Tora Bora: An Opportunity Lost

Tora Bora: An Opportunity Lost

From The United States Army in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) October 2001–September 2005

As the Kandahar campaign ended, intelligence indicated that Taliban and al-Qaeda leadersand fighters seemed to be moving toward Tora Bora.123 Tora Bora had previously sheltered the mujahideen against the Soviets and since the late 1990s, had been improved by al-Qaeda as a training area and refuge. The complex consisted of a series of defensive positions and cavesdug into the steep sides of the mountains and along the valley floor. The caves held large stocksof food, weapons, ammunition, and other supplies stockpiled to enable al-Qaeda to make a stand against a larger force.124

The valley was 9.5 kilometers wide, 10 kilometers long, and surrounded by 12,000- to 15,000-foot mountains that formed a concave bowl facing northeast. The primary avenue ofapproach into the area was from the town of Pachir Agam south through the Milawa Valley that joined the Tora Bora Valley at its eastern end. Most of the al-Qaeda positions were spread alongthe northern wall of the valley. Because the high mountains and steep terrain made CAS much less effective, any successful assault against the enemy would have to include ground troops.125The valley was also only 15 kilometers from the Pakistan border. Any al-Qaeda terrorists that wished to escape the valley could walk along one of several possible escape routes to reach the border, a journey that would take approximately 17 hours. Although the Coalition could block these escape routes by placing forces in blocking positions, the nearness of Tora Bora to the Pakistani border made that risky. The Coalition did not want those elements to mistakenly crossthe border or otherwise come into conflict with Pakistani troops.

Intelligence from various sources indicated that the population in the Spin Ghar region of Nangarhar province was sympathetic to al-Qaeda. With that organization’s presence in thearea for many years, a large proportion of the local tribesmen had become beneficiaries ofemployment and trade with Osama bin Laden’s group. Additionally, the sources indicated thatal-Qaeda and Taliban strength was significant, but reports were not definitive and only offeredestimates of between 300 and 3,000 enemy troops in the region.

More important to the Coalition leadership were the intelligence reports that suggested binLaden and other senior al-Qaeda leaders were taking refuge in the Tora Bora Valley.126 With the evidence now available, it is almost certain that at least Osama bin Laden was at Tora Boraand made good his escape as the Coalition attack culminated in mid-December. Several official government and former government sources affirm this view.127 Additionally, in early 2005, the Department of Defense (DOD) released a document from a purported eyewitness, a detainee at Guantanamo Bay, who had fought under bin Laden during the Afghan-Soviet War and claimed that he helped the al-Qaeda leader escape from Tora Bora in December 2001.128

Given the importance of Tora Bora as a refuge for both al-Qaeda leadership and the remnants of their forces in Afghanistan, Coalition leaders began deliberating about the means of assault- ing the enemy redoubt. In keeping with the efforts to maintain a small footprint in the country,General Franks and his staff at CENTCOM sought Afghan allies for the fight. Moreover, thefact that the Coalition did not have the right type of conventional combat forces in the region made Afghan proxies more important. The opposition group forces that would ultimately team with the United States at Tora Bora were a collection of small local militias numbering approxi-mately 2,500 fighters that were grouped under the label “Eastern Alliance (EA).” The alli- ance was comprised of four anti-Taliban groups led by Commanders Hajji Qadir, Hajji Zahi, Mohammed Zaman Ghun Shareef, and Hazrat Ali. Only the last two leaders commanded asignificant force to put into the field, and the last, Ali, would emerge as the primary commanderat Tora Bora due to his connections with the NA. Ali had previously fought alongside Ahmad Shah Massoud and was considered to be the most loyal to the overall anti-Taliban effort.

Ali became the “security chief” of the EA, while Zaman was named the Jalalabad com- mander, but the two were rivals rather than friends.129 The majority of Ali’s men were ethnic Pashay, while Zaman’s men were Pashtun, thus the two groups disliked and distrusted each other. During the assault on Tora Bora, there were times when the two factions shot at eachother rather than at their Taliban and al-Qaeda foes and the fighters. The antipathy the leadersand their respective militias held for each other did not bode well for a successful outcome against a determined enemy.

On the Coalition side, CENTCOM had little to offer in the way of ground forces to help Ali and the others in their assault on Tora Bora. The 1st Battalion, 87th Infantry (1-87 IN), a part of the 10th Mountain Division’s force in the theater, was tied up with security missionsat K2, Mazar-e Sharif, and Bagram Airfield. The US conventional forces in the theater—the1st Battalion, 187th Infantry (1-187 IN), a unit that belonged to the 2d Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division, at Shahbaz Air Base in Pakistan and US Marine Task Force 58 that hadarrived at Kandahar Airfield in late November—were also busy with security tasks. Even hadthese forces been available, there were few aviation lift assets in Afghanistan making the pri- mary problem of transport into the Spin Ghar region essentially impossible to solve. Franks simply appeared not to have any ground forces inside CENTCOM’s area of responsibility to assist the EA.

However, once Coalition military leaders began receiving credible intelligence reportsoffering positive identification of enemy forces in the region, they began committing forces to the fight. In late November, Coalition airstrikes began hitting targets in the Spin Ghar, killingand wounding many of the enemy and wreaking destruction on their vehicles and facilities. Meanwhile, Mulholland, now armed with the evidence of a large al-Qaeda presence near Tora Bora, decided to send an ODA to develop the situation further. Coalition leaders had decided to rely on the SF/Afghan partnership that had worked so well elsewhere.

Arrival of ODA 572

As promised, Mulholland directed ODA 572, under the command of Master Sergeant Jefferson Davis, to Jalalabad on 2 December 2001 to link up with Hazrat Ali. The team soon found that forging a close relationship with Ali and other EA leaders at Tora Bora would bedifficult. First, Ali refused to wait for ODA 572’s arrival and the team discovered that he hadalready commenced operations without coordinating with US representatives. When MasterSergeant Davis finally linked up with Ali on 4 December at his headquarters near Pachir Agam,he and his team immediately ran into problems. Misunderstanding the role the ODA was to play, Ali demanded that the special operators directly participate in combat, a mission that ran contrary to their main roles of advising and coordinating air support. Because of the problems between ODA 572 and Ali, Mulholland ordered the team back to Jalalabad until the issues could be sorted out. After some additional negotiations and explanations with Ali, the ODA returned to Pachir Agam on 6 December.

The reappearance of ODA 572 also returned the CAS capability that would soon tip the scales in favor of the EA. With Ali’s concurrence, the ODA’s plan was to divide into two teams and each would establish an observation point (OP) from which to direct the CAS for Ali’s force. The air attacks would destroy, damage, or otherwise suppress the al-Qaeda positionsthereby allowing Ali’s men to advance through the Milawa Valley into the mouth of the Tora Bora Valley. There they would move against remaining pockets of resistance. On 7 Decemberone-half of ODA 572 set up an OP on the eastern ridgeline and commenced the airstrikes. The following day, the other half set up on the northwestern side of the valley and began operations.130

Until 8 December ODA 572 operated under the loose control of JSOTF-N. The following day, Task Force (TF) 11—a Coalition SOF organization focused on capturing or killing enemy leaders—arrived and took control of all Coalition operations in the area. Committed to the region by General Franks, TF 11 consisted of 50 elite American troopers as well as contingents from British SOF.131 While the new task force was not equivalent to an American infantry bat- talion, these troops could be used in close combat alongside Ali’s troops. The task force mis- sion, like that of the ODA, was to support Ali’s offensive and kill or capture as many al-Qaedaleaders and troops as it could find.

Soon after his arrival, the TF 11 commander conducted a reconnaissance of the al-Qaeda defenses and realized he was up against a strong opposition. On 10 December he decided to both reinforce the two ODA OPs with some of his troops and establish additional OPs farther forward. That afternoon Ali sent him word to send some SOF troops forward to support an impending attack. Two special operators were sent and the attack went forward. Around 1600 that day, some of Ali’s men reported that they had cornered Osama bin Laden. The TF commander immediately ordered all of his available force forward to locate, capture, or kill the al-Qaeda leader. However, the early dusk of Afghan winters in the mountains meant that TF 11 would not arrive at the reported area until after dark. Nonetheless, the men piled into trucks and sped forward.

Unfortunately, the TF commander then encountered a problem that had plagued the opera-tions from the beginning. En route to the specified location, TF 11’s convoy met Ali’s convoyon the road coming out of the valley. The EA commander had ceased operations for the night and had left the two TF 11 men who had accompanied him on the attack stranded and alone near the al-Qaeda positions. It was the holy month of Ramadan in the Muslim world and Ali’s men were going home to break their fast. Upon encountering the TF 11 convoy, Ali promised the American commander that he would turn around and reinforce the pursuit, but he did not follow through on this pledge.132 While the two stranded Soldiers were able to make their way back to safety, bin Laden made his escape.

One member of ODA 572 explained how the Ramadan holiday played a key role in thefight at Tora Bora:

One of the biggest problems you have when you work with forces like this—indigenous-type forces—is their logistic system. They don’t have a well-developed logistic system like we have. . . . Pretty much all their meals either had to be prepared straight from either raw materials or animals and what-not—cooked freshly right there for them. So a lot of the problems during the battle is, they’ll go battle all day. Then when they pull back, it’s not like a retreat they’re going from the enemy; it’s dinnertime. . . . Then the enemy moves back forward and reoccupies position. Then they got to go up there and try to retake it again.133

Another team member emphasized this problem, noting that the religious holiday exacerbated the situation, “Yes, it was a big, big problem because it was Ramadan at the time. They’re not eating or drinking, really, all day. When it’s their time to eat and drink, they want to eat and drink.”134

Early in the battle the ODA OPs would bring in CAS to destroy the Taliban and al-Qaeda positions. The bombardment would force the survivors to retreat; then Ali’s men would occupy the recently vacated ground. However, at night, the EA troops would pull back to eat and drink and the al-Qaeda forces would return to their original positions. The next day the process was repeated.135 Because of this pattern, the TF 11 commander decided to keep his force close to the front. He hoped that with his own men occupying terrain at night it would convince the Afghan commander to keep his troops forward after dark to hold the ground they had taken during the day.136 The effort did not immediately bear fruit.

Despite the slow pace that the EA approach required, enemy forces in the valley were increasingly under pressure and their positions were becoming less tenable each day. Much of this pressure was provided by the highly-accurate air support that was directed by the TF 11 Soldiers and the ODAs. On 10 and 11 December alone, the air controllers on these SOF teams called in airstrikes on al-Qaeda positions for 17 continuous hours.137

In reaction, some Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders attempted to use negotiations to extricate themselves. On the night of 11–12 December, al-Qaeda elements contacted Zaman and tried tonegotiate a cease-fire so they could surrender to the Afghan forces. The negotiations came as asurprise to the men of ODA 572. One staff sergeant on the team recalled:

One of the interpreters that we did work with—who we had with us all the time—came in and said, “Stop. No more bombs.” When he would do that, usu- ally it meant that General Ali’s troops were about to move forward again. But it turned out that we were like, “Why are we stopping for so long?” He’s like, “No, no. Don’t drop any more.” It turned out that one of the other commanders had rigged up a bargain, I guess, to receive a large surrender.138

When members of ODA 572 realized what was happening, they immediately attempted toend the cease-fire. According to one ODA member, the Taliban and al-Qaeda forces wanted to“lay down their weapons and then walk away,” which Afghan custom would have allowed.139Because the members of ODA 572 were certain that the forces at Tora Bora were al-Qaeda and that Osama bin Laden might be there as well, they considered conditional surrender unaccept-able. One noncommissioned officer (NCO) on the ODA recalled that there was only one typeof negotiation that would have been acceptable: “it’s a complete unconditional surrender, and [the Taliban and al-Qaeda forces] are processed as prisoners” by the United States.140

Once the American opposition became known, the cease-fire ended and Coalition forcesrenewed their effort to reduce the enemy positions at Tora Bora. In the minds of the American Soldiers in the region, however, this process was excruciatingly slow. Most alarming was that all the terrain taken by the combination of EA forces and CAS during the day was ceded back to al-Qaeda at night when the Afghan militia retreated to their bases lower in the valley. The constant retreat had one unintended advantage. Soldiers in TF 11, armed with night observa- tion and target acquisition equipment and powerful and accurate sniper weapons, became themasters of the night. With no friendly forces in the area after dark, the Tora Bora Valley and its accompanying slopes were a virtual free-fire zone and the dead bodies of al-Qaeda fighters carted off the field the next day in EA trucks were proof of the special operators’ lethality. Onlyon 14 December did the process change when American commanders convinced Ali to keep his men forward and occupy ground already seized.141 By this date, al-Qaeda forces had been severely mauled and were not able to defend this terrain.

The fighting continued at Tora Bora until 17 December. As the fighting concluded, the combat took on a brutal quality as al-Qaeda’s most dedicated fighters remained in the cavesto cover the retreat of their leadership. This resistance allowed large numbers of al-Qaeda andTaliban fighters, along with their leaders to slip over the high, snowy, passes of the Spin Gharinto Pakistan.

When hostilities ended in the valley, CENTCOM directed ODA 561 to travel to the val- ley on 20 December and begin searching the cave complexes that studded the mountains in and around Tora Bora to determine whether wounded or killed al-Qaeda leaders had been left behind. In the process, they found no evidence that any of the key al-Qaeda or Taliban leaders had been killed or wounded in the combat.142

With that team’s departure several days later, operations by US forces in the Tora Bora region essentially ended. Nevertheless, many questions remained and the most important of  these focused on how the combined American and Afghan force had allowed such a large con- tingent of enemy escape. The mission at Tora Bora had been to cut off and capture or kill large numbers of al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters, and the Coalition forces in the valley had achieved some success in this. Estimates had placed the number of enemy in the hundreds or perhaps thousands and Coalition operations had taken a large toll on these enemy formations. One SOF commander later estimated enemy killed in action (KIA) at 250, but he arrived on the field well into the fight.143 The JAWBREAKER team that was calling in airstrikes in the Milawa Valley was successfully engaging enemy troops with CAS almost 2 weeks earlier. EA forces had sharp engagements with the enemy even before ODA 572 arrived and that team began calling in airstrikes early on as well.

On the other hand, it is unlikely that as many as 1,000 enemy troops were killed, as some observers have estimated.144 Still, using the lower estimates of enemy KIA and given historicratios of wounded in action (WIA) to killed, another 750 fighters would have sustained some level of injury during the fight. Because of the harsh weather and sanitary conditions of theenvironment at that time, a number of these wounded men would have eventually succumbed to their wounds. In addition, Coalition forces accepted the surrender of a number of al-Qaedaand Taliban forces, but the exact figures remain unclear. These numbers offer an approximatetotal of 1,100 enemy KIA, WIA, and enemy prisoners of war (EPWs) as a conservative esti- mate of total enemy casualties. Even if the enemy forces in the Tora Bora region numberedas high as 3,000, the above casualty estimate is a significantly large percentage given historicaverages for losses in battle. It is even more impressive when one considers that few of theEA fighters and none of the US or British participants were lost in the fighting at Tora Bora. However, this estimate also suggests that as many as 1,500 fighters may have escaped to fight another day. Some of them likely made their way to the Shahi Kowt Valley in Paktia province and would fight Coalition forces again 3 months later.145

The actions at Tora Bora undoubtedly dealt a severe blow to those Taliban and al-Qaeda elements that remained active in Afghanistan after the fall of Kabul and other major Coalition successes that fall. As a result, operations in the valley were clearly not perceived as a victorybecause of the flight of so many enemy fighters and the likely escape of Osama bin Laden andother key leaders. The reasons for this incomplete success were myriad. Some observers have emphasized the lack of Coalition conventional forces that might have closed down the exit routes to Pakistan. Clearly, in December 2001, CENTCOM did not have combat forces in the theater equipped and trained to conduct sustained operations in the wintry elevations of the Spin Ghar Mountains. Even if these forces had been available, their use in blocking positions to seal the passes into Pakistan was probably unrealistic. The problems associated with inserting and supplying multiple battalion-sized units, spread out across mountainous terrain, were almost insurmountable. As noted earlier, there were not yet enough Army airlift assets in theater, for example, to put a force of this size into position and resupply them on a regular basis. Negotiating with the Pakistani Government over the role of these forces, operating so close to the border, would have added more complications.

An additional explanation of the incomplete success at Tora Bora was the nature of the EA and its relations with US forces. The rivalry between the various militia groups createdrifts in the alliance and made command and control difficult. In fact, diplomacy became theprimary means of persuading the Afghan chieftains to work together and move toward a common purpose. Furthermore, at some points in the battle, diplomatic skills were not enough to keep the alliance together and the individual leaders began acting unilaterally. Given the poor relations between the two primary commanders, Ali and Zaman, it is somewhat surprising that operations went as well as they did.

Although the Tora Bora operation was tarnished by the lost opportunity to capture or kill Osama bin Laden, the overall Coalition campaign in southern and eastern Afghanistan to oust the Taliban and evict al-Qaeda from the country must be considered a success. The plan to work with indigenous anti-Taliban Afghan groups to drive the Taliban from Kabul and Kandahar worked brilliantly. Indigenous leaders like Hamid Karzai proved to be critical not only for the achievement of American political goals in Afghanistan, but also for the ODA team that worked with Karzai at the tactical level. Although Karzai did not have much military acumen, his political savvy and intimate knowledge of the country and culture was a critical enabler that made the campaign much more feasible. Karzai readily admitted that he could not handle the military aspects of the campaign and wisely turned that element over to members of ODA 574 who essentially took command of Karzai’s opposition group. The ODA leader, in turn, accepted Karzai’s assessment of the political landscape and the two achieved a resounding victory at Tarin Kowt, which led to the fall of the Kandahar and, arguably, sowed the seeds of the Taliban’s demise. ODA 583’s experience with Gul Agha Sherzai proved to be equally successful. Only at Tora Bora did this form of unconventional warfare (UW) not prove to be as fruitful.

Coalition practices and technology were not the only explanation for the success in the south, east, and north of Afghanistan in the fall and early winter of 2001. The leadership, orga- nization, and tactics of the Taliban and its al-Qaeda allies were equally important. Because the Afghan-Soviet War and the resultant civil war devastated Afghanistan, the country possessedalmost no production infrastructure or modern and financial institutions. Thus, the Taliban could not adequately outfit and equip their forces with modern tanks, artillery, or ground-to-airmissiles that might have beaten back Coalition ground and air forces.

Despite this, the Taliban government in October and November 2001 initially attempted todefend fixed positions using its antiquated weaponry. Because the Taliban and al-Qaeda troopslargely manned these static sites, they were highly vulnerable to extremely accurate CAS sor- ties. Thus, they suffered huge casualties in terms of men killed or captured and equipment destroyed.

The Taliban and al-Qaeda were actually better suited to unconventional tactics rather than the conventional operations they tried to conduct. Once driven out of or otherwise freed fromfixed positions, they would become a more potent fighting force. No longer would they have towait for attacks against them; they could seize the initiative, at least locally, deciding where andwhen to attack. This transformation of the Taliban and al-Qaeda from conventional fighters tothe unconventional began at Tora Bora. Bin Laden, Mullah Omar, and their military command- ers realized that they could not stand up to US military might and melted into the mountains of southern and eastern Afghanistan and the tribal regions of Pakistan to escape. In these sanctuar- ies they would begin to reconstitute and eventually sally forth to strike US and Coalition forces then disappear back into the mountains to blend in with the local population.

Before that reconstitution was complete, however, there remained one more sanctuary inAfghanistan that held a large number of al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters. That refuge was in the Shahi Kowt Valley in Paktia province to the southwest of Tora Bora. Many of the enemy’s toughest fighters, including some that had survived the Coalition’s assault on Tora Bora, beganassembling there in January and February 2002. The Coalition’s effort to eliminate these forces would lead to the biggest engagement of the campaign in Afghanistan.