Ever since the election year dawned on Sri Lanka, doubts about whether the election would take place persisted. Even some leading political players were skeptical. Many ordinary Sri Lankans did not believe that it would take place. They believed Sri Lanka’s shrewd political class would find a way to cancel the election in 2024. This doubt was finally resolved with the gazette notification, which scheduled the much-anticipated presidential election for September 21. Reportedly, many aspiring candidates, including President Wickremesinghe, have paid their deposits.
The official confirmation of the election would undoubtedly generate animated discussions and debates about many issues. One of the questions would be about the Tamil attitude toward the election. The conventional wisdom is that the candidate who wins the minority, especially the Tamil confidence, would win the election. Once, it was suggested that the presidential election could not be won without minority votes. There is very little truth in it. Gotabaya Rajapaksa won the 2019 presidential election without minority votes, a fact he repeatedly emphasized in his book, The Conspiracy to Oust Me from the Presidency. Nevertheless, having the Tamil votes could be helpful, which explains the interest in the Tamil attitude.
A segment of the Tamil polity always prefers to boycott presidential elections. In line with the LTTE philosophy, this segment likes to treat presidential elections as an affair of the South. This time around, the call for a boycott is muted. There could be two reasons for this. One, they learned a lesson in 2005. Two, Gajendrakumar Ponnampalam, leader of the Tamil National People’s Front (TNPF), is absent from the political scene, most likely due to health issues.
This time, there has been a demand to contest the presidential election by fielding a common Tamil candidate. The demand marks a shift from the traditional Tamil attitude vis-à-vis presidential elections. Traditionally, the Tamils have adopted a pragmatic approach, voting for a moderate Sinhala candidate instead of contesting the election. In all postwar presidential elections, they have voted against Rajapaksas. The Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), the premier Tamil political party of the 1970s and 80s, never contested a presidential election. The Tamil National Alliance (TNA) followed the same policy. The Tamil voters complied with their main party’s approach.
In 2024, despite the doubts about the presidential election, Tamil polity remained active, working on the concept of a common Tamil candidate. The North-based Tamil civil society was active and promoted the idea of fielding a common Tamil candidate. Last week, several Tamil groups, including political parties and civil society organizations, signed an agreement to boost the idea. The quest to field a common Tamil candidate stems from the notion that the Sinhala candidates the Tamils voted for in the past have not delivered on their promises. The sentiment is not unjustified. For example, Maithripala Sirisena, who won the 2015 election with the support of the Tamil voters, delivered nothing. His promise to devolve power did not evolve beyond appointing parliamentary committees for constitutional reform. Many candidates the Tamils favored, for instance, Sarath Fonseka, turned against them after the election. Therefore, one cannot condemn the Tamil groups for contemplating the idea of fielding a common candidate to contest the forthcoming election.
The concept of a common Tamil candidate entails two distinct components: (1) the Tamils should contest the presidential election, and (2) the candidate should be accepted and fielded by majority, if not all, Tamil opinions.
The second component, the concept of a common candidate, is fragile. First, the Tamil polity is not a unified unit that can agree on and field an “effective” common candidate. Selecting such a candidate itself would create conflict and disunity. In 2019, Tamil political parties, including the TNA and C.V.Vigneswaran’s Tamil Makkal Koottani (TMK), signed what they called the 13-point proposal. The coalition collapsed almost immediately. The TNA, an essential component of the 13-point coalition, without consulting other partners, endorsed Sajith Premadasa. Vigneswaran decided to stay neutral. Therefore, it won’t be surprising if the new alliance also collapses.
Second, there are hardly any charismatic personalities who could effectively contest the election and gain most of the Tamil votes. This issue could ultimately undermine the idea of fielding a common Tamil candidate. However, it is possible that proponents of this idea are imagining Vignesvaran as the common candidate. A couple of weeks ago, Vigneswaran suggested that the election should be postponed to preserve the existing stability. He also (ridiculously) suggested that the election should be delayed because no candidate will secure the required 50 percent (plus one vote) in this election (MP Vignesvaran says “Good for the country if election is postponed” Daily Mirror, 7/4/2024). This argument is absurd because the Constitution has devised mechanisms to deal with situations where no candidate has the votes to win the election in the first count. Moreover, this could create a bad precedent where authoritarians could postpone elections based on the notion that there are no clear winners.
Nevertheless, the crux of Vignesvaran’s argument is that he likes Wickremesinghe to continue in office. Would he undermine Wickremesinghe’s chances by contesting the election as the common Tamil candidate? Most likely not. He will contest only if it helps Wickremesinghe to win the election. This reality could considerably weaken the idea of a common Tamil candidate and force the proponents to field an ineffective or unattractive candidate, which would not buttress the Tamil position.
Third, the Ilankai Thamil Arasu Katchi (ITAK) is not part of the alliance that promotes a common Tamil candidate. It has not participated in the signing of the agreement. Recently, ITAK parliamentarian Sumanthiran declared that the party would work against and defeat the common Tamil candidate, if fielded. Reportedly, only the Sritharan faction of the party favors the idea of a common Tamil candidate. Therefore, without the support of the main Tamil political party, the idea could fizzle out. When Kumar Ponnampalam contested the 1982 election, the TULF called it a “cheap stunt.” He garnered only 2.67 percent of votes. Therefore, the idea of a common Tamil candidate does not look promising at the moment.
The first component of the concept that the Tamils should contest the forthcoming presidential election is promising. First, the presidential election is a significant political event. As a part of this system, the Tamils should participate by contesting the election. Tamils contesting the election should not be viewed as an anti-national decision. Second, Tamil participation could upset the election results, strengthening their political power in the long run. Therefore, the main Tamil political party, the ITAK, should field one of its leaders as the candidate and mobilize resources to secure most Tamil votes. It should lead the discussions to form a grand Tamil alliance. Currently, the discussions are led by civil society groups. Nevertheless, the indications are that the ITAK would directly or indirectly support one of the Southern candidates and continue with its routine politics.
