The Battle of Suoi Tre:Viet Cong Infantry Attack on a FirebaseEnds in Slaughter
The Battle of Suoi Tre:
Viet Cong Infantry Attack on a Firebase
Ends in Slaughter When Armor Arrives
by First Sergeant Christopher P. Worick
It was like the 10 o’clock late show…”
In 1967, the troop buildup in Vietnam
was in full swing with no end in sight.
American commanders, equipped with
more personnel and supplies, decided to
revise the overall strategy of local con-
tainment for a more aggressive approach.
Combined arms operations would now
venture farther into enemy-held territory
in an attempt to draw the communist forc-
es into battle.
Operation Junction City, the largest com-
bined arms operation to that date, began
on 22 February. The operation was de-
signed to disrupt the Viet Cong Central
Office for South Vietnam (COSVN), de-
stroy the Viet Cong and North Vietnam-
ese forces, and clear War Zone C, III
Corps’ tactical zone base areas in the
northern Tay Ninh Province.
1
Junction
City would reinforce the necessity for
armor and cavalry for the remainder of
the war.
The initial phase of Junction City kicked
off with airmobile troops lifted into the
northwest corner of the operational area
near the Cambodian border.
2
The mission
was to establish fire support bases for
follow-on infantry and establish a horse-
shoe blocking position.
3
With this in place,
mechanized forces began their attack north
into the open end of the horseshoe toward
the “U” end of the position. Initial ene-
my contact was sporadic, but mechanized
units found Viet Cong base camps, hos-
pitals, bunker systems, and small groups
of Viet Cong. Dense jungle and enemy
mines made progress slow for the armored forces.
Upon reaching the northern limit of ad-
vance, the mechanized units wheeled
west to “squeeze” the enemy.
Feeling the
pressure, Viet Cong resistance
Operation
Junction City occurred at a remote fire-
base
on 21 March.
It would become
known as the battle of Suoi Tre or Fire
Support Base Gold.
5
The shock effect of
armor would turn an enemy victory into
a disastrous defeat.
If You Build It, They Will Come.
On 19 March, almost a month into the
operation, the 3d Battalion, 22d Infantry
(-) and the 2d Battalion, 77th Artillery (-)
began airlifting three batteries of 105mm
howitzers and about 450 troops into an
egg-shaped clearing near the former vil-
lage of Suoi Tre. Their mission was to
establish Fire Support Base (FSB) Gold
and provide indirect fire support for the
4th Infantry Division’s 3d Brigade Task
Force.
6
This particular area had been qui-
et thus far and heavy action was not ex-
pected. When the first helicopters set
down in the landing zone (LZ), it became
obvious that something was different. Viet
Cong scouts, waiting in the surrounding
woods, had placed command detonated
mines facing inward in the clearing. The
detonation of these explosives destroyed
three UH-1 (Huey) helicopters. Unde-
terred, the Americans continued to secure
the perimeter and establish the firebase,
despite the fact that an unusually large
number of Viet Cong were spotted mov-
ing in the area.
7
American troops were unaware that they
had landed virtually on top of approxi-
mately 2,000 Viet Cong troops spear-
headed by the 272d Main Force Regi-
ment of the 9th Viet Cong Division.
8
Dis-
turbed by this sudden threat, the enemy
observed the Americans for the next 2
days while formulating a plan of attack.
Feeling that the odds were in their favor
based solely on their numerical superior-
ity, the Viet Cong would use speed and
surprise to overwhelm the Americans.
By using human wave assaults to quick-
ly move in close to the defenders, they
would deny U.S. forces the ability to Use their technological advantage
At FSB Gold, the infantry and artillery-
men continued to reinforce and improve
their perimeter defenses; they built de-
fensive bunkers, rehearsed contingency
plans, conducted ambush patrols, and
constructed 18 firing positions for the
artillery batteries.
9
To the southwest of
FSB Gold were elements of the 2d Bat-
talion, 12th Infantry, the tank-mech infan-
try task force of 2d Battalion, 22d (2/22)
Infantry (Mechanized) and the 2d Battal-
ion, 34th (2-34) Armor (-).
10
Under the command of Lieutenant Col-
onel (LTC) Raymond Stailey, 2-34 Armor
moved north on 20 March as part of the
3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division Task
Force, commanded by Colonel (COL)
Marshall Garth. The task force had been
placed under operational control of the
25th Infantry Division for Junction City.
The 2-34 Armor had been conducting
search and destroy operations, which con-
sisted of clearing 10×10 kilometer quad-
rants, searching for any sign of the Viet
Cong.
11
On 20 March, COL Garth or-
dered 2-34 Armor to link up with 2/22
Infantry, commanded by LTC Ralph Ju-
lian, and continue to push north as a com-
bined arms team toward the Suoi Samat
River. Earlier that afternoon, the scout
platoon of 2/22 Infantry had cleared a
trail 1,500 meters to the north, but had
been unable to find a ford.
12
The recon
platoon from 2-34 Armor would have bet-
ter luck in the search.
Arriving ahead of the main body at the
river, the 2-34 Armor scouts found that
the dry season had reduced the river to
a muddy stream. A possible fording site
had been located at a bend in the river;
however, bridging assets would still be
required to get vehicles across without
getting stuck. LTC Stailey met with his
scouts at the river and coordinated for an
M113 to be sunk in the river and two ar-
mored vehicle-launched bridges (AVLBs)
set across, if necessary. This contingency
plan was then passed along to all maneu-
ver elements. Separated from the fire
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