Anthony Cowden
Security, Iraq
The strategy that the United States is following to “disrupt, degrade, and ultimately defeat” Daesh is to conduct an air campaign against their strongholds and personnel in Iraq and Syria, and to support whatever ground force is willing to go up against them. It is not the policy of the U.S. to provide that ground force. Instead, the U.S, has worked to put together a coalition of regional parties—Arab countries as well as “moderate” Syrian rebels—to provide an effective ground force, with no success to date.
U.S. military joint doctrine divides conflict into six phases: (0) Shape, (I) Deter, (II) Seize the Initiative, (III) Dominate, (IV) Stabilize, and (V) Enable Civil Authority. At present, the conflict is stuck in Phase II and will continue to be so until an effective ground force can be found. During Phase II the Joint Force Commander (JFC) seeks “to seize the initiative through the application of appropriate joint force capabilities.” The one “appropriate joint force capability” that is currently lacking in the fight against Daesh is an effective ground force. Without an effective ground force it will be impossible to transition to Phase III, the Dominate phase (“breaking the enemy’s will for organized resistance”).
Phases are linear (well, they are supposed to be, anyway) and have distinct transition points and criteria. Phases II and III are the “break things and kill people” phases, and the U.S. military is exceptionally good at them. Phase IV (Stabilize) “is required when there is no fully functional, legitimate civil governing authority present”, and Phase V (Enable Civil Authority) “is predominantly characterized by joint force support to legitimate civil governance in theater. The goal is for the joint force to enable the viability of the civil authority and its provision of essential services to the largest number of people in the region.” It is Phases IV and V that the United States has recently had more difficulty with, both as a military and as a nation.
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