Masoud Pezeshkian, the president-elect of Iran, is set to be inaugurated on July 30. His election campaign was marked by significant promises related to foreign policy, aimed at shifting the dynamics of Iran’s international relations. Central to his agenda was the pledge to reengage with the nuclear deal and improve diplomatic ties with the West, including the US. But whether Pezeshkian will be able to achieve these objectives is a matter of considerable debate. The complexities of Iran’s political landscape pose significant challenges to the realization of his foreign policy goals.
One of Pezeshkian’s primary foreign policy promises has been a return to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action nuclear agreement, which was signed in 2015 but fell by the wayside after the US withdrew in 2018. He views it as essential for Iran’s reintegration into the global community. Additionally, he aims to mend and improve relations with Western nations, including the US. However, the feasibility of these promises is contingent on the political will within Iran and the reaction of the international community.
The main objective behind Pezeshkian’s goals is to lift the sanctions that have long crippled Iran’s economy . Sanctions relief is seen as a gateway to numerous benefits, including the full reintegration of the Islamic Republic into the global financial system. Such a reintegration would increase Iran’s global legitimacy, allowing it to engage more freely in international trade and investment. In addition, lifting sanctions would significantly boost Iran’s revenues.
However, Iran’s advancements in its nuclear program have raised serious concerns both regionally and globally. The International Atomic Energy Agency last month issued a stark warning after its inspectors confirmed that Iran had begun feeding uranium gas into advanced centrifuges at its Natanz facility, marking a significant escalation in its enrichment capabilities. These advanced centrifuges enhance the efficiency of uranium enrichment by spinning the uranium gas at exceptionally high speeds.
This process allows Iran to enrich uranium to higher levels more quickly, drastically reducing the time required to produce nuclear weapons. Iran has acknowledged enriching uranium to 84 percent, which is perilously close to the 90 percent threshold needed for weapons-grade material. This development has heightened fears of a potential nuclear arms race in the region.
The Biden administration is under considerable pressure, particularly from Republicans, to take decisive action to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. This pressure is not solely a matter of foreign policy but also a significant domestic political issue, with various stakeholders influencing the administration’s approach.
It is worth noting that, while the nuclear deal involves multiple countries — France, Germany, the UK, Russia, China and the US — the most crucial players in reaching a deal are Tehran and Washington. Historical precedents, such as the agreement reached by the Obama administration with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, demonstrate that political will in both countries is essential for any agreement. However, the current political climates in Iran and the US present formidable obstacles to reviving the deal, despite any mutual interests that may exist.
In spite of Pezeshkian’s expressed desire to return to the nuclear deal and the Biden administration’s long-standing support for its revival, the prevailing pressure in both Washington and Tehran opposes such an outcome. Trust between the two governments is at an all-time low. In Washington, the opposition comes mainly from Republicans, who argue that Iran cannot be trusted to comply with any agreement and that sanctions should be maintained or even intensified to curb its regional ambitions. Meanwhile, in Iran, hard-liners, including the senior cadre of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, oppose reengaging with the US. They view the nuclear deal as a potential threat to their ideological and political interests.
This entrenched opposition on both sides creates a challenging environment for any diplomatic breakthrough.
Furthermore, the socioeconomic and political conditions have changed since the Rouhani administration. Previously, sanctions were severely affecting Iran, creating an appetite for a nuclear deal. Today, the sanctions are less impactful, diminishing the motivation for a new agreement. During Rouhani’s tenure, the economic strain from sanctions had reached a tipping point, compelling the Iranian leadership to seek relief through diplomacy. However, the Iranian leadership today perceives that the impact of sanctions has been mitigated through various means, reducing the urgency for a deal.
Additionally, Iran’s ongoing tensions with Israel have shifted priorities, with a focus on maintaining a strong defensive posture rather than pursuing diplomatic avenues. This change in the internal and external landscapes complicates the possibility of a renewed nuclear agreement under Pezeshkian’s leadership.
When discussing improved relations between Iran and the West, it is essential to distinguish between the EU and the US. While better ties with the EU are feasible, improving relations with Washington seems highly unlikely as long as Khamenei remains in power. Opposition to the US is a fundamental principle of the Islamic Republic, rooted in ideological commitments. The EU, on the other hand, has been more open to engagement with Iran, focusing on economic and diplomatic ties that could benefit both sides.
In conclusion, despite Pezeshkian's promises, better ties with the US and the revival of the nuclear deal are extremely unlikely. The deep-seated mistrust between the two nations, coupled with the internal political dynamics in both Tehran and Washington, creates a formidable barrier to any meaningful diplomatic progress. As such, the prospects for a major shift in US-Iran relations under Pezeshkian’s presidency remain bleak.
