The 528th Support Battalion in Panama Proved The concept of ARSOF

The 528th Support Battalion, a relatively new and untested unit, was facing inactivation on 20 December 1989. But, the 528th deployed two task-organized support elements to Panama during Operations JUST CAUSE and PROMOTE LIBERTY that caused the Army to reconsider its decision. Their performance demonstrated the need for a dedicated ARSOF combat service support battalion.

“PROVING THE CONCEPT”

The 528^th Support Battalion in Panama

by Christopher E. Howard

tivated at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, on 3 June 1986, the 13th Support Battalion was ‘reflagged’ by the U.S. Army Institute of Heraldry as the 528th Special Operations Support Battalion (SOSB) on 16 7May 1987.¹Authorized 12 officers, 5 warrant officers, and 146 enlisted soldiers, the 528th SOSB was to provide dedicated administrative, logistical, and maintenance support to the Headquarters, [U.S.] Army Special Operations Command, and, when directed, to other Army Special Operations Forces.² Its immediate headquarters was the 1st Special Operations Command (1st SOCOM), the forerunner of the 1st Special Forces Command (Airborne). Before Operation JUST CAUSE, the 528th SOSB participated in readiness exercises and provided limited support to operational missions, but had not been tested in combat.³

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528th SUPPORT BATTALION ORGANIZATION (Circa 1989)

* 1st SOCOM placed the 528th Support Battalion and the 112th Signal Battalion under the Commander, 4th Psychological Operations Group for administrative purposes. While known as the “ARSOF Support Command,” no separate brigade-level (O-6) command existed for ARSOF support units until the establishment of the Special Operations Support Command (SOSCOM), in 1994.

From inception as an ‘out of hide’ unit, the 528th SOSB had to compete for personnel and resources in 1st SOCOM.⁴ Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Louis G. Mason, the 528th’s first commander, and the driving force behind its creation, had to prove its necessity.⁵ Major (MAJ) Joseph R. Lalla, Chief, G-4 Plans, 1st SOCOM, also wanted to “prove the concept” of a dedicated ARSOF support battalion, by incorporating the 528th SOSB into contingency plans. The crisis in Panama presented an opportunity.

In March 1988, MAJ Lalla was part of a nine-man 1st SOCOM planning team, led by the Deputy Commander, Colonel Joseph S. Stringham. They were to write a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) support plan for Contingency Plan (CONPLAN) ELABORATE MAZE, the U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) contingency plan for Panama.⁶  Lalla inserted two 528th SOSB Forward Arming and Refueling Points (FARP) into the logistical annex of the BLUE SPOON operations order (OPORD).⁷ Positioned at Fort Sherman and Empire Range, the FARPs would support the 160th Special Operations Aviation Group (SOAG) and 617th Special Operations Aviation Detachment (SOAD) during combat operations.⁸

This hand-drawn map of Panama’s Canal Zone was sketched by 528th SOSB logistics planners during the lead-up to Operation JUST CAUSE. It reveals the anticipated difficulty of moving fuel, by road, from the tank farm near Empire Range to the planned FARP site at Fort Sherman.

In preparation for its BLUE SPOON mission, the 528th SOSB trained and rehearsed with the 160th SOAG, to become compatible with that unit’s refueling teams.⁹ In May 1989, MAJ Lalla, as the 528th’s Executive Officer (XO), led a small contingent to Panama, as part of the “security enhancement” mission.¹⁰ His party included a refueling team, led by First Lieutenant Robert T. ‘Tim’ Davis. They set up and operated a FARP at Fort Sherman for thirty days, to support ARSOF aviation elements in Panama.¹¹

When BLUE SPOON was revised, the 528th role was reduced to one FARP at Howard Air Force Base (AFB), across the isthmus.¹² In October 1989, the 528th’s refueling team rehearsed its BLUE SPOON part at Hunter Army Airfield, by supporting all ARSOF units involved.¹³ The team was combat ready; all that remained was to monitor the situation in Panama.¹⁴

On 17 December 1989 (D-3), the 528th was directed to deploy a twelve-man Special Operations Support Element (SOSE) to Panama on 18 December to operate a FARP for Special Operations Aviation, and provide ammunition support to the 75th Rangers of Task Force RED. Led by Captain (CPT) John M. Gargaro, the SOSE included several soldiers who ran the FARP on Fort Sherman earlier that year, to include its non-commissioned officer-in-charge (NCOIC), Master Sergeant Michael A. Bienkowski. The SOSE deployed with one M1008 Commercial Utility Cargo Vehicle (CUCV), two M35A2 2½ ton ‘deuce and a half’ trucks, four 10,000-gallon fuel bags, two 350-gallon-per-minute pumps, and five four-inch refueling point hoses.¹⁵

What did a FARP look like in 1989?

Tailored to the mission they were to perform, there was no ‘one size fits all’ Forward Arming and Refueling Point (FARP). During Operation JUST CAUSE, the 528th Special Operations Support Battalion (SOSB) sent an eleven-man team to Panama to operate a FARP at Howard Air Force Base.^1a Below is an overview of that team and its equipment.

Team Composition^2a

• 1x Captain (officer-in-charge [OIC])
• 1x Master Sergeant (noncommissioned officer-in-charge [NCOIC])
• 6x Petroleum Supply Specialists (Military Occupational Specialty [MOS] 77F) 
• 3x Ammunition Specialists (MOS 55B)

Fuel System Supply Point Equipment^3a

• 2x 350 gallon-per-minute (GPM) pumps
• 4x 10,000 gallon petroleum storage bags
• 2x filter/separators 
• Assorted nozzles, valves, and hoses^4a

Duties

The OIC and NCOIC controlled operations, maintained communications with the owner of the local airspace, and interfaced with aircraft controllers.^5a The six ‘fuelers’ (77F) ensured that fuel was circulated, filtered, and dispensed to waiting aircraft. The three ammo specialists (55Bs) provided ammunition support to the Rangers.

The SOSE reached Howard AFB at 1400 hours, eight hours before the FARP was to be operational.¹⁶ Unfortunately, their hoses were not compatible with the U.S. Air Force (USAF) refueling trucks.¹⁷ Together, they improvised a solution and the FARP went into operation at the north end of the taxiway.¹⁸ Because it could rapidly dispense fuel with four-inch hoses and perform ‘hot refueling’ at night, it was in high demand.¹⁹ The FARP dispensed 72,000 gallons of JP-5 fuel in the first ten days of JUST CAUSE.²⁰ Using its two ‘deuce and a half’ trucks, the team delivered ammunition to the Rangers, and controlled their ammunition holding area at Howard AFB.²¹

When the Special Operations Command, South (SOCSOUTH) had forward service support problems, the 528th SOSB was tasked to send a second support element to Panama. They were to connect the 1st SOCOM units of Joint Task Force South with the U.S. Army South support infrastructure, and provide direct support to these units.²² Unlike the FARP, which had been planned for and rehearsed well in advance, this “Logistical Support Element” (LSE) called for improvisation. With minimal guidance, recently-promoted CPT Tim Davis (now the 528th Operations Officer [S-3]), and CPT Mark A. Olinger (the Headquarters and Headquarters Company Commander), assembled an ad hoc LSE, and prepared for deployment.²³ Davis “spent many late hours” with CPT James C. Yarbrough (1st SOCOM, G-3 Current Operations), getting the LSE “shoved into the TPFDL [Time-Phased Force Deployment List].”²⁴ The LSE was ‘bumped’ three times at Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina, but reached Panama on 24 December 1989 (D+4).²⁵

The twenty-five person LSE had a five-man command and control element, with CPT Davis serving as the acting battalion commander and CPT Olinger as the troop commander, and five separate four-man sections: medical, slingload and resupply, air movements, maintenance, and food service.²⁶ While attached to the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (CAB) for administration, the LSE was operationally controlled (OPCON) to Colonel Anthony H. Normand, Commander, Joint Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Task Group (JPOTG).²⁷ The LSE brought the 528th SOSB in Panama to thirty-seven personnel.

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528th Support Battalion

Logistical Support Element To Joint Task Force-South

Operating out of empty maintenance and supply buildings on Corozal West, near Panama City, the LSE provided a wide variety of combat service support services.²⁸ It supplied the 96th CAB with Meals-Ready-to-Eat (MREs) for distribution to a Panamanian hospital; conducted sick call for the 96th CAB and hundreds of displaced Panamanian civilians; repaired dozens of Ranger weapons and delivered Class V (ammunition). It arranged the delivery of Class I (food) and Class III (petroleum, oil, and lubricants) supplies to the 1st PSYOP Battalion, and provided maintenance, transportation, and contracting support.²⁹

LTC David L. Shaw, the 528th’s Commander, arrived a day or two after the LSE.³⁰ On 30 December 1989, he provided Major General James A. Guest, Commander, 1st SOCOM, at Fort Bragg, NC, with a detailed report showing that the 528th SOSB ‘Supported to the Utmost’ in Panama.³¹ While his soldiers proved ‘value added’ in Panama, inactivation plans moved forward.³²

But, it was not too late to save the 528th. After-action reviews highlighted the battalion contributions in Operations JUST CAUSE and PROMOTE LIBERTY, and demonstrated the value of dedicated ARSOF combat service support.³³ These led the Department of the Army to postpone inactivation of the 528th SOSB, and to direct U.S. Special Operations Command to study the problem of ARSOF logistics.³⁴ The 528th SOSB successes in Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM (1990-91) saved the battalion; inactivation was cancelled.³⁵

CPT Tim Davis, who was instrumental before and during JUST CAUSE, as a company commander and the Battalion S-3, took pride in a “very small and still young” battalion’s performance in Panama.³⁶ Years later, he still marveled at how “three Army captains [Olinger, Gargaro, and himself], on short notice, deployed two task-organized support elements, of which only one was planned and rehearsed, into a very ambiguous environment.” Their outstanding work, Davis noted, “changed the dialogue on Army support to SOF.”³⁷

Post Script: The 528th Special Operations Support Battalion was inactivated in 2005, and reorganized into the 528th Sustainment Brigade, which continues to support ARSOF “to the utmost.”

TAKEAWAYS

• Operations JUST CAUSE and PROMOTE LIBERTY validated the need for a dedicated ARSOF CSS capability
• The 528th Support Battalion’s contribution to JUST CAUSE/PROMOTE LIBERTY was both carefully planned and rehearsed (the FARP), and completely improvised (the LSE); but both elements accomplished their mission
• Despite being undermanned and relatively inexperienced, the 528th’s outstanding performance in Panama convinced the Army to reconsider inactivating the unit 

CHRISTOPHER E. HOWARD

Christopher E. Howard served four years in the U.S. Army before earning an MA in History from Appalachian State University. He worked as a Psychological Operations training specialist at USAJFKSWCS before joining the USASOC History Office in June 2018. His research is focused on the history of ARSOF sustainment and support.

BACKGROUND OF LOUDSPEAKER 
TEAMS IN PANAMA

by Jared M. Tracy, PhD 

When Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega nullified democratic elections in May 1989, U.S. President George H.W. Bush ordered an additional 1,900 troops to Panama to protect U.S. citizens and property.¹ Among them were three Fort Bragg-based 1st Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Battalion (POB) loudspeaker teams, comprising a nine-man detachment.² Over the ensuing months, 4th PSYOP Group (POG) soldiers rotated in and out of this detachment, which supported U.S. exercises and helped defuse Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF) and Dignity Battalion (DIGBAT)-fueled protests using pre-recorded tapes and ‘on-the-spot’ messaging.³ This provided 4th POG soldiers with experience in and familiarity with Panama.

However, the need for greater tactical loudspeaker involvement became obvious as plans for U.S. military intervention accelerated after the failed PDF coup against Noriega on 3 October 1989. Lieutenant General (LTG) Carl W. Stiner, Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps and later Joint Task Force (JTF)-South, had directed that PSYOP loudspeaker teams accompany CONUS-based assault forces “to support combat operations and make effective broadcast appeals to PDF/DIGBAT elements to cease fighting, and [warn] civilians away from dangerous conflictive areas.”⁴ By his orders, and in accordance with contemporary doctrine, there was to be at least one two-man loudspeaker team per battalion.

Colonel (COL) Anthony H. Normand, Commander, 4th POG, and Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Dennis P. Walko, Commander, 1st POB, had been involved with contingency planning for months, and directed the development of products on a ‘need-to-know’ basis. However, Stiner’s directive placed them in a bind: there were not enough loudspeaker teams in the predominantly Spanish-speaking, U.S. Southern Command-aligned 1st POB. According to Army Field Manual 33-1: Psychological Operations (1987), each full-strength POB would have three PSYOP companies, each with one Audio-Visual (A/V) Platoon, commanding eight 2-3 man loudspeaker teams.⁵ In theory, 1st POB could field twenty-four loudspeaker teams and systems for Panama, assuming that it was at full-strength and had no other missions. However, this was unrealistic given the XVIII Airborne Corps requirement for numbers of loudspeaker teams.

Operational plans, fine-tuned as D-Day (20 December 1989) approached, called for roughly 20-24 loudspeaker teams. One such plan was as follows:

• 3 for Task Force (TF) RED-Tango (1/75th Ranger Regiment [+]) 
• 3 for TF RED-Romeo (2/75th Ranger Regiment [+]) 
• 9 for TF PACIFIC (HQ, 82nd Airborne Division [ABD]; 1st Brigade, 82nd ABD [+]) 
• 1 for TF WHITE (SEAL Team 4) 
• 1 for TF GATOR (4th Battalion, 6th Mechanized Infantry Regiment [+]) 
• 1 for TF BLACK (3-7th Special Forces Group [+]) 
• 1 for a Special Operations team 
• Remaining 1st POB teams (in Panama since May 1989) for in-country forces⁶

Since 1st POB did not have enough teams to cover its USSOUTHCOM commitment and a Panama contingency, personnel from the other 4th POG battalions (6th POB, 8th POB, and 9th POB) had to support the mission, despite having different regional alignments and language capabilities.⁷

Major (MAJ) Robert W. Caspers, Executive Officer (XO) of the U.S. Central Command-aligned 8th POB, recalls the preparations prior to D-Day. It began in the early fall as “as contingency planning for an exercise or a possible operation was really ginning up. We side-saddled with the 1st [POB] representatives, who were, of course, the regional experts in the area to help plan PSYOP support to the corps operation.” Direct 8th POB involvement at XVIII Airborne Corps planning meetings “was a little sporadic . . . At times they only wanted the regional representative there; that having priority, for obvious reasons, in terms of going into a specific geographical area.”⁸

8th POB planners prepared for “a very generic operation” due to the prevalence of “very restricted information.” They knew that loudspeaker teams were the priority, and therefore had “both the people and the equipment required (both the man-packed and the vehicular systems) ready to move on a relatively short notice to anywhere. . . [W]e ended up with more equipment ready to go than actually went.”⁹ On D-Day, the 8th POB contribution was three High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) mounted with 450-watt, AN/UIH-6A loudspeakers, and seventeen personnel with a 250-watt, AN-UIH-6 loudspeaker for each team.

PSYOP units outside of 1st POB scrambled to place “at least one Spanish speaker with pretty good fluency with each team.” First, they sometimes found Spanish speakers from the combat units that they supported. For instance, one detachment containing 6th and 8th POB soldiers had ‘borrowed military manpower’ from 1/504th Parachute Infantry Regiment (PIR) for this purpose (but only after combat operations had started). Second, they occasionally tasked soldiers of Hispanic heritage within their own unit, but with no PSYOP background, to serve on loudspeaker teams. For example, 8th POB employed Supply Specialists and other Military Occupational Specialties as loudspeaker team members. And finally, 4th POG provided pre-recorded tapes in Spanish to all deploying teams to help bridge the language gap. This is the ‘big picture’ behind the employment of tactical loudspeaker teams during Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama, a limited amount of which was actually known to the soldiers and Non-commissioned Officers (NCOs) themselves.

NOTE
This article is part of our series on Operation JUST CAUSE. For a background on Special Operations’s involvement in JUST CAUSE, read The Path to War in Panama.