The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) is Pakistan’s main intelligence agency, established in 1947. Initially a small military unit, it has grown into a powerful organization, often seen as more influential than the country’s government. Over the years, the military’s control over politics has allowed the ISI to operate almost like a separate state. Today, the ISI not only gathers intelligence, but also plays a key role in shaping Pakistan’s foreign policy.
Despite their secretive nature, Western intelligence agencies have worked closely with the ISI during the Cold War and the War on Terror. In the 1980s, the ISI gained international attention by helping the CIA support Mujahideen fighters against the Soviet Union. While foreign powers have seen Pakistan as an ally against communism and terrorism, they often misunderstand the regional interests of both Pakistan and the ISI.
In the 1980s, Pakistan became home to over two million Afghan refugees and served as a crucial frontline state, offering a safe base for the Mujahideen fighting Soviet invasion. During this time, Pakistan partnered closely with the US, managing about $2-3 billion in covert aid from the CIA to support the Mujahideen, including training over 80,000 fighters. Even after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, both current and former Pakistani military officers continued to provide training and support in Afghanistan, ultimately aiding Taliban forces in combat.
Since its creation in 1947, Pakistan, which has a Muslim majority, has seen India as a major threat. To counter India’s influence, the ISI has supported various proxy groups from Kashmir to Afghanistan to boost Pakistan’s security. Over the years, the ISI has trained and armed a range of proxies, including local militias and Islamist extremists. However, except for the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, these efforts have not been very successful. In fact, this approach has harmed Pakistan’s relationships with other countries, which have accused it of backing terrorist groups.
The formation of Pakistan’s intelligence community was marked by chaos and danger. In 1947, Britain divided India into two independent countries based on religion, creating the Dominions of India and Pakistan. India’s Partition led to widespread violence and migration, as conflicts erupted between the Hindu and Muslim communities.
From the very beginning, Pakistan was a prime example of a ‘security state’, largely due to the trauma and violence experienced during Partition. This turmoil led the country to prioritize security and protection from its founding. As a result, Pakistan’s focus on security significantly shaped its policies and national identity.
Founded in 1948, the ISI was created by Major-General Sir Walter J Cawthorn, a former intelligence officer in the British Indian Army, along with Syed Shahid Hamid, a prominent Pakistani army brigadier. In the late-1940s, during a restructuring of Pakistan’s intelligence agencies, Cawthorn and Hamid sought to reshape Pakistan’s military intelligence based on the British Joint Intelligence Bureau (JIB).
The British model enhanced military intelligence by adding economic and political intelligence to its duties. For Pakistan, the Kashmir War highlighted the need to combine intelligence efforts, which was crucial for understanding the complex conflicts in the border region. However, in its early years, the ISI developed slowly and faced common challenges that plagued Pakistan’s intelligence community, particularly a shortage of technical staff and managers.
In the 1950s, Pakistan’s intelligence community was mainly led by the Intelligence Bureau (IB). Unlike the ISI, which reported to the Commander-in-Chief, the IB reported directly to the Prime Minister, giving it more influence and access to power. After the 1949 UN ceasefire in Kashmir, the Pakistani government worried about losing what was left of Kashmir. So, the IB took the lead in Pakistan’s unconventional warfare strategy in the region. Meanwhile, the ISI remained a second-rate intelligence agency, struggling to gain the same attention from the civilian government as the IB.
In 1958, Ayub Khan, Commander-in-Chief of Pakistan’s Army, staged a successful coup and overthrew the civilian government. Under his military rule, all members of Pakistan’s intelligence community reported directly to him. However, the three main intelligence agencies—the IB, MI, and ISI—competed with each other due to unclear and overlapping duties. Importantly for ISI, Khan, being a military leader, mistrusted the civilian-run IB, which led him to favour the military intelligence (MI) agencies.
The ISI played a crucial role in strengthening Khan’s position by monitoring criticism of his regime and suppressing political opposition. Before the 1965 presidential election, the ISI began its involvement in domestic intelligence by spying on groups that opposed Ayub Khan. By the mid-1960s, the ISI had become the leading intelligence organization in Pakistan, supporting the Khan regime. However, its focus on silencing domestic opponents and manipulating elections left it unprepared for the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War.
The failures of the 1965 Indo-Pak War and growing public unrest led to Ayub Khan’s resignation in 1969, marking the start of Pakistan’s return to civilian rule in 1971. During the 1970s, the return of civilian leadership under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto reduced the ISI’s influence.
In 1977, the military once again overthrew Pakistan’s civilian government. General Zia became the new president and started Islamization of the country. This change also affected the ISI, as Zia replaced the Director-General, Ghulam Jilani, with Mohammed Riaz Khan, a devout Muslim who followed the Sharia law.
During the 1970s and 1980s, Zia redirected the ISI’s focus toward domestic repression, targeting his opponents, including Shia militants and loyalists of Bhutto. Under Zia, the ISI’s role expanded significantly, as it took on the responsibility of coordinating the Mujahideen insurgency in Afghanistan and promoting terrorism in the Indian Punjab. By the time General Zia died in 1988, ISI had solidified its position.
In Pakistan, the appointment of a new Director-General of ISI (DGISI) often attracts more attention than the naming of a Prime Minister or President. This position is viewed as one of the most powerful in the country because the ISI can secretly influence both domestic and foreign policies. Typically, a serving three-star lieutenant-general from the Pak Army is chosen for this role. Although the Prime Minister officially appoints the DGISI, the Chief of the Army Staff plays a significant role in recommending and selecting candidates.
Since 2021, Nadeem Anjum has headed the DGISI. His appointment stirred controversy because the civilian government was not consulted. This led to a three-week stalemate between the Chief of the Army Staff and Prime Minister Imran Khan. Ultimately, the army prevailed, and Anjum was appointed DGISI in October 2021. In October 2022, Anjum became the first DGISI to publicly address the media when the ISI faced accusations regarding the murder of a well-known Pak journalist.
Reports from the UK-based investigative media outlet, Grey Dynamics, indicate that the ISI is located in Islamabad. Its headquarters are quietly situated in a busy civilian area of the city, with only one barrier entrance near a hospital. In 2009, a journalist from The Guardian was allowed inside the complex and described the ISI HQ as looking like “a well-funded university”, complete with tidy lawns and a central fountain.
Under the DGISI, there are three Deputy Directors-General (DDGs), each a two-star officer from the Pak military. Each DDG is responsible for one of the ISI’s three divisions:
The ISI is further divided into various departments:
Between 1979 and 1989, the ISI teamed up with the CIA to counter the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. During this time, ISI provided advanced US weapons to Afghan resistance groups, which helped the agency gain international attention. Their collaboration was crucial in weakening the Soviet forces, with Pakistan sending more than 75,000 tons of US military supplies into Afghanistan from 1983 to 1987.
Pakistan’s interest in Afghanistan started long before 1979 and did not end with the Soviet Union’s withdrawal in 1989. Since gaining independence in 1947, Pakistan viewed Afghanistan as a significant threat, similar to India. Afghanistan had supported the idea of Pashtunistan, which aimed to separate from Pakistan. Because of this, Pakistan has always preferred a friendly or weak government in Kabul.
Pashtunistan is a proposed region that includes areas in Pakistan and Afghanistan, where the Pashtun people live. The idea is for these areas to unite as an independent state. Afghanistan has historically supported this concept, causing concern for Pakistan about potential territorial loss.
Since gaining independence, Pakistan has often felt economically and militarily outmatched by India. To challenge its neighbour, Pakistan has used unconventional methods, particularly focusing on the Muslim-majority region of Jammu-Kashmir. After failing to take control of Kashmir in the 1965 Indo-Pak War, Pakistan intensified its unconventional warfare efforts there.
In the 1980s, the ISI set up a Kashmir bureau to manage operations, logistics and psychological tactics. This bureau trained and equipped various groups, including the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) and other radical Islamist organizations. During the 1980s and 1990s, India’s intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), accused Pakistan of supporting terrorism within India.
Pakistan’s relationship with the US-led war on terror is quite complicated. On one side, Pakistan helped the US during the 2001 intervention in Afghanistan. On the other, it sheltered radical Islamist extremists who attacked the coalition forces. In the 1990s, the ISI also played a significant role in supporting the rise of the Taliban, which was involved with the al-Qaeda in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks.
In 2011, Osama bin Laden, the person behind the 9/11 attacks, was killed by US Navy SEALs in Abbottabad, in Pakistan. For six years, he had been living in a compound close to a Pak military academy. The fact that Laden was hiding there raised major concerns about the ISI’s involvement and effectiveness: Did the ISI knowingly ignore the presence of one of the world’s most wanted terrorists?
In the 1980s and 1990s, the ISI, possibly, had connections with the al-Qaeda as part of their network of Islamist allies in Afghanistan. While the ISI supported pro-Taliban groups, it is unlikely they had direct control over the al-Qaeda’s actions. There is no proof that the ISI selected the al-Qaeda’s targets or directly assisted in their operations.
Since its establishment in 1948, the ISI has become a key force in Pakistan, reflecting the military’s significant influence in the country. Military rulers have changed the ISI from a simple intelligence agency into a powerful organization that supports the military’s dominance. Acting as an extension of the military, the ISI has shown itself to be a major player in Pakistan’s politics and operates like a government within government.
