By Yong Suk Lee
(FPRI) -- Long-time Korea observers Robert Carlin and Sieg Hecker claimed in an online article on January 11 this year that Kim Jong Un has made a strategic decision to go to war. Carlin and Hecker argue that Kim’s (tactical) decision for war would “only come after he concluded [that] all other options had been exhausted, and that the previous strategy shaping North Korea policy since 1990 had irrevocably failed.” Just a few days later, Kim Jong Un abandoned reunification as a national aspiration in a speech and declared that South Korea is a “primary foe and principal enemy,” further fueling regional and international concerns about a possible conflict on the peninsula.
North Korea’s martial declarations or threats of war should not come as a surprise for Korea experts, however. The North has been at war with the United States and South Korea since 1950. North Korea in its current form is an ideological expression of the Kim family of rulers, from Kim Il Sung to Kim Jong Il and now Kim Jong Un. Pyongyang has made clear that its primary goal is preservation of the Kim family regime and dynastic succession, not the well-being of the North Korean people, dedicating North Korea’s meager economic resources to build strategic arms to guard the throne. Kim Jong Un’s right to rule comes from the barrel of a gun, as it did for his father and grandfather, and a constant state of conflict with his own people or foes, real or imagined, is the paranoid reality of his regime.
No amount of assurances and economic aid from the United States and South Korea can soothe Pyongyang’s paranoia, although successive South Korean administrations have tried. Unfortunately, South Korea’s very existence is an existential threat to North Korea because it runs counter to the ideological foundation of the Kim family of rulers, showing the world that Koreans can live just fine—free, wealthy, and vibrant—without the Kims.
North Korea has frequently lashed out against South Korea militarily. In March 2010, the Northsank a South Korean warship, killing forty-six sailors. In November of the same year, it bombarded a South Korean–held island, Yeonpyeong Do, in the Yellow Sea,resultingin four dead and eighteen seriously wounded. Pyongyang used a South Korean marine corps military exercise occurring on the island as an excuse for the artillery attack. The North Korean attack was well rehearsed and coincided with an internal propaganda campaign to boost the standings of the heir apparent at the time, Kim Jong Un, as an“artillery genius,”according to South Korean officials.
In many ways, Kim Jong Un, being groomed for leadership at the time, was picking up where his father and grandfather left off, recalling events such as thebombing of the Korean Air passenger jetin 1987 that killed 115 people or anattempted assassination of the South Korean presidenton a state visit to Burma in 1983 that killed 21 people.
Nations have gone to war over far less serious incidents. Journalist Don Oberdorfer claimed in his bookThe Two Koreasthat South Korea indeed came close to taking military action in 1983 after the Burma assassination attempt, but U.S. diplomatic pressure forced Seoul to back down. Unfortunately, this is a consistent theme in US -South Korea relations.
When North Korea kills South Koreans, it is counting on the United States to pressure Seoul not to respond militarily, and Washington lives up to Pyongyang’s expectations every time. The US response following a North Korean provocation against South Korea is to encourage all sides to calm down and to twist the South’s arm not to respond militarily. Washington tries to mollify Seoul with US Air Force flyovers and Navy ship visits and vague White House statements about “all options being on the table.” All options are not on the table, and these actions do not deter North Korea. The US reaction is predictable, North Korea is counting on it, and Pyongyang is winning the deterrence game.
In 2010, when South Korean President Lee Myung-bak made the decision to finish the military exercise that the North Korean attack interrupted, the level of public pressure the Barack Obama administration placed on South Korea was stunning. The United States once again offered sanctions and bomber flyovers. On one hand, the US response fits Albert Einstein’s definition of insanity: doing the same things over and over again and expecting different results. On the other hand, US concerns are understandable. Around28,500 US troopsare stationed in South Korea, and Washington does not want to risk the lives of its soldiers or citizens living and working in Korea. There are more US soldiers and citizens in Japan, if military escalation on the Korean Peninsula triggers a regional escalation.
The United States is not alone in shying away from military escalation or actions that could threaten North Korea. South Korea is reluctant as well. The administration in Seoul does not want to take a course of action that could jeopardize its economic prosperity or endanger a large number of citizens, most of whom live within North Korean artillery range in the capital city of Seoul. It is a prudent and understandable concern.
President Lee, in the end, rejected US pleas and finishedthe scheduled military exercise on Yeonpyeong islandthe North interrupted. Despite doom and gloom predictions of some experts, Pyongyang remained quiet. When the entire South Korean military was on a war footing, waiting for the North Koreans to act, they chose to do nothing.
Despite North Korea’s bluster or the worst fears of some observers, there are no indications that Kim Jong Un wants war with the United States and South Korea. He has shown in multiple international engagements, including three meetings with President Donald Trump, that he is not crazy. Kim is not suicidal and most likely wants what all dictators want: to rule for a lifetime and die of old age. He does not want to see his and his family’s pictures on a deck of cards, being hunted down by US Special Forces, because he woke up one morning and decided to attack the United States. There is no retirement for Kim Jong Un. There is no book deal, no lucrative speech tours, no seats on corporate boards; either he dies while in power of natural causes, or he and his family will likely meet a terrible end.
US policymakers and military officials consistently overestimate North Korea’s risk calculus and cede strategic leverage and escalation dominance to Pyongyang. If the North launches another limited military attack against South Korea, looking for a quick cheap shot to bloody Seoul’s nose, the United States should not press the South to restrain from a proportional counter-attack. A South Korean military response will undermine decades of North Korea’s strategic thinking. The South is more than capable of defending itself, and Kim Jong Un has nothing to gain and everything to lose if he escalates.
South Korea’s counter-attack against North Korea in a future provocation would also send a clear message to Russia, which just signed a new mutual defense agreement with the North, that Washington will not restrain its allies from defending themselves. This is a message that previous US administrations failed to send to Russian President Vladimir Putin, with disastrous results.
Korea scholar Victor Cha makes a compelling case that some type of provocation from North Korea is likely in 2024. His Center for Strategic and International Studies data makes a strong case that North Korean belligerence increases during an election year. If North Korea does stay true to form in 2024, the Joseph Biden administration should not miss this opportunity to reset Pyongyang’s assumptions about Washington’s relationship with Seoul. This is especially critical now, when Kim Jong Un is riding high following Putin’s visit to North Korea and a new treaty with Russia. This is the first reversal of geopolitical fortune for the North since the end of the Cold War. The United States and South Korea missing another opportunity to set clear boundaries for Pyongyang will make Kim more dangerous than he already is. Kim Jong Un is likely bolder and more confident with a superpower ally, and Washington relying on the same old playbook on Korea will further fuel his destructive appetite.
