By Alfin Basundoro
Indonesia has reportedlyshown interestin procuring YJ-12E missiles, one of the latest Chinese-made coastal defence cruise missiles. This aligns with Jakarta’s plan to develop a robust coastal defence system to deter repeated maritime incursions in its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) around the South China Sea, particularly by Chinese vessels. For instance, in early 2023, the largest Chinese Coast Guard vessel entered and stayed in Indonesia’s EEZ near the North Natuna Sea for some weeks.
While this approach seems strategic for improving bilateral relations with China, the procurement may not yield the deterrence effects desired by Indonesia. Instead, it carries significant risks to Indonesia’s overall military modernisation. Indonesia may be being provided with a downgraded version of the missile and the purchase may negatively impact its relations with Western partners. To navigate these complexities and maximise the benefits of its strategic partnerships, Indonesia should consider strengthening its non-military security cooperation with China.
Since establishing acomprehensive strategic partnershipin 2013, Indonesia and China have fostered cordial relations across various sectors, including investment, mining and infrastructure. Defence and security cooperation are alsointegral to the partnershipbetween Beijing and Jakarta, encompassing high-level security dialogue, joint training and military industry and trade. Until 2023, Indonesia’s defenceprocurements from Chinaincluded acquisitions of CH-4B armed unmanned aerial vehicles valued at approximately US$24 million, C-705 and C-802 anti-ship missiles worth a combined US$89.2 million and TD-2000B self-propelled air defence systems valued at US$80 million.
Yet strengthening bilateral security cooperation, mainly through defence acquisitions, is easier said than done and is becoming increasingly problematic. While collaboration with China might seem beneficial for Indonesian defence policymakers in building military capacity, China’s aggressive behaviour in the South China Sea, including its2023 incursionin the North Natuna Sea, poses a significant risk to further progress.
If Indonesia continues with the YJ-12E purchase, China will likely supply a downgraded version of the missile that reduces its capability to deter China’s own naval assets. China has sold downgraded weapons several times to Indonesia, including the C-802, the export variant of the YJ-83, with a reduced range. In contrast, in 2022 Indonesia signed a procurement agreement for 45Atmaca anti-ship missilesfrom Turkey. Turkey is generally perceived as maintainingfairness in arms transfers, which enhances confidence in the reliability and effectiveness of the Atmaca missiles.
Amid escalating tensions in the South China Sea and heightened geopolitical rivalries between China and the United States, both sides have weaponised their economies. Procuring Chinese missiles could adversely impact Indonesia’s relations with Western partners, which are increasingly pursuing a de-risking strategy to mitigate risks associated with Chinese influence. Indonesia can draw lessons from Turkey’s acquisition of the S-400 air defence system from Russia, which led to its exclusion from the F-35 joint development partnership with the United States.
Indonesia has relied on its Western counterparts to modernise its military and is undertakingmajor procurement projects, including the purchase of Dassault Rafale fighter jets, Scorpene submarines and other advanced equipment. Indonesia is also in the process of procuring F-15EX fighter aircraft from the United States. If Indonesia continues to acquire weapons from China, it risks jeopardising these procurement efforts due to concerns over its perceived strategic alignment with China.
Beyond geopolitical risks, this missile procurement complicates maintenance and training. As of 2023, Indonesia possessed severalanti-ship missilesincluding the Exocet from France, the Russian P-800 Oniks and the C-705 and C-802 from China. Soon Indonesia will receive the Atmaca anti-ship missile. The addition of the YJ-12E will increase the number of anti-ship missile types to six, requiring technicians and operators to learn new systems and resulting in higher maintenance costs.
Jakarta should focus instead on strengthening its non-traditional security cooperation with China to hedge against risks and maximise the benefits of its strategic partnership with Beijing. This approach poses minimal risk, as non-traditional security is less closely tied to geopolitical dynamics. Several Western countries also still cooperate with China in this sector, such as France, whichpartners with Chinain counter-terrorism capacity-building for law enforcement agencies.
Thisapproach might includecounter-terrorism cooperation, intelligence sharing and cooperation to address transnational crimes such as human trafficking and cybercrime, which areincreasing in both countries. Both countries should also continue their ongoing initiatives, such as finishing the plan of action for cyberspace security, engaging in joint anti-corruption initiatives and renewing the counter-terrorism memorandum of understanding, which expired in 2020.
While defence procurement will continue to play a role in Indonesia’sstrategic partnership with China,the country must carefully navigate the risks posed by using Chinese military armaments to faceChina’s assertive actionsin regional waters and the risk of Western economic weaponisation. By prioritising non-traditional security cooperation, Indonesia can safeguard its national interests while fostering a balanced and pragmatic approach to international relations.
