Iraq is the fifth richest country in the world in terms of oil resources. Almost 10 percent of global reserves are located within the borders of this country. With approximately 5 percent of global oil production, it is a pivotal player in the global energy market. Moreover, although it does not produce large amounts, it has 2 percent of the world's natural gas reserves.
However, Iraq is one of the world’s most oil-dependent economies. Over the past decade, oil revenues have accounted for almost all of its exports, 85 percent of its state budget, and nearly half of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Despite all of its oil wealth, Iraq struggles to create jobs for its 40 million population, nearly 60 percent of which are under the age of twenty-five.
Türkiye, on the other hand, is not as lucky as its southeastern neighbor in terms of energy resources. While it has managed to remain among the world's twenty largest economies with a dynamic population of approximately 85 million, the country's limited energy resources pose a major obstacle to its continued growth.
Therefore, there could be nothing more natural than for these two countries, which lived together on Ottoman lands since the mid-seventeenth century until the end of the First World War and have been neighbors for almost the last 100 years, to come together and develop joint projects that would allow them to share their resources and capabilities.
However, in the Middle Eastern geography, it is impossible for commercial projects to be realized without taking into account the security dimension. The recent developments between Türkiye and Iraq also point to a process in which both dimensions are considered together.
The talks held in Ankara last week between the Turkish and Iraqi delegations were the latest stage of that process. The security dimension of the contacts, chaired by Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan and Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hüseyin, included the "Memorandum of Understanding on Military, Security Cooperation and the Fight Against Terrorism" signed between the two countries. The agreement, which the parties describe as “historic,” includes the establishment of joint security centers in Iraqi territory and the conduct of counter-terrorism efforts, particularly against the PKK, through these centers.
While security-related talks continue, work on the Iraq Development Road Project is being carried out in the background.
The Development Road Project envisages connecting the Al Faw Port, one of the largest infrastructure projects in Iraqi history and currently under construction in Basra, to Türkiye via a two-way highway and railway, and transporting goods from the Gulf countries and Asia to Europe. The project will include a 1,130-kilometer highway and a 1,200-kilometer railway. It is set to be completed in three phases: the first by 2028, the second by 2033, and the third by 2050. The cost of the project is announced as $17 billion, but it will probably be much higher than that figure.
The project is expected to reduce the time it takes to transport goods between the Chinese port of Shanghai and the Dutch port of Rotterdam from thirty-three days to fifteen days by creating an alternative route to the Suez Canal. It includes not only transportation infrastructure but also energy transmission and communication lines.
The efforts of both countries to implement the project reached a certain stage during President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's visit to Baghdad last April, and a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between Türkiye, Iraq, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates.
There are very high hopes for this project. The Iraqi government calculates that, apart from transporting oil and gas, this route will significantly reduce the cost of trade between Southeast Asia, especially China, and Europe, leading to numerous economic opportunities. Believing that this project can also resolve its serious infrastructure deficiencies, Baghdad is trying to expand its cooperation with Türkiye. The recent inauguration of the Türkiye-Iraq electricity transmission line in July is a testament to this growing partnership. It can be said that this new line reflects the changing geopolitical dynamics in the region, and that Baghdad is turning more to Türkiye while trying to reduce its dependence on Iranian electricity.
Likewise, Baghdad's decision to list the PKK as a banned organization upon Türkiye's request and to ban the activities of three parties linked to the PKK can be seen in this context. The Baghdad government also seems to have accepted that in order for the project to be realized, the PKK - which is defined as a terrorist organization by the US and the European Union - must be cleared from Northern Iraq.
Another development between the two countries was Türkiye’s decision last week to grant visa-free entry to Iraqi citizens under the age of 15 and over 50. Considering that Türkiye is seen as one of the most attractive countries for Iraqi youth, a new influx of people from Iraq to Türkiye can be expected.
Considering all of this, can it be said that a new era has begun between Türkiye and Iraq? After years of disagreements over water resources, oil exports, and the presence of the PKK in Northern Iraq, is a fresh season beginning between these two neighbors? Or is it a new false spring in the Middle East, where even the most ambitious projects can collapse with a single pull of a trigger?
To be honest, it cannot be said that the Development Road Project will be realized so easily. The project faces stiff competition from numerous large-scale geopolitical and geoeconomic initiatives. Among the rivals are China's Belt and Road Initiative, the US-backed India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), and Iran's ambitious plans to transform its ports into central nodes for trade between East Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Europe. It is highly unlikely that these competitors will simply stand aside and let the Development Road Project succeed without an objection.
On the other hand, Iraq does not have a significant place in China’s road plans. The route proposed by Beijing passes through Central Asia and Türkiye, not Iraq. Moreover, Ankara’s priority is to be a direct main corridor between China and Europe. Therefore, it is likely that Türkiye will see the Development Road as an opportunity to increase trade with the Gulf region and the Middle East rather than Asia, and that it will probably experience a difference of purpose with Iraq in this regard. The potential for the Development Road Project to significantly weaken Iran's Middle East policy and regional influence, as well as to negatively impact the trade of Gulf countries, further complicates the situation.
The idea of developing new economic and commercial connections between countries and even continents has gained significant momentum in recent years. The notion of living in peace in a world connected by roads is highly appealing. However, it should not be forgotten that in the Middle East, where hostilities and tensions never end, such projects carry the potential to fuel competition and conflicts and reveal hidden tensions rather than increasing the welfare of societies.
In conclusion, in this geography rife with wars, conflicts, extremism, and terrorism, and where great powers are engaged in a geopolitical struggle, peaceful coexistence might not be a desirable for everyone.
