinions on the matter, both for and against. The number of Indian soldiers remaining in the Army had dropped considerably, decreasing to 771 by 30 June 1893.59 This level of attrition made a strong argument against enlarging the Indian force, but Lamont recognized that some arguments for continuing the program were valid. He stated, “The advisability of employing individual Indians as scouts. . . . has never been called into question.”60 But by the time Lamont submitted his annual report T here were several reasons for the decline in numbers in a program that had seemed to hold such promise less than three years earlier. The language barrier was still a major impediment.
It was all well and good to lift the requirement of English fluency for enlistment—doing so certainly improved recruiting numbers—but not being able to understand what was being said to them probably left the Indians feeling embarrassed and inferior. The Indians seemed restless and unhappy with the regimens of military life. Homesickness was a strong motivation drawing them away from military life, and once the shine dulled on the novelty of military service, the Indians wanted out. By mid-1895, only one Indian unit remained.63
T he unit left standing was now Capt. Hugh L. Scott’s Troop L, 7th Cavalry, which was posted at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and composed chiefly of Kiowa and Comanche as well as a small number of Cheyenne and Arapaho. Scott was able to fill his troop due to his good rapport with the Kiowa chief, Poor Buffalo. Scott had served at Fort Meade and was among the Army’s staunchest adherents of carrying out the Indian-soldier experiment. He believed in a healthy “give and take” with his men; he allowed them to leave their hair long, saying, “let it drag on the ground as far as I’m concerned.” Yet despite Scott’s willingness to accept their longer hair, the Indians eventually had to give in to Army regulations and cut their hair anyway.64 Scott also sought and received special approval from Secretary Lamont to permit young enlistees to bring their wives with them. While this permission was granted, the wives were stopped short of going along with their husbands on campaigns.65 These allowances contributed to the success of Scott’s troop, but as he himself noted, Troop L was successful “only as long as he had stayed with it.” He added that the officers of Indian units “could not be changed around as in white troops,” suggesting that the stability of personnel in his unit was critical to its success. Scott remained with his 7th Cavalry troop for the duration of its existence, and that made all the difference. But Scott also understood that the success of his unit was atypical. “Since all the other troops were a disappointment,” Scott explained, “the experiment of enlisting Indians was regarded as a failure.” Scott’s Troop L, 7th Cavalry, served until 31 May 1897, when its compliment of fifty-three Indians was discharged.66
According to the Army’s adjutant general, 1,071 men in total had served during the trial. In his words, the Indian enlistees “never reached a degree of substantial success as useful soldiers,” notwithstanding the “strenuous and intelligent efforts” by recruiters and troop and company commanders.67 Scott took issue with that statement, responding, “Innumerable obstacles were thrown in my way by unthinking officers.” Though he never identified the officers or explained which obstacles he meant, Scott did add that “support in Washington was withheld by a change of the Secretary of War.”68 By the time General Schofield mustered out of service in September 1895, the Indian-soldier experiment had waned to the point it was rated a failure. Secretary Proctor had initiated the program with a flourish, but his successors did little to support its continuation.
Although the experimental program of the 1890s ultimately failed, it at least set the stage for the future successes of Native Americans, who have served honorably and well in the United States’ armed forces ever since. During World War I, when all Native Americans were required to register for the draft even though most of them were not yet viewed as full citizens, 6,500 Native men were drafted into military service, while another 5,000 volunteered. The Onondaga and Oneida tribes went so far as to declare war on Germany, and many Native Americans volunteered for the most perilous missions. They paid a price for these daring efforts, losing about 5 percent of those who served compared to the 1 percent loss for U.S. troops overall.69
Famously, the Navajo code talkers of World War II followed in the footsteps of the Choctaw warriors of World War I. Just as the Choctaw telephone squads had frustrated the efforts of the Germans in the Great War, so too did the Navajo and other tribes such as the Tlingit of southeast Alaska during the Second World War. T hese Army warriors were also proficient in hand-to-hand fighting and served well as snipers.70 During the Korean War, Native Americans served in the upper echelons of the Army: Major General Hal L. Muldrow Jr., a Choctaw, commanded the Division
Artillery, 45th Infantry Division, from Dec. 10, 1951, to May 22, 1952. Colonel, and later Brigadier General, Otwa Autry of the Creek Nation commanded the 189th Field Artillery Battalion, 45th Infantry Division, until May 1952. The 189th delivered some of the heaviest artillery fire during the battles for Hills 191 (T-Bone Ridge) and 275 (Old Baldy) during the summer of 1952.71 As in these three previous wars, Native Americans were heavily entrenched during the Vietnam War, in which more than 42,000 Native Americans served admirably.72 David McCormick is a retired freelance writer specializing in history and regional interest topics. He has a master’s degree in regional planning and was a longtime employee of the city of Springfield, Massachusetts. His articles have appeared in America’s Civil War, Army Magazine, Michigan History, Naval History, and Pennsylvania Heritage, among others.
Editor’s Note The terms “Indian” and “Indians” have been used in this article in keeping with the vernacular of the period and the naming conventions of the day. The use of Native American at the end of the article is an acknowledgement that Indian and Indians are no longer acceptable nomenclature.