By Nikolas K. Gvosdev
(FPRI) -- “Energy is the new currency,” Derek Pew recently commented to me. The ability to generate large amounts of inexpensive energy is, of course, extremely critical for all sorts of digital industries, from mining bitcoin to running data centers. In addition, solutions to many problems and challenges in the physical world will require energy abundance—not rationing—to be addressed and solved. Energy as currency is directly tied to finished outputs.
We are witnessing, in real time, the collapse of industrial production in Europe directly connected to prohibitively expensive energy costs. A large supply of inexpensive energy is absolutely necessary for countries coping with water challenges, climate mitigation measures, food security, and transport infrastructure. As John Sitilides concludes, “Energy abundance means greater domestic prosperity, industry, and quality of life … as well as global geopolitical resilience and diplomatic leverage.”
Over the last decade, proponents of what might be termed the “energy diet” argued that measures that forced reduction in energy use would spur measures for greater efficiency and innovation in the realm of “green” energy. The reality is that while some positive developments have emerged, the “green gap” between what the new approaches can deliver and the demands of energy-intensive, fourth industrial-revolution businesses cannot be entirely bridged. Moreover, politicians and influencers alike have not been successful in changing popular attitudes about consuming the fruits of a high-energy economy. This means that governments will continue to be guided by the “prosperity-legitimacy equation”: Their legitimacy will be directly connected to the extent they can continue to provide a stable, middle-class lifestyle within reach of their citizens.
If a country cannot generate sufficient energy on its own, it will either become dependent on an external source of supply or it will have to purchase the goods and services it requires from a provider that has access to affordable energy and can deliver them at an acceptable price. Data service providers, therefore, will seek to be located in places where energy is affordable and reliable. In some cases, nature determines this—such as access to geothermal energy. In other cases, nature’s capriciousness may be overridden by human deliberate action—for instance, the construction of a nuclear reactor.
Of course, different types of energy exact different costs. Moving forward, if energy deprivation is not seen as a realistic strategy, then the emphasis will be on sources that do not contribute to further atmospheric emissions to try and mitigate the environmental and climactic impacts. Geothermal, hydroelectric, and tidal energy are only feasible in specific geographic areas. Wind and solar energy are not continuous in their output. To maintain a high energy economy, nuclear power and natural gas must be part of the mix.
These realities contribute to what Judah Grunstein has described as a national security-green transition nexus. This nexus operates at two key levels, both of which are directly tied to energy. The first is redefining national security from simply combating the kinetic threats and cyber actions of other states and non-state actors to seeing the health, energy, economic, and technological security of the nation as co-equal tasks. This means having the energy to power the health system, keep purification and mitigation systems functioning, even to energize the artificial intelligence-enhanced data centers attempting to assist humans in finding medical and technological fixes.
The second is conceptualizing a new map that charts out the best way to guarantee sustained and stable access to the raw materials and necessary components we need. Low-carbon electricity sources require access to copper, uranium, lithium, cobalt, and tungsten, among other minerals; ability to manufacture or purchase concrete and steel at low prices; having access to components and machinery—not to mention the human capital in terms of researcher and the larger workforce.
So securing supply chains and industrial centers, as well as cultivating workforce development——mean that the national security establishment has to be ableto think, as Parag Khanna advised, in terms of “natural resource discoveries, infrastructures, demographic movements, and other shifts” in developing national security priorities. However, as Derek Reveron and Ihave warned, “the prevailing US national security ‘mental map’ in terms of envisioning regions does not overlay with the changes that have been occurring.”
The energy-as-currency construct allows us to re-envision priorities for US national security along two lines of effort. The first is to determine the extent to which the United States wishes to depend on elongated and complicated supply chains that also provide a security rationale for its system of alliances. (One reason some US overseas partners are quietly so concerned about proposals for a greater US reliance on the hemisphere and to shift to an overt policy of nearshoring is the belief that allies who subsist under a framework of extended deterrence today may not be so vital for US security tomorrow, allowing for a retrenchment of US security guarantees.) But no matter how that map is drawn, the priority for the US military would be to keep open the most vital flows.
The second, building on John Sitilides’ point above, is the extent to which surplus energy produced by the United States is exportable to friends and partners. Thinking about the late Amitai Etzioni’s notion of “integrative power”—an energy/financial network that connects US partners becomes a way to reinforce the American hub.
North American natural gas and the US nuclear industry, in partnership with key allies, provides two powerful energy coins to spend. The next administration should invest them wisely.
