Vietnam: The Tactics and Techniques of Counter-Insurgency Operations”
Instead of Vietnam being fought as a classic COIN operation, it would be fought as a conventional war. There were some early successful programs such as the CIDG and CAP that could have served as the basis for a COIN strategy. However, U.S. military leadership did not follow through with these programs and it led to Vietnam being becoming a failed COIN campaign. During the war, the U.S. military had opportunities to fight this war differently, using a COIN strategy that followed the British model from Malaya.
Westmoreland thought he understood and believed he could win.
The inability of the U.S. to properly link the tactical, operational, and strategic applications of COIN in Vietnam ultimately led to the defeat of U.S. strategic objectives.. tactics and operations were not the problem . The real problem was that the building strategy was not compatible with a largely tactical COIN approach. Operationally, COIN was ignored in favor Of big unit operations directed at the North Vietnamese army. According to historian Douglas Porch, “The errors were made on a much higher level. The American military seriously underestimated the difficulties involved in dealing with the enemy forces. . . . In short, American leaders, both civilian and military, committed a strategic blunder that has brought many Generals to grief: they chose the wrong battlefield.” Vincent Scott King
LCDR, United States Navy
Overall Concept of Operations
Paper Prepared by the Task Force in Vietnam1
Saigon, January 10, 1962.
OUTLINE PLAN OF COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS
The concept of counterinsurgency operations envisions combined use of political, economic, psychological, military and paramilitary efforts to maintain security and government control and support where they still largely exist (white areas) and to restore them in areas where they have broken down to a greater or lesser extent (red and pink areas).
For purposes of definition a red area is considered one where the VC operate with virtual impunity, enjoy the support, voluntary or not, of the populace, and are susceptible of expulsion only through a major military effort. A pink area is one in which the VC and the GVN are competing for dominance and in which, for example, the VC may control by night and the GVN by day. In white areas the GVN by and large exercises normal control and VC activities are mostly harassments rather than more significant actions.
It is clear that in each and every province the gamut of security runs from white (at least in the area of the provincial capital) through pink to red. It is also clear that the type of counterinsurgency operations conducted will differ substantially, depending upon the degree of security in a given area.
The main considerations which should govern the priority of counterinsurgency operations are the following: 1.Every effort should be made to keep existing white areas white through appropriate political, economic, psychological and paramilitary measures. Military forces should not be diverted for use in white areas, but effective paramilitary forces are essential for maintaining security in those areas.2.Simultaneously, to extend security control from white to pink and red areas in application of the amoeba principle, combined political, economic, psychological, military and paramilitary efforts should be mounted on a carefully coordinated, phased basis in successive selected geographical areas. Flexibility is necessary in the choice of these areas.3.At the same time constant pressure should be maintained (essentially by military means) on the Viet Cong in other pink and red areas in order to keep them off balance, and psychological/civic action efforts should be carried out to convince the populace in these other areas that the Government is still aware of their existence. Gradually these areas would become the targets for major coordinated, phased actions of the type outlined in 2, above.
2. Operational Control and Coordination
Planning, control and coordination of all counterinsurgency operations (whether in white, pink or red areas) are a key to success. Policy should be made by the national-level Internal Security Council under the direction of the President. Execution of this policy through planning, controlling and coordinating the combined political, economic, [Page 19]psychological, military and paramilitary operations should be performed by a Central Director of Plans and Operations under the Internal Security Council. The Secretary of State for the Presidency could serve as this official provided he is relieved of other functions.
Security committees should be established at the regional, provincial and district levels, to insure thorough coordination at all stages of operations. These committees will consist of the appropriate officials at each level responsible for military and civil affairs.
3. Military Counterinsurgency Operations (see MAAG paper on “The Tactics and Techniques of Counter-Insurgency Operations”2 for description of military counterinsurgency operations).
4. Political, Economic and Psychological Counterinsurgency Operations
Political, socio-economic and psychological counterinsurgency measures at the local and village level will vary in nature depending upon the degree of security in a given area. These measures are spelled out in Annex B, and are summarized below.
In the political field they include steps to improve the compensation, selection and training of village and hamlet officials; a continued training program for district officials; and the establishment of advisory councils of notables at the village level. These steps appear practical only in white and pink areas, and can be extended to red areas only as they are made whiter.
In the socio-economic field expansion and acceleration of regular village-level programs in areas now white or light pink or which become so as a result of military operations should be conducted in order to demonstrate to the people that the Government offers them real hope for improvement of their living standards. This program should be designed to give each and every village a basic minimum of government-established facilities. The aim should be to do this within a matter of weeks, not years. This program should be executed through the regular economic and social ministries of the GVN down through the provinces and districts. At the top a Cabinet subcommittee would provide for coordination, and at the bottom civilian civic action teams would assist village officials.
In addition, certain special programs would be useful in areas where regular programs cannot operate. These special programs include the rural reconstruction teams now operating under the control of the Ministry of Civic Action, special military task forces consisting [Page 20]of military civic action and psychological warfare teams and protecting troops, similar “hit-and-run” civic action operations by the Ministry of Civic Action, and a special impact flying-doctor program.
In the information field the military psychological warfare forces should be responsible in red and dark pink areas because of the protection required by operating units. This would parallel military responsibility for civic action in the same areas. On the other hand, information activities in existing white or light pink areas and in areas where security has been restored should be handled by the civilian agencies of the GVN. Civilian information specialists should operate in conjunction with civic action specialists working on the breakthrough program at the village level since the most credible information will be that based on actual accomplishment.
5. Time Phasing of Counterinsurgency Operations
Major phased, coordinated actions aimed at restoration of security in red and pink areas will center around military operations, but will also require plans and operations in the political, psychological, economic and paramilitary fields (see Annex C for detailed outline). Those actions against any given red and/or pink target area can be visualized in three successive phases: preparatory, military, and follow-up. Careful coordination of all aspects of the action—political, socio-economic, psychological, military and paramilitary—is required at each phase to insure that military effort will not be wasted.
Maintenance of security in white areas will also require coordinated action (see Annex D for detailed outline). In these areas the focus should be on providing village and hamlet protection through paramilitary action and helping the villagers to improve their standard of living through socio-economic action. Political and information action should be closely related to these two programs. All of these activities should be executed forthwith and simultaneously if white areas are to be kept white.
6. Geographical Phasing of Counterinsurgency Operations
It is essential to preserve as white areas those areas which are still relatively white, and simultaneous action should be taken in all such areas. This should include, as a minimum, all areas adjacent to provincial capitals, most district seats, and the lowlands area of Central Viet-Nam.
Concomitantly major actions aimed at the restoration of security in red and pink areas through the application of the amoeba concept should be initiated on a selected, successive basis (see Annex E). First priority for such action should be given to those areas which are essential to the continued existence of the Government of Viet-Nam. [Page 21]To preserve the national entity it may be necessary to give priority to areas which by themselves do not contribute materially to the over-all strength of Viet-Nam, but which are controlled by the VC as potential areas from which to attack. In determining geographical priorities for preserving the base of government and eliminating the treat to security through application of the amoeba concept, several factors will need to be considered (population density, economic importance, area strength of the Viet Cong, suitability to isolation from Viet Cong, etc.). It is believed that on balance first priority should be given to the provinces which surround Saigon to assure a secure primary base for further GVN operations. The second priority should be given to the remaining Southern provinces because of their population, their importance as the rice basket of Viet-Nam and the greater difficulty confronting the VC in that area in reinforcing their strength through large scale infiltration from North Viet-Nam. The red and pink areas in the coastal low lands north of Saigon to the 17th parallel should also be given simultaneous second priority since this area includes a large segment of the population and controls the major route of land communication to the North.
This does not mean that other areas are to be neglected. Simultaneous action will continue toward the establishment of a border force aimed at reducing infiltration. Concurrently, major military actions will be taken in other areas against Viet Cong targets of opportunity as they arise, since it is necessary to keep the Viet Cong from consolidating their hold in any area. However, phased across-the-board military, political, socio-economic, and psychological action would be concentrated in the first instance on the area surrounding Saigon.
- Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 84,
Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Harkins) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff1
Saigon, November 5, 1963—2:06 a.m.
MAC J-3 8607. Summary Evaluation South Vietnam.
F. Effect of coup on RVNAF and their operations against VC.1.There has been no significant change in Saigon troop dispositions since coup. VNAF support missions and small unit actions continue at nearly normal pace while bn and larger operations remain in a slump as the senior ARVNcommanders remain preoccupied with political reorganization, and ARVN continues police chores. Expect by weekend CMD units should replace majority of III Corps units in Saigon.2.Surge of cooperativeness toward US personnel continues, although too early to judge extent of its staying power. AOC and JOC personnel report improved responsiveness in counterparts. I Corps sr advisor today reports increased spontaneity of information from ARVN.3.Decision to maintain VN special forces, to delimit functions, to subordinate command to JGS and to place deployed elms under full command of Corps Cmdrs. This will be boon to unity of effort and decentralization of control. Details to be reported separately.4.CG 2 ADIV reported today that VNAF restrictions on aircraft armaments lifted.5.New leaders can be expected to support strat hamlet operations as pillar of strategy; and Big Minh repeats his awareness of their socioeconomic importance.6.Top commanders stress desire to get on with war at full throttle as soon as govt formed and launched. No plans for increased tempo for opns yet forthcoming.
G. Steps Being Taken To Form New Government.1. Nothing definitive since last report. Committee still in throes of organization; negotiations with top civilian leadership are reportedly advancing slowly.2.From this point forward, Embassy will probably have fuller info on organizational steps and progress. .Reshuffling of personnel at provinces and district level continues.
Telegram From the Embassy in Franceto the Department of State1
Paris, November 5, 1963, 8 p.m.
2223. Ref: Deptel 2333.2 I told De Gaulle that it was our general intention to recognize the Vietnamese Government when it was formed and provided they did not take action which would be inimical in the near future. De Gaulle said that of course France had never supported the Diem regime because they had not shown the proper attitude towards French interests there and while regretting the assassination of Diem and his brother they did not have any great regrets for the regime. The U.S. on the other hand had continually supported Diem until the very end when he had lost our confidence. De Gaulle then gave his view of the future of the present regime along typically De Gaullelines. He said the military were in power, the military meant war, this would mean that they would intensify their war efforts and would press us for increased assistance, demands which we would find hard to resist. He saw very little hope in the Indo-Chinese situation and attempted obliquely to place some blame on the U.S. for coming into the south while China and Russia were coming in from the north. I pointed out to the General however that we would have been perfectly willing to live with a divided Vietnam but that the Communists were the ones who had started the current war and that it was either a question of helping Vietnam resist these attacks or letting the entire country go Communist. I asked the General whether he thought a divided Vietnam was worse than a divided Korea. He replied that the division of Korea meant that there was no solution there, to which I agreed but said that there was at least an accommodation that kept the peace. He repeated his prophecy that the present government [Page 569]would have to be more active in the war and that this would eventually make it unpopular with the people as had been the case with Diem.
Comment: I did not feel it wise to raise with De Gaulle our feeling that the change in regime would end any question of neutralization. I did not think this added anything to the discussion and he certainly gave me no evidence of any interest in the question.
Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Harkins) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Taylor)1
Saigon, November 5, 1963—5:17 p.m.
MAC JOO 8625. Gen Don called on me this morning. This is the first time I’ve seen him since Adm Felt’s departure last Friday.2 We discussed the recent past and future plans. I said I had heard so many conflicting stories on the coup and on the demise of Diem and Nhu I would like to get his version.
He said as far as he could tell, Diem and Nhu left the Palace Friday evening about 2200. They went in some Chinese civilian’s car to a house in Cholon. Though the Generals had talked to Diem and Nhu during the evening, neither of the brothers let on they were no longer in the Palace. JGSintelligence knew the house in Cholon and the two were arrested there, Saturday, a.m.
They were placed in an M-133 for security and for delivery to the JGS compound. Upon arrival at the compound it was discovered they were dead. The Generals were truly grievous over this because they had promised safe conduct. Don did not explain what had happened, whether it was suicide or someone had not got the word.
He is holding the coffins for later shipment to Hue for burial.
I asked about Ngo Dinh Can, the late President’s brother in Hue. Don said I Corps troops were protecting him and he was considering bringing him to Saigon for safekeeping. I asked about the graves [Page 570]reported being found in Can’s enclave. Don smiled and said they had nothing to do with Can at all. Don knows Can very well and, while I Corps Commander, visited him many times. He said he knew where the graves were and that they had been there for years. They belong to many families who lived in and around the area even before it became Can’s residence.
Don went on to say he received a call from Los Angeles from Mrs. Nhu this morning. That the Madame went into a tirade, saying they were all fools-murderers and bought by the Americans-that the people would never follow Big Minh or the military. Don disclaimed any connection with the demise of Diem and Nhu-also that he was not bought off. He told the Madame if she were here she would see for herself the changed attitude of the people. She asked about her children. Don told her they departed last night, but could not tell her when they would arrive in Rome. Incidentally, they must be there by now as they made good connections with a jet flight out of Bangkok last night.
As to the present—they were still making changes in command—also in some province chiefs (I’ll report them when firm). I reminded him many of the province chiefs had done well and suggested not changing them all just for change’s sake.
He admitted he and Big Minh considered the possibility of a counter coup—but are not too concerned as they pretty well know who is involved.
I asked about Col Tung, former Commander of the Spec Forces. Don said Tung was with the Generals when the coup started. He said he didn’t know what has happened to him since.
Don feels he can get most of the troops out of the city by this weekend and as soon as the changes in command are established, he will be ready to prosecute the war. He said he as Minister of Defense and Chairman of the JGS could see no difficulties in getting orders carried out.
The Special Forces now under command of Maj Gen Nghiem, former Commander of III and I Corps and who now also commands the parachute brigade, will be directly under the command of the JGS. Further, when working in a corps of S.F.’s would be under command of the corps commander concerned.
He intends to disarm the Republican Youth except those who are hamlet militia, and also Madame Nhu’s Women’s Army. He hopes to steer them to more productive fields—didn’t explain the productive part.[Page 571]
Don said Gen Dinh, presently III Corps Commander, would probably be Minister of Security. Wearing this hat he would command the National Police and perhaps the Gendarmerie. However, he was considering bringing the Gendarmerie back into the army as most of the officers and NCO’s originally came from the army.
All in all, if, I repeat, if things work out, we’ll have a more orderly set-up-and a more streamlined chain of command, fewer para-military organizations under arms and not as much concern with political interference which caused delays and in some cases changed missions and orders.
I reminded Don that the courage and determination shown by the coup’s battalions in overcoming the Presidential Brigade of 1,500 men, if displayed in fighting a VC battalion of three to four hundred men, could make short order of the remaining VCin SVN.
All this might add up to a much earlier ETA for getting counterinsurgency in SVN under control.
I feel sure this will be true if I can get the show on the road.
Regards.
Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Felt) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff1
Honolulu, November 5, 1963—7:45 p.m.
1. In conversation with Gen Don last Friday morning, he emphasized his contention to get control of the Special Forces. I note ref C reports decision has been made to maintain the Special Forces but to delimit their functions and to subordinate command to the JGS and corps commanders.B.During same conversation with Gen Don, proficiency of Gen Cao was discussed and I got definite impression that a change would be made in order to give better leadership to the accelerated military effort to be undertaken in IV Corps. Ref D reports that Gen Cao has been relieved by B Gen Nhon.C.It important, of course, for combat units brought into Saigon during coup to be returned to their field duties at [of] fighting the war. My staff estimates that there is an equivalent of one and one-half divisions in Saigon area not counting troops from Quang Trung training center and Thu Duc. Ref C reports no significant change in Saigon troop disposition since the coup and that situation should start to improve by the coming weekend.D.VNAF had been operating under restrictions as to armament load. Ref C reports restrictions have been lifted.E.We hope to see soon increased tempo of operations in the field and implementation of intent as stated orally by the gens.F. It particularly important to obtain whole-hearted support of civilian leaders and institutions.G.Under Diem regime, restrictions were placed against military psyops directed toward population in support of civic action program. We can expect these restrictions to be lifted.H.It encouraging to note that police in Saigon are back on the job.I.Ref D gives preliminary report on province chiefs. I would expect new arrangement to destroy parallel system established by Diem whereby province chiefs could switch hats and bypass the corps commanders and the JGS.J.I think it important to determine the future of Nhu’s Republican Youth Organization.K.We can assume that Nhu had an organization which was penetrating the military. Counter-coup planning would emanate from these infiltrators. They should be weeded out.
Telegram From the Department of Stateto the Embassy in Vietnam1
Washington, November 6, 1963—7:50 p.m.
746. Eyes only for Ambassador Lodge from the President. Reference your 949.2 Your message makes a fitting ending to the weekly [Page 580]reports which you have sent in response to our 576,3 and from now on I think we should be in touch as either of us feels the need, but without this particular process of continuous watching on a specific set of questions.
Your own leadership in pulling together and directing the whole American operation in South Vietnam in recent months has been of the greatest importance, and you should know that this achievement is recognized here throughout the Government.
Now that there is a new Government which we are about to recognize, we must all intensify our efforts to help it deal with its many hard problems. As you say, while this was a Vietnamese effort, our own actions made it clear that we wanted improvements, and when these were not forthcoming from the Diem Government, we necessarily faced and accepted the possibility that our position might encourage a change of government. We thus have a responsibility to help this new government to be effective in every way that we can, and in these first weeks we may have more influence and more chance to be helpful than at any time in recent years.
I am particularly concerned myself that our primary emphasis should be on effectiveness rather than upon external appearances. If the new Government can limit confusion and intrigue among its members, and concentrate its energies upon the real problems of winning the contest against the Communists and holding the confidence of its own people, it will have met and passed a severe test. This is what we must help in, just at it was ineffectiveness, loss of popular confidence, and the prospect of defeat that were decisive in shaping our relations to the Diem regime.
I am sure that much good will come from the comprehensive review of the situation which is now planned for Honolulu,4and I look forward to your own visit to Washington so that you and I can review the whole situation together and face to face.
With renewed appreciation for a fine job, John F. Kennedy.
Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency Station in Saigon to the Agency1
Saigon, November 16, 1963—12:50 p.m.1.Have not seen Halberstam article but I believe that the important matter Ambassador Lodge wishes to talk about in Washington is the replacement of General Harkins.2.The Vietnamese junta members certainly do consider General Harkins as a symbol of the old order and it is perhaps significant that there is no great depth of contact between U.S. military and the key junta figures. Advisers still have official contact on their military affairs but the Generals are clearly moving in the direction of occupying themselves with the problems of running the country, for which they do not look for advice from the U.S. military. With respect to General Harkins himself, during the pre-coup period, the junta leaders did not feel they could confide in him without fear of repetition to the Palace.MACV as a whole, and specifically General Harkins, were very much caught off base by the coup, in good part because, as he has many times stated, he believed such a development would be unfortunate. Most dramatic example was the briefing given Admiral Felt who departed the very morning of the coup with MACV assertions that no coup would take place. With respect to his assessment of the war, we are on less clear ground as he was talking generally about military and strategic hamlet progress and the opposite view was talking mainly about political dissatisfaction in the cities. Certainly General Harkins’ emphasis has been that of a good soldier resolved to take his objective and not being easily deterred by evidence of difficulty or opposition. However, this emphasis on progress and strengthening of the Vietnamese has somewhat obscured the fact that the enemy has only been contained, not reduced in the short term, although containment in this subversive war should lead gradually to reduction.3.With respect to General Harkins’ position vis-a-vis Ambassador Lodge, it is quite clear that the Richardsoncase was only the overture to the opera. Ambassador Lodgehas many positive qualities of political sagacity, courage and meticulous insistence on following specific Washington directives, but the fact is that he is running very much a vest-pocket operation and not a country team or total American effort. This method of operation puts a premium on subordinates who can operate on a tactical level rather than as co-workers in the strategic vineyard. The relationship of course has been exacerbated by the incident in which Harkins was telling Don that it was not the time to [Page 603]run a coup when the Ambassador was trying to support a Vietnamese effort in this direction, by Harkins’ personal intervention with Thuan to dissuade him from resigning on the basis of a very private and sensitive conversation Thuan had with D’Orlandi which was reported to Lodge, and the fact that Harkins was kept out of the coup planning in response to Washington’s instructions to Lodge that this be discussed only with CIA. Putting the U.S. effort and the American community into an integrated bundle is made no easier by the absence of any working system of policy coordination, since top level country team meetings are seldom held. On the military side the usual multiplicity of staff and command levels and the emphasis on the statistical approach separate General Harkins from the highly personalized political activities of Lodge.4.In summary, the junta members have no great love for General Harkins but probably would be content to see him remain on purely technical military level. The Vietnamese themselves are groping around the organizational, bureaucratic and political jungles, trying to turn their convictions and their popular support into specific ways of strengthening the country against its enemy. Ambassador Lodge has established a highly positive image in their eyes and in the eyes of many Vietnamese for his obvious support of the revolution. How this image will bear up against their inevitable day-to-day negotiations and collaboration with the working level American community remains to be seen. If the approach is to be the one outlined by Ambassador Lodge however it will be clear that the members of the community will have to learn to adjust to his style or be replaced.
Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency Station in Saigon to the Agency1
Saigon, November 19, 1963.
2540. 1. General Don, accompanied by Generals Kim and Khiem, stated 19 November that Gen Big Minh had invited General Phoumi pay an incognito and discreet visit to Saigon at end November. Don believes it particularly essential establish good relationships with Laos in order permit a collaborative effort along Lao-Vietnam border against Viet Cong lines of supply and communication. He said that Laotians do not have sufficient force to cover this area themselves and are quite willing and anxious that Vietnamese assist but Vietnamese wish to be correct in clearing any such activity with Laos. Vietnamese would use Special Forces units in civilian clothes as regular army would not handle matter discreetly enough. Don said they had high regard for General Phoumi and look forward to fruitful relationships with him.
2. Following points were made in reply to General Don: a.Importance of including Souvanna Phouma in any contacts with Laos. We believe, and General Don agreed, that neutralists and General Phoumi forces working very well together and it important to maintain this close collaboration in interests of free world.b.Importance of maintaining some form of balance in Laos rather than taking too vigorous a position, as open conflict invites major DRV participation and although we are working on it, up to now we have not built adequate strength on non-Communist side to withstand an onslaught.c.Within these limits we concur with desirability of continuing and stepping up discreetly handled Vietnamese operations in cross border area of same nature we trained for and initiated in 1961 and early 1962, suspended during period immediately after Geneva Accords of 1962 and have endeavored to resume in recent months with first results just coming in.[Page 608]
4. Comment: Generals were most confiding and open in expressing their ideas but they anticipate that they will be treated with discretion. Thus request most limited distribution this information and non-exposure outside American channels in order encourage Generals continue keep open a frank and honest mutual channel of information and suggestion.
5. This message passed to Ambassador Lodge and General Harkins. Suggest addressees pass to local Ambassadors on limited basis.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 S VIE