Amidst new waves of security and defence overtures in the Indo Pacific region ranging from the newly formed the Squad, to Aukus and potential Asian NATO, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) has been deemed by some to be increasingly obsolete.
However, the geopolitical and security reality and practicality make less sense for Washington to ditch the Quad in favour of the Squad or direct security alliances.
New Delhi has been singled out, highlighting its non-alignment adherence and the increasingly courting of Moscow both in defence and energy, and the thawing of ties with Beijing in recent months.
This does not project the full power interest and importance of Delhi for Washington’s grand ambition of checking both Beijing and renewed Moscow’s intent in the Indo Pacific region, however.
While Quad has always been seen as the softer power version of Washington’s quest for China containment in the Indo Pacific, further validated by the focus on rules based order and extended maritime domain awareness, there has never been a shift of predominant focus on containing China’s regional ambition.
These trails of complementing measures in shoring up regional trust and confidence through disaster responses and providing security bulwarks through deterrence and focus on new threat settings such as cyber security and climate impact, are intended to extend the sustainability and acceptance rate of Quad in the region. This differs from Aukus or the Squad in their orientations of direct hard power deterrence and security alliance formation with operational and interoperability mode of functions.
The four Quad members are united not only by common threats, but by common intent of getting the economic and trade returns among themselves and in extending their version of the Indo Pacific stability and security in halting Beijing’s narration and coercion of regional players.
Having a diverse security and non security domains to leverage on, the Quad presents a more credible and trusted essence of actionable deterrence and second strike capacities, with more resilient substance ranging from undersea cable security to disaster response and humanitarian relief and upholding common political ideologies of democracy and freedom.
One of the flagship cooperation, the extended maritime domain awareness, differs from other normal conventional maritime interoperability capabilities, in a way which the Squad is not able or not geographically viable to do so.
The Indian Ocean remains the central geosecurity domain for Quad, with the Indian Navy using this as both a joint capacity enhancer and an extended maritime support from the US as the status quo maritime presence and the growing scales of Japan and Australia.
As India’s Foreign Minister Jaishankar put it, the overall strength is built on the overarching common binding string of democratic polities, pluralistic societies and market economies, providing a stabilising factor in a volatile world.
The Quad’s varied agendas might be seen as unclear to some, but the internal variety of members’ offerings and capabilities in different domains provide a resonance and alignment of interests and assurances which will provide a credible and resilient partner of choice to the region as compared to China or the package offered by any one individual single power in the Quad.
Binded by a single entity of cooperation, it can either present itself as a softener of Washington’s at times direct anti China rhetoric or it can also be seen as an amplifier of combined hard power lethality and deterrence in an added weight of power impact in both deterring conflicts or in winning one.
What the Squad lacks other than traditional hard power projection, the Quad makes up with its agility and flexibility in moulding responses, both in narratives and extended power projections.
For the Squad, an overt focus on traditional security suits them as each member has an existing mutual defence treaty with the US, and the mechanism is as such that it is to specifically counter Beijing’s threats in the East and South China Seas.
The Quad, meanwhile, is not a traditional military alliance, and contributes to the wider regional order. The level of support and interaction also holds volume, as the Quad includes both leaders’ and foreign ministers’ tracks, while the Squad so far is confined at the minister of defense-level.
As compared to the Squad which is primarily direct hard power and deterrence drive, the Quad has added layers of trust building and economic friendshoring efforts to complement its ultimate objective of consolidating both their own guardrails and extending new ones to non members.
The Quad is not only primarily driven by Washington’s sole quest for China containment alone, as widely seen or perceived. Japan, Australia and India each has its own wariness and insecurity with China, with equal if not more intent to check Beijing’s deepening encroachment to their economic and security survival.
Although New Delhi is distinct in its foreign policy approach as compared to other Quad members, it will want to remain ingrained in this platform in upholding regional rules based order and keeping China in check, while maintaining its own individual policy affiliation and personal leadership camaraderie with Moscow. The Quad serves to complete India’s security and economic interests.
India is more concerned about the security interests of its immediate neighbourhood, including the Indian Ocean and the Malacca Strait and its land border with China. The Quad is seen primarily as supporting this gap and need of New Delhi.
However, it does create a long term overarching arc of stability for the region, and thus diminishing the expansion capacity of Beijing which will in turn boost India’s regional ambition that is mutually aligned with the Quad’s objective of a rules based and stable region.
It also complements its Act East Policy, in both getting the trust and confidence of regional players through trade and economic lenses and through the perspective as a responsible security and defence player and supporter both in traditional and non traditional sense.
The Quad can escape the scare and fear mongering tactics employed by others of terming it as another US led bloc warfare mentality, by enlarging the membership that will be based on both values and ideological adherence and foreign and economic policy responsibility and outlook.
Engaging with ASEAN seems to be a lost cause in the first place, as the latter will not want to diverge from its roots of centrality and non affiliation. However, the Quad can continue to expand its soft power narrative by enhancing its soft approach through the promotion of democracy and freedom, which will add both credence and geopolitical weight to an expanded Quad both in its essence of principles and total security returns.
Japan faces its most serious threat setting since WWII, and has commenced a massive defence and security shake-up and spending, with record defence spending and a new array of alliance-building and security friendshoring through its Official Security Assistance (OSA), the Reciprocal Access Agreements (RAA) and a string of renewed economic and diplomatic friendshoring movements.
Economic and security factors are the main objectives, with the leverage on its decades old presence in the region in key economic and investment on key sectors that have transformed regional economies long before China’s new economic capture through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).
Japan hoped to capitalize on its different economic and trade and values-based approach in offering an alternative to the Chinese version of economic overtures, and this is based on principles and long term assurances of non interference in internal affairs, and with the key aim of technology and capital transfer in a resilient and sustainable way.
With its new three pronged threat setting facing Tokyo with the axis of Beijing-Pyongyang-Moscow, Tokyo sees Southeast Asia as one of the most important platforms in its security assurances, and second is its economic and trade and supply chain resilience.
Tokyo is hoping to both slow down China’s momentum in capturing the region’s key policymaking and economic dependence, while slowly gaining the region’s trust and leveraging on the region’s fear of instability and threat of China by offering direct defence assurances and assistance.
By doing so, Tokyo is able to present a different offering and viewpoint that is different from Beijing, and also different from Washington, in not being seen as too US centric or aligned to the approach of forcing the region to choose a side.
Tokyo’s soft landing approach is geared towards assuring its own long term security by depending on regional powers’ own capacity in helping to deter China’s threat in the wider geographical dimension, which will help to lessen Tokyo’s burden.
By leveraging on an extended deterrence concept, and in offering a new trust based alternative based on values of democracy, freedom and stability, Tokyo is offering a new version of economic and defence friendshoring concept that is distinct from the US or the West, minus the connotations and baggage that they bring.
With this new approach, it has helped to elevate Tokyo’s regional trust building and guardrails, while further extending its ideological spread of freedom and democracy while maintaining its pacifist stance, without jeopardizing its traditional pacifist outlook.
Japan is projected to continue to support ASEAN’s unique position on the Indo Pacific, and will present soft defence approach and economic friendshoring as the ultimate policy assurances.
The security dilemma plaguing the region remains volatile as ever, with continued arms race and sabre rattling that have weakened conflict prevention mechanisms.
Alliances and counter alliances have further cemented the region as the most critical geopolitical contesting front that will dictate the future of diplomacy and security.
