By Mohammed A. Salih
(FPRI) -- The recent election of Masoud Pezeshkian as Iran’s president has sparked speculation about the future of Iranian foreign policy, particularly as his campaign promise of “constructive engagement” with the outside world has drawn significant attention.
Pezeshkian, a former health minister and member of Parliament, was relatively unknown inside and outside Iran before he invigorated and won the presidential election held after President Ebrahim Raisi’s death in a helicopter crash in May. He defeated Saeed Jalili, who represented the ultraconservative Principalist wing of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI), with 53 percent of the votes in an election marked by the lowest turnout in the IRI’s history. In light of the polarized political landscape that has marginalized Reformist and Moderate/Centrist elements, Pezeshkian has adopted a conciliatory approach, evencallinghimself a Principalist. However, his policy views align more closely with the Reformist and Moderate/Centrist camps, especially regarding improving relations with the West and regional states. He prominently enlisted former foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, a key advocate for engagement with the West, to campaign with him.
As Pezeshkian prepares to take office on Tehran’s Pasteur Street, many wonder if he will introduce meaningful changes to Iranian regional policy. As far as regional policy is concerned, a Pezeshkian administration will mark continuity rather than change, as Tehran will work toward consolidating its gains in the region and, overall, maintain its aggressive posture toward the US presence and its allies. The president’s role in foreign policy, especially in regional matters, is limited by structural/systemic strictures, with control held by the powerful, unelected pillars of the Islamic Republic of Iran: the Supreme Leader’s Office (beyt-e rahbari) and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) through its Quds Force. Nevertheless, Pezeshkian may introduce a change in style with his largely conciliatory tone and open-arms gestures, seeking cooperation mainly on economic and investment fronts with regional states, particularly as the region faces dangerous circumstances due to the fallout from the conflict in Gaza.
Due to the surrounding region’s strategic importance to the IRI’s stability and survival, the Supreme Leader’s Office and the IRGC’s Quds Force are recognized as the primary authorities in formulating and executing Iran’s regional policies. Although part of the IRGC, the Quds Force directly connects to the Leader’s Office–especially under its former commander, Qassem Soleimani. Since the early years of the IRI, but particularly after the 2003 Iraq War, Iran’s regional policy has focused on developing and consolidating a network of proxies and allies known as the Axis of Resistance (mehvar-e moqavemat). The Quds Force has spearheaded the expansion and strategic coordination of the Axis, which now stretches across the Palestinian territories, Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, with additional Afghan and Pakistani components..
This reality has meant that elected presidents in Iran have limited influence over regional policy. Pezeshkian himself admitted this on multiple occasions, most notably during the last presidential debate. When rival Jalili pressed him on foreign policy decision-making, Pezeshkianburst outin a revealing moment that “the Supreme Leader makes the final decisions” and “would not allow [a decision] if he disliked it.” Caught off-guard by Pezeshkian’s candor, Jalili acknowledged that the role of the president and other bodies was to ensure the “precise, correct, and timely implementation” of the Leader’s decisions.
Since his election, Pezeshkian has already outlined some of his regional priorities. One of his first actions was responding to a letter from Hassan Nasrallah, the Secretary-General of Hezbollah, a key member of the Iran-sponsored Axis of Resistance. PezeshkianreassuredNasrallah that “support to the resistance is deep-rooted in Iran’s core policy” and would continue. In a phone call with Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh, Pezeshkianpledged“comprehensive support for the oppressed people of Palestine until all their aspirations and rights are realized, and Al-Quds [Jerusalem] is liberated.” HereiteratedIran’s support for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and thanked the Yemeni Ansarullah group (Houthis) for their “support of the Palestinian people,”praisingtheir attacks on international shipping lines in the Red Sea as a “brave” decision. The Houthis havetargetedover seventy international ships to pressure Western nations and Israel to stop the conflict in Gaza.
Pezeshkian’s calls with leaders of groups and governments in Iran’s Axis of Resistance not only underscore their centrality in Tehran’s efforts to counter Israel, particularly as the Israeli military prepares for a potential offensive into Lebanon, but also signal the continuation of the long-standing IRI regional policy. The Axis serves as Iran’s primary vehicle for regional domination and power projection along the Gulf and Levant fronts, targeting Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Israel, and potentially Jordan. Iran exploited the chaos from the last decade’s popular uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa to expand the Axis and grow its influence over key states like Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and more recently Yemen. While some view the Axis as a loose alliance with relatively autonomous members, many groups, especially Iraqi armed factions and militias fighting in Syria on Iran’s behalf, owe their existence and status to the IRGC’s direct involvement. Tehran has strategically mobilized and directed this network to achieve its regional objectives. In places such as Syria, Iran and its Axis members have collaborated with global powers like Russia to challenge US’s role in the region. There is no indication this would stop during Pezeshkian’s tenure, particularly as Pezeshkian himself hasstressedthe importance of close relations with Moscow and expressed firm support for the Axis.
The Axis of Resistance feels particularly threatened by the Abraham Accords and the potential reconfiguration of regional security and geopolitics if these accords expand to include countries like Saudi Arabia. This threat has prompted Tehran to adjust its approach to dealing with Gulf Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia. Despite establishing a militarized infrastructure to project power from the south (Houthis) and the north (Iraqi militias), Iran has also pursued diplomatic engagement. Even Raisi’s Principalist government, supported by groups hostile to Saudi Arabia, signed a China-brokered deal with Riyadh in 2023.
Pezeshkian haspledgedto continue such engagement, especially when it comes to economic cooperation and investment, given Iran’s need for non-oil sources of revenue and foreign investment. Iran’s trade with Saudi Arabia has increased steadily. In the first three months of 2023, Iranexported$14 million worth of goods to Saudi Arabia, nearlymatchingits exports over a seven-month period in 2022. Iranian officialshopeto reach $1 billion in trade in the short term. But alongside this push for increased trade, Iran certainly relies on Arab and Muslim backlash against the Gaza conflict to undermine the Abraham Accords and deter Saudi normalization with Israel.
In short, when it comes to the Middle East, despite occasional fluctuations, anti-Israelism, support for the Palestinian cause, and exporting the revolution by mainly creating and supporting Shia militia groups that espouse the IRI’svelayat-e faqihideology to capture regional states from within, have remained fixtures of Iranian policy since 1979. There is no indication that Pezeshkian intends or has the ability to alter this grand strategy.
Given Iran’s domestic power structure and internal struggles, analysts and policymakers often debate whether each new president can bring changes to the country’s foreign policy. To understand this, one must consider the nature of elections in Iran, an authoritarian state. Iranian elections involve a two-tiered process starting with a rigorous vetting phase by the unelected Guardian Council, appointed by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and his loyalist chief of the judiciary. The Council disqualifies candidates deemed insufficiently loyal to the system, effectively the Supreme Leader. This vetting is so stringent that even senior officials like Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani and President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad were disqualified in the recent presidential election—notably Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, a key revolutionary figure and two-term president, was also disqualified from the 2013 presidential election.
In the second phase, vetted and handpicked candidates considered loyal and unthreatening to the Supreme Leader compete in a managed election. The results can be tampered with if deemed necessary by the establishment’s unelected organs, as is widely believed to have occurred in the 2009 presidential elections. Pezeshkian’s ascent to the presidency, though competitive in the second phase, resulted from this carefully orchestrated process . Given these structural and systemic constraints, expecting substantial or substantive change in regional policy from a Pezeshkian administration is unrealistic unless the powerful unelected centers of the IRI show a willingness for change, which is currently absent or unclear. The structure and flow of power within the IRI allow unelected institutions to stall and thwart plans by elected bodies like the government and cabinet, but the latter cannot do the same, especially in the realm of foreign policy.
Insofar as outreach to regional states, particularly Gulf Cooperation Council members and the West, Pezeshkian and his foreign minister will be able to play a formal diplomatic function in terms of government-to-government interactions. This will be aided by the likelynominationof pro-engagement Reformist/Moderate figures for the role of foreign ministers, such as Abbas Araqchi, Mehdi Sanayi, or Seyed Mohammad Sadr. However, they will not drive policy or be its sole implementers, as the IRGC’s Quds Force will still play a crucial on-the-ground role in executing regional policy.
At best, through the Supreme National Security Council, the president and some cabinet members might influence certain aspects of foreign policy decision-making. However, Iranian law and precedent dictate that Khamenei, an unelected figure, holds the final authority over the Council’s decisions. Pezeshkian’s willingness to engage with the outside world and his less controversial profile compared to predecessors like Raisi and Ahmadinejad will facilitate outreach to neighbors and the West. However, these qualities do not empower him to dictate the direction and priorities of Iranian foreign policy.
A critical question is whether the Reformist-Moderate/Centrist current is willing to defy Khamenei and the unelected institutions in domestic and foreign policy realms. After years of being largely excluded from power, the Reformist-Moderate groups’ return to government through Pezeshkian puts them in a dilemma on how to deal with the powerful unelected centers within the IRI establishment. Antagonizing the Supreme Leader and IRGC risks further setbacks for the Reformist-Moderate camp, especially since their popular base has dramatically shrunk. Pezeshkian’s electoral victory after two rounds of competition was largely owed to considerable turnout from his fellow ethnic Turks in the second round, not the Reformist-Moderate political machinery.
If the Pezeshkian administration aligns with the unelected centers of the regime, it will likely play a more prominent public role in Iranian regional policy, similar to the former Raisi-Amir Abdollahian duo. Otherwise, like the Hassan Rouhani-Zarif duo, the Pezeshkian government’s regional role will be further eroded and limited. Zarif himselfcomplainedof such sidelining during his tenure, even launching unprecedentedattackson Quds Force’s former commander Qassem Soleimani for ignoring his role in regional affairs.
Given the current dynamics, a Pezeshkian administration is unlikely to significantly impact Iran’s policy toward the United States in the Middle East. Without a grand deal with the United States on reviving the nuclear Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or regional affairs—something Pezeshkian cannot initiate without approval from Khamenei and the IRGC—Iran will maintain its hostile stance toward US military presence particularly in Iraq and Syria, areas of strategic importance to Iran. The Quds Force will continue to use proxy militias in these countries to threaten and target US troops, as has been the case since October 7.
The US presence in Iraq and Syria remains the primary obstacle to the expansion of Iran’s dominance over these two states. In both countries, US forces are primarily stationed in areas controlled by Kurdish partners. Iran, alongside theAssad regime, hasusedtransnational and local tribal militias to harass the Syrian Democratic Forces and attack US bases in Syria. In Iraq, Tehran has targeted US forces and allied Kurdish interests directly and through affiliated Shia armed proxies. Despite a lull in such attacks, the Pentagonblamedan IRGC-backed group for launching two drone attacks on US troops at Iraq’s Ayn al-Assad airbase on July 16, highlighting a recurring pattern of aggression by Iran-sponsored Axis of Resistance groups. Using these proxy groups allows Tehran to deny direct responsibility, while reaping the benefits of making the United States appear weak and increasing pressure on US policymakers to withdraw troops from Iraq and Syria. Tehran hopes that the rise of isolationist trends on both the left and right of the US ideological and political spectrum, combined with constant harassment and calculated attrition of US troops, will eventually compel a future US president to throw the towel and withdraw from the region.
Overall, Washington should expect Iran’s aggressive regional policy to persist, regardless of whether it chooses to target US troops, interests, and allies through proxies or directly. State and non-state actors in the region allied with the United States understand Iran’s expansionist goals and the threats it poses to regional security and stability. Given the entrenched power of unelected institutions like the Supreme Leader’s Office and the IRGC, a Pezeshkian administration will likely follow the established course, reinforcing Iran’s commitment to its long-standing objective of being a, if notthe, dominant power in the Middle East.
