Ethnic conflicts have become a global problem with serious regional cross-border implications. Scholarly concern with ethnic groups and conflict have become increasingly salient since the second half of the twentieth century. An estimate shows that one-third of all countries experienced civil conflict and ethnic unrest.
The term ‘ethnicity’ or ‘ethnic’ finds origin in the Greek term, ethnos meaning nation and its modern-day meaning translates to a group of people who share a common culture, and sense of heritage. There has been a proliferation of ethnic nationalism in many parts of the world. Language, culture, memory, history, and tradition are the vital sources of ethnic nationalism. These variables can drive the members of an ethnic community in shaping their own collective identity and destiny.
Managing the violence of ethnic groups is one of the most important central problems of state-building, security, and governance. The Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), situated in Bangladesh’s Southeastern hilly districts of Bandarban, Rangamati and Khagrachari, is plagued by ethnic conflicts and violent secessionist movements.
The strategic significance of the CHT is underlined by a few important geopolitical and economic considerations. First, Chittagong Port is the largest port of Bangladesh, facilitating 90% of the country’s international trade while the rest is covered by road transport. Navigation of the Chittagong seaport depends on the water level in the Karnaphuli River that meanders through the CHT. Second, the facilities of the port, industries, Chittagong city, and the adjoining town depend on the power generated by the hydroelectric capability situated in the CHT. Third, navigation through and irrigation from the Karnaphuli, Sangu, Matamuhuri, and Halda Rivers and their tributaries will also depend on peace and stability in the CHT.
Fourth, the economy and living standards of the CHT and the entire Chittagong region are closely interlinked. Fifth, with New Delhi’s increasing interests in coupling the Indian northeastern seven sister states with the sea via the Chittagong port, the potential CHT conflict might spin up to the transboundary Feni River that nearly cuts the Chittagong swathe from the rest of Bangladesh. Three significant rivers — the Muhuri, Feni, and Selonia — flow through Feni, further enhancing the district’s strategic value. These rivers not only support local agriculture but also play a crucial role in cross-border relations with India, given their shared usage and management.
Feni’s proximity to the Indian state of Tripura adds another layer of strategic importance, as it serves as a gateway for cross-border trade and cultural exchange. The district is thus a focal point for maintaining robust border security and fostering diplomatic relations with India. The Feni waistline, running through the Feni district, represents a critical vulnerability for Bangladesh. This line serves as a critical connection between the eastern and western parts of Bangladesh. From a geopolitical standpoint, the Feni waistline is critical. In his article entitled, Rethinking Feni’s Geopolitical Significance, published in the daily New Age on 29 August 2024, KM Saiful Bashar notes that Bangladesh’s location, bordered by India on three sides and the Bay of Bengal to the south, necessitates careful consideration of these vulnerabilities.
The Feni waistline holds significant geoeconomic importance. The district of Feni is a hub that connects the capital, Dhaka, with the port city of Chittagong, and it serves as a vital link in the country’s supply chain. The recent flooding exposed how quickly and easily this link can be severed, causing widespread economic disruption. With an eye to further strengthen India’s friendly ties connectivity with Bangladesh, Prime Minister Narendra Modi Tuesday virtually inaugurated the 1.9-km-long ‘Maitri Bridge’ or the India-Bangladesh Friendship Bridge, built over Feni River that connects Sabroom district in south Tripura to Ramgarh in Bangladesh. The building of the Maitri Bridge over the Feni River is strategically significant, because it is expected to connect the landlocked northeastern ‘seven sisters’ region with Chittagong port in Bangladesh.
Being a port city, Chittagong is very much crucial for the regional development of South Asian land-locked countries like Nepal, Bhutan and parts of Southern China, Northeast India and Myanmar. Northeastern Indian region is characterized by widespread conflicts which are related to the geography of the region, the multiethnicity of its population and the political and economic feeding grounds of discontent.
The Modi regime in India initiated a highly controversial initiative- the National Register of Citizens (NRC). The NRC is meant to be a register of all Indian citizens whose creation was mandated by the 2003 amendment of the Citizenship Act, 1955. Its purpose is to document all the legal citizens of India so that the illegal immigrants can be identified and deported. Consequently, with a stroke of pen, 40 lakh people were rendered stateless. The NRC is a violation of human rights, and it shows the uncertain future of the non-registered people, often termed as ‘illegal Bangladeshi migrants’ living in Assam. Sixth, most of the Chittagong and even parts of Noakhali would be vulnerable should the CHT breakaway from Bangladesh or if an insurgency were to be sustained through the region. All three CHT districts have international borders.
Last but not the least, China has a historic claim to India’s northeastern border state of Arunachal. At the same time, Myanmar’s border regions are rich in natural resources such as oil and gas. For instance, Rakhine is a borderland province having large oil and natural gas reserves, reaching 11 trillion and 23 cubic feet respectively. Due to the potential for ethnic unrest in the frontiers, which places a premium on cooperation with neighboring states, China pursues a defensive approach to securing its land borders and maintaining territorial integrity. The Sino-Indian rivalry is on the rise in South Asia. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a global campaign to build connections between China and the world through trade investment and infrastructure. The BRI, launched in 2013, is motivated by strategic and as well as economic priorities in South and Southeast Asia. Chinese firms and corporations are engaged in ports, high-speed trains, and infrastructure-building projects in bordering countries like Myanmar. Great powers have thus enormous interests in the South China Sea, Indian Ocean, Northeast India, CHT, Chittagong port and the Bay of Bengal regions.
Bangladesh, to the east of India on the Bay of Bengal, is a densely populated South Asian country. It has more than 4,000 kilometers of border with India and 271 kilometers of border with Myanmar. It is a gateway to the eleven South-East Asian countries such as Brunei, Myanmar, Cambodia, Timor-Leste, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. The CHT bordered by India and Myanmar, is situated in the south-eastern corner of Bangladesh. A land of hills and forests, CHT presents a sharp contrast topographically with the rest of Bangladesh. Its inhabitants are of Sino-Tibetan descent belonging to the Mongolian group and closely resemble the people of northeast India, Burma, and Thailand rather than the people of the vast alluvial plains of Bangladesh.
The CHT has had a long history of conflict and bloodshed. Numerous ethnonationalist groups are active in the three hill districts of the CHT. Of late, a new separatist group, namely, the Kuki-Chin National Front (KNF) surfaced in the CHT and the hill districts of India, Myanmar and the disputed territories between China and the neighbors.
KNF has its own armed wing, namely, the Kuki-Chin National Army (KNA). Members of newly KNF looted over Bangadeshi taka 15 million from Sonali Bank’s branch in Ruma, Bandarban on the first week of July 2024. They looted 14 weapons from the Ansar members guarding the bank and allegedly abducted the Sonali Bank manager. The latest violent confrontation in Rangamati town and Khagrachari’s Dighinala and Sadar Upazilas, resulting in the deaths of four people and left at least 72 others injured. Leaders of Chakma community urged the Indian Prime Minister to take steps to protect lives and properties of the hill tribes and religious minorities. These tribal leaders might have placed their demands to the interim Yunus government through proper means, instead of showing their allegiance to the Modi regime in India.
It is also true that beyond the accord-transferred responsibilities to the ethnic minority-controlled three district councils and the larger regional council, the hill leaders demanded more closing of the military outposts, stringent restrictions on the Bengali settlers and more resource allocations for the hills, to mention a few of those demands.
The premise of the current paper is built upon the prism of realist paradigm, power politics and great power competition. With the global rise of China, Professor Stephen Walt, a globally reputed realist scholar in his 2018 paper entitled, Rising Powers and the Risks of War: A Realist View on Sino-American Relations, predicts that the United States and China will increasingly see each other as rivals and will engage in more intense security competition. It is to be noted that security is a matter of both perception and reality. Against this backdrop, the paper aims to address a couple of key questions:
In current security discourse, both internal and external non-traditional threats must be emphasized. The level and nature of threat to national security of Bangladesh has changed over time. Internal and external security threats make CHT quite vulnerable. The main sources of threats as well as shifting power of power dynamics are discussed in the following subsections.
The Rohingya crisis is a complicated and multifaceted concern for Bangladesh. Some scholars argue that the Rohingya crisis relates philosophically to the general moral and legal problem globally concerning the status of “stateless” refugees who suffer the scandal of perpetually disputed ethnic and national identity. The Rohingya crisis has been disrupting the bilateral relations between Myanmar and Bangladesh since the late 1970s.
As a host nation, Bangladesh faces several non-traditional security threats originating from the Rohingya crisis. Drug trafficking is a major threat to regional security and domestic stability. Drug addiction has become a matter of serious global concern. Bangladesh is near the three major drug-producing regions: The Golden Triangle, the Golden Crescent and the Golden Wedge. In the CHT, the smuggling of drugs and arms has increased instability in the region.
On May 3, 2023,violence broke out between the Meitei community and the Kuki tribe in Manipur’s Churachandpur town, which is close to Imphal, the state’s capital. The reason for the clashes has been attributed to the non-tribal Meitei people’s demand for scheduled tribe status. While the Meitei’s view the Kukis as outsiders and drug peddlers, the Kukis see themselves as marginalized by the Meitei’s, who hold major political and administrative positions in the state. The violence in Manipur escalated from burning the Anglo-Kuki War Memorial to destroying homes and killings, displacing about 5,000 people within 48 hours. Within two months, the number of displaced individuals soared to 60,000, the death toll reached 70, and over 1,700 buildings, including homes and religious structures, were reduced to ashes. Geopolitically, Manipur has strategic importance as it shares a border with Myanmar and serves as a gateway to Southeast Asia for India. Also, Manipur is crucial for India’s Act East Policy (AEP), which aims to develop cultural links, trade, tourism, and connectivity with Southeast Asia. The trilateral highway project linking India, Myanmar, and Thailand starts from Moreh in Manipur and ends at Mae Sot in Thailand.
The fall of Sheikh Hasina through an unprecedented mass uprising on 5th August 2024 created some sorts of political vacuum in the social and institutional settings in Bangladesh. Since 2009, India has supported the Hasina regime and helped it to survive adverse situations. India’s business interests and desire to keep the country within its sphere of influence shaped India’s policy toward Bangladesh.
Indeed, the ouster of Hasina is a significant setback for India’s security and regional policy. A reasonably understandable anti-Indian sentiments and feelings reached its climax for the incessant Indian support provided to the sustenance and survival of the autocratic Hasina regime. Consequently, the diplomatic relations between Bangladesh and India reached its lowest ebbs after the interim government resumed state power. "If you destabilize Bangladesh, it will spill over all around Bangladesh, including Myanmar and seven sisters in West Bengal everywhere," Dr. Yunus told NDTV. He further warns, "It will be a volcanic eruption everywhere around us and in Myanmar... and it would be a bigger problem because a million Rohingyas are in here”.
The security situation in the CHT has become complicated since the 1997 peace accord. There are two opposing views about the deterioration of the law-and-order situation there. A group of scholars such as professor Amena Mohsin singled out processes of militarization, Bengalization and religious conversion at the CHT as aggravating factors for the deterioration. These experts talked in favor of empowering indigenous population and subsequent withdrawal of the CHT military camps. On the other hand, the scholars belonging to the opposite camp, professor M. Rashiduzzaman for instance, argued for the importance of maintaining territorial integrity, geopolitical interests and strategic communication along the cross-border region.
Geo-strategically Bangladesh is of huge significance to China. In recent years, the traditional Sino-Indian rivalry has been accelerated by at least two key developments. Firstly, China’s announcement of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013 through which China began to encroach in India’s traditional sphere of influence (South Asia); and secondly, the flare-up in the mid-2020 along the Sino-Indian border regions (known as the LAC or the ‘Line of Actual Control’) which possibly has brought a fundamental shift in the Indian perception and strategy vis-à-vis China. Jeremi Garlick (2020) in his The Impact of China’s Belt and Road Initiative shows that the BRI consists of two strands. The first is the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB), which is in fact envisaged as several overland routes passing through Central Asia, Russia, Mongolia, Iran and Turkey to Europe; while the second is the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR), identified as a sea route through South and Southeast Asia via the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean to the Middle East and Southern Europe.
Moreover, China has a historic claim over the northeastern state of Arunachal Pradesh. China has released a fourth list of 30 new names of various places in Arunachal Pradesh amid Beijing’s stepped-up assertions in recent weeks to re-emphasize its claim over the Indian State. India has been rejecting China renaming places in Arunachal Pradesh, asserting that the State is an integral part of the country and assigning "invented" names does not alter this reality. India after the 1962 War with China adopted the “Scorched Earth” policy of keeping the border areas with China underdeveloped.
The Atal Bihari Vajpayee-led NDA Government in 1999 first changed the policy of keeping the border areas of India along China underdeveloped. His cabinet approved thirteen new border projects to develop the Sino-Indian border areas. In 2006, the UPA government launched the Indo-China Border Roads Program (ICBR) to construct good quality roads in the forward areas of the Sino-Indian border for easy conduct of Indian troop movement. It proposed to construct the 1850-kilometre-long Trans Arunachal National Highway along the northern bank of the Brahmaputra River. The main aim for constructing this highway was to move troops quickly in the border areas of Arunachal Pradesh from Assam.
The current Modi government has increased the Border Roads Organization budget to Rs 14,387 crores in 2023-2024 in comparison to the previous budget of Rs 3782 crore for the year 2013-2014. In the years between 2014 and 2022, 6806 Kilometers of road construction have been completed in the Sino-India border areas in comparison to only 3610 Kilometers of road constructed between 2008 and 2014. This boost in the infrastructural development in the border areas with China has changed the geopolitics of the border areas with China.
India’s efforts to enhance connectivity with Southeast Asia under the Look/Act East Policy rest on five initiatives: the Kaladan Multi-modal Transit Transport Corridor (KMMT), the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), the Trilateral Highway and its extension (TH-ext), Ganga-Mekong Economic Corridor (GMEC), and the Mekong-India Economic Corridor (MIEC).
In December 2021, Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken laid out the U.S. Government’s Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS), America’s vision for a free, open, connected, prosperous, resilient, and secure Indo-Pacific region in which all countries are empowered to adapt to the 21st century’s challenges and seize its many opportunities. The Biden Administration also established the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) to enhance economic cooperation among the Indo-Pacific states. As one of the small states of the Indian Ocean and Bay of Bengal, Bangladesh has emerged as a vital factor in the geopolitics of the region. The U.S. Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken wrote an article entitled, America’s Strategy of Renewal: Rebuilding Leadership for a New World, published in the November/December 2024 Issue of the Foreign Affairs. In that article, Antony J. Blinken has clearly spelled out the vision and mission of the United States of America:
“We infused U.S. alliances and partnerships with new purpose. We elevated the Quad—the partnership with Australia, India, and Japan—and took concrete steps to realize a shared vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific, from enhancing maritime security to manufacturing safe, effective vaccines. We launched the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council, marshaling the world’s biggest economic partnership to shape global standards for emerging technologies and protect the United States’ and Europe’s most sensitive innovations. We raised the ambition of critical bilateral relationships, such as the U.S.-India Strategic Partnership, and revived regional engagement, with President Biden hosting summits with leaders from Africa, Latin America, the Pacific Islands, and Southeast Asia”
China considers the IPS the ill-motivated to weaken China’s rise, sees the IPEF as a threat to its regional dominance. Chinese leaders are convinced that the United States won’t willingly allow China to become the dominant power in Asia, much less deign to share global leadership with Beijing. Beijing has embarked on projects such as Xi’s overlapping Global Security Initiative, Global Development Initiative, and Global Civilization Initiative, all of which challenge the West’s right to unilaterally define universal rules and seek to undermine the notion of universal values in areas such as human rights.
Given the current geo-strategic atmosphere and reality, we may conclude that the CHT problems have many domestic and global dimensions. The end of the Cold War has unleased new forces in international politics. The 1997 peace accord has established a kind of Chakma hegemony in the CHT. As a result, smaller ethnic groups like the KNF challenged the peace treaty demanding the creation of an exclusive ethnic homeland namely Kukiland. It is high time for Bangladesh to adopt a comprehensive and informed peace strategy to tackle the ethnic conflict and security problems in a systematic and enlightened manners.
