For most of the three decades since gaining independence in 1991, Turkmenistan has been left out of discussions on Central Asia and the role of both north-south and east-west transportation routes linking the region to the rest of the world. Ashgabat seldom released much data about itself or allowed others to collect it.
Analysts and commentators writing on Central Asia often left the country without much consideration or even any mention. When the isolationist country did attract attention, it usually was regarding Turkmenistan’s constitutionally mandated neutrality, the extreme authoritarianism of its leaders, or the poverty of its population. Over the past two years, however, that has begun to quickly change. Turkmenistan is assuming an ever-more important role as a route for north-south and east-west trade between China and Europe, Russia and South Asia, as well as the countries of Central Asia and the outside world. This growing role has already intensified geopolitical competition over Turkmenistan and sparked fears in Ashgabat that such outside involvement could undermine the Turkmen regime (see EDM, December 15, 2022, May 11, 18, 2023). (For background on the regime’s domestic difficulties, see EDM, February 14, 2017.)
Two developments this week will only further raise the profile of Turkmenistan and increase domestic pressures on the regime. First, Kazakhstan, Russia, Iran, and Turkmenistan signed an agreement in Aktau that contains a road map for the development of the north-south transit corridor through Turkmenistan. The plan suggests that this route, rather than either the Caucasus or the Caspian Sea, will become the most important branch of that corridor (Eurasia.expert, July 19; for background on Turkmenistan’s opening, see EDM, February 10, 2021, October 16, 2023, July 10).
Moscow had earlier hoped to develop the north-south corridor through the Caucasus or the Caspian but has had to refocus its attention eastward toward Central Asia because of instability in the first case and the lack of capacity in the second. That shift only became possible as Turkmenistan has increasingly opened up (see EDM, May 24, 2020, January 4, 2023; Eurasia.expert, May 10, June 15). Second, Ashgabat announced on July 22 at a meeting in Bucharest that it intends to sign an agreement with Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Romania to create what those countries are calling a “Caspian Sea–Black Sea” corridor, which would be a major component of the east-west transit projects that China, the West, and counties in both Central Asia and the South Caucasus have long been interested in (Ekho Kazkaza, May 15, July 22).
The prime outside movers for the development of these two trade corridors are Russia and Iran for the north-south corridor, which Moscow has been pursuing since 2000, and China and the West championing the east-west corridor, with the countries of Central Asia having an interest in both. Until the last two years, these countries have typically planned to circumvent Turkmenistan rather than pass through it, even though routes via Turkmenistan’s territory were shorter, easier, and cheaper (Ntranslab.ru, April 23). Now, facing problems at home and desirous of playing an expanded international role, Turkmenistan has decided to open up and become a more active participant in regional transit, sparking new interest in routes through its territory. Meanwhile, regional interest in working with Ashgabat has increased largely due to the consequences of sanctions that have made the north-south route more important for Russia and Iran. In addition, the continuing turmoil in the South Caucasus has made the development and construction of multiple routes westward more important for China and Central Asian countries.
Unsurprisingly, Ashgabat has sought to ensure that both routes passing through its territory develop in tandem. The Turkmenistan authorities clearly hope that this will allow them to benefit from both while allowing Ashgabat to play one group off another—a continuation of at least one aspect of its neutral and balanced foreign policy. That will not be easy, however, given the expansive regional agendas of Russia, China, Iran, and the West. Nevertheless, it likely represents a better option for Ashgabat than trying to remain outside such international networks. As both a transit country and a hub for north-south and east-west trade, Turkmenistan will likely be able to boost its role in the region and may take steps to ease the conditions of its population. The transition at home, nonetheless, could quickly prove even more fraught than the transition internationally. At least, there are several compelling reasons to think so.
Up to now, Turkmenistan has been not only one of the most isolated countries in the post-Soviet space but also far and away the most authoritarian. The population is poor, and the regime has kept a lid on any domestic strife by offering subsidies of various kinds, deploying brute force, as well as closing mosques and any other institutions that might help crystalize an opposition (Rus.azattyq.org, December 2, 2021; Ia-centr.ru, February 16, 2023). The country suffers from growing water shortages and agricultural problems (see EDM, March 7).
Unlike the other Central Asian governments, Ashgabat has not allowed its people to work in Russia and send home remittances that have reduced poverty and tensions in those countries (Turkmen.news, January 14, 2022). Similar to the other countries in the region, Turkmenistan has become increasingly monoethnic with the departure of Russians and other Central Asian nationalities. This trend has made Turkmenistan more nationalistic even as it has elevated the importance of tribal divisions within Turkmen society—divisions that are behind many political arrangements in the country and that will likely be unsettled by the influx of foreign money and influence (Hronikatm.com, November 14, 2023; Ia-centr.ru, November 27, 2023).
To date, Ashgabat’s combination of carrots and sticks has maintained relative stability. However, the construction of new rail lines and highways to support the north-south and east-west corridors and the money these corridors look to bring in once they are completed will likely unsettle existing arrangements and lead to more challenges for the governing regime. Countering these new complications will not be easy for officials in Ashgabat, long accustomed to authoritarian rule over an impoverished population. Understanding the latest developments will not be easy for other governments either, many of whom are all too accustomed to ignoring Turkmenistan altogether. Unless that changes, Turkmenistan’s impending transition from superficial stability to a seedbed of serious conflict is likely to catch regional players unaware and leave them with few options to prevent problems there from spreading more widely.
