On Saturday, Israel’s retaliatory attack was framed as “carefully calibrated.” But in the absence of ceasefire, regional turmoil is simmering close to an edge, thanks to the escalation ladder.
Early on Saturday, Israel hit Iran with a set of airstrikes, stating it was targeting military sites in retaliation for the 180 missiles that Iran fired into Israel over 3 weeks ago (which itself was a reprisal against a prior Israeli offensive).
Officially, it was a “carefully orchestrated, underwhelming retaliation” that was preceded by Israel's message to Iran ahead of the impending attack. But not everything is what it seems to be in the Middle East.
The Israeli retaliation was designed to be underwhelming; not by the Netanyahu cabinet, but by the White House and the Pentagon.
Presumably, portions of Iranian military sites in three provinces – Tehran, Ilam and Khuzestan – were hit. Iran said its air defenses successful and damage was estimated as “limited.”
Yet later, Israel Defense Forces (IDF) stated Israel targeted “missile manufacturing facilities used to produce the missiles that Iran fired at the state of Israel over the last year.” It also hit surface-to-air missile sites and “additional Iranian aerial capabilities.”
To stress that the retaliation was more effective, the Israeli Air Force later claimed that these attacks had destroyed “the backbone of Iran's missile industry”, a critical component of its ballistic missile program. The targets struck were sophisticated equipment that Iran could not produce on its own and had to be purchased from China. Subsequent reports claim Israel destroyed air defense systems near oil refineries in retaliatory strike on Iran.
If that’s the case, Netanyahu government was trying to minimize the damage it caused in Iran, to appease the White House and defuse a potential Iranian response. By the same token, Netanyahu struggled to deflect international attention away from atrocities in northern Gaza and southern Lebanon.
The Netanyahu cabinet was playing with fire.
Since early October, I had argued that there were basically three basic scenarios for an Israeli retaliation:
In the first case, Iran would likely contain its further response. In the second, Iran would escalate. In the third, all bets would be off in the Middle East and global reverberations would ensue.
Israel’s Saturday attack seems to have been positioned within the scenario 1 (unless critical infrastructure was, indeed, destroyed which takes us into scenario 2 and more lethal consequences). This was a surprise to many who expected a massive Israeli reprisal, as President Netanyahu and his defense minister Gallant had pledged and the cabinet’s far-right had urged.
The net effects in Israel? PM Netanyahu lost political capital. In part, he will suffer heavy criticism by the Messianic far-right. It seeks a war with Iran and would like to drag the U.S. administration into a regional conflict.
At the same time, the opposition blames Netanyahu for the failure to better sync Israeli responses with Washington (the argument of center-right Benny Gantz). Another part of the opposition says Israel should have deployed a stronger response against Iran (the argument of the centrist Yair Lapid).
The fact that a pure scenario 2-like retaliation did not happen - if that proves to be the case - is likely a direct outcome of hard American pressure. After all, the initial Israeli retaliation plan was leaked, which undermined the expected scenario 2 attack.
Most likely, Israel’s initial plans were far more aggressive and offensive. Most probably, those plans were buried after U.S. pressure. If the Biden administration and/or its stakeholders were behind the leak, it would not be surprising.
A regionwide war in the Middle East is the last thing the Democratic White House needs just two weeks before the U.S. presidential election – particularly as the fragile lead of Vice-President Kamala Harris is softening.
The way the Israeli response was constrained may contain the ongoing destabilization in the Middle East in the short-term; until the U.S. election day. That, however, is predicated on the assumption that the impending attack by Hezbollah against more than two dozen Jewish settlements in northern Israel will not further escalate the status quo.
Nonetheless, during the U.S. presidential transition – between November and mid-January – there is another vacuum when much can still happen.
It is not in the interest of Iran to attack. But it is very much in the interest of the Netanyahu cabinet and particularly PM Netanyahu to retaliate harder. To retain his immunity and avoid prosecution for corruption, Netanyahu depends on the far-right support.
The bottom line: If Harris wins the US election, Netanyahu will face some constraints. If Trump emerges as the winner, Netanyahu is likely to see it as a carte blanche for a broad-scale Iran attack.
Currently, both Israel and the U.S. share the strategic objective of destabilizing Iran and undermining its government. As I show in my bookThe Fall of Israel, these goals were developed in the US already two decades ago. The question is not “what” and “why”, but “when” and “how.”
The Middle East crisis is far from over. Tragically, the future of the Middle East is effectively a hostage of the U.S. presidential race.
There are many possible scenarios, as long as Israel is able and willing to execute offensive actions in multiple fronts, thanks to the incessant flow of U.S. weapons to Israel, American bases in Israel and the region at large, and massive financial inflows of U.S. military aid.
In the past, U.S. military aid to Israel amounted to $3.8 billion per year; last year, it soared to $18 billion. It is not transparent aid. The Biden administration has not disclosed its true extent. Financially, it contributes to the soaring U.S. debt, which already exceeds the size of the American economy. In the Gaza Strip and possibly in southern Lebanon, this aid has made U.S. complicit to genocidal atrocities.
Thanks to the continued destabilization, the turmoil in the Middle East is simmering close to an edge. Worse, the uncertainty is likely to prevail as long as
The worst is not behind. It has only been deferred, for now.
