By Jade Guan
Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te marks the third consecutive term for the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party, intensifying cross-strait relations. Some argue that there is a dichotomy betweenhawksanddoves, or those who favour force and those who do not in order to incorporate Taiwan into China. The US military has increasingly noted that the hawks are winning this battle.
Then-Indo-Pacific Commander John Aquilinostated in March 2024that Beijing aims for a forceful reunification by 2027. But a hawk-dove distinction may be irrelevant because there is only one prevailing approach in China that matters — Xi Jinping’s approach. Beijing’s tactics towards Taipei have evolved since the Democratic Progressive Party came to power in 2016, but theoverall strategy and objectiveshave remained consistent.
Xi has consistently emphasised the long-term and overarching interests of the Chinese nation when addressing cross-strait relations. This wasreiterated in his meetingwith former Taiwanese president Ma Ying-jeou in April 2024, emphasising peaceful reunification and integrated development over unification by force.
The essential calculation for Beijing involves comparing the challenges posed by the fully empowered administration of former president Tsai Ing-wen with those of Lai’s relatively weaker position. Tsai won 57 per cent of the vote and a legislative majority, presenting a significant challenge. In contrast, Lai won with just 40 per cent and lacks a legislative majority. Beijing’s course of action focuses more on managing these challenges than altering its fundamental goals.
While the overall strategic posture will not change in the short term, Beijing may adopt a mix of hard and soft tactics towards Taiwan over the next four years. The softer approach involves economic incentives that benefit Taiwan and advance cultural and business relations. The harder approach includes opposing and combating Taiwan independence, diplomatic isolation and military exercises around Taiwan when necessary.
Distinguishing between Beijing’s overall strategy and these evolving tactics towards Taiwan help avoid overinterpreting or misreading Beijing’s temporal actions, such as the military drillconducted immediately afterLai’s inauguration speech.
That said, there are safety measures and risk factors thatdeserve more attentionto navigate troublesome cross-strait relations in the next four years, including US–China communication channels, US–Taiwan relations, cross-strait political and societal interaction, and Taiwan’sinternal political dynamics.
As mutual trust between China and the United States has eroded, the availability of communication channels between the two has become increasingly important for discussing contentious issues and reducing the risk of miscalculation. Despite tensions, channels between the United States and China have resumed, as evidenced by high-level meetings and continued dialogue such as the Xi–Biden call on 2 April 2024 and subsequent visits by US officials to Beijing. Military dialogue hasalso continueddespite more frequent and proactive exercises by both sides.
US–Taiwan relations have become robust, characterised by high levels of communication and trust, and this relationship acts as a crucial variable in the broader US–China–Taiwan dynamic. Washington could ensure Taipei does not cross Beijing’s red line of pursuing formal independence. At the same time, Washington’s close relationship with Taipei acts as adeterrentagainst Beijing and any plans to unify by force.
While the lack of trust between Beijing and Taipei makes restarting formal communication and negotiations challenging, the potential for gradual improvement through civilian exchanges remains a critical aspect of cross-strait relations. The16thStraits Forumwas held in June 2024 in Fujian, closest province in China to Taiwan. This signals that China still aims to expand exchanges, aligning with its strategic goal of achieving integrated development with Taiwan.
The current political landscape in Taiwan, where the ruling party does not hold an absolute majority, implies that Beijing might place hope in mainstream Taiwanese sentiment favouring peace and development over conflict and regression.
With 60 per cent of Taiwanese voters not supporting Lai, Beijing is unlikely to initiate conflict, understanding the potential backlash from this majority. Equally important, with the main opposition Kuomintang and its smaller partner, the People’s First Party, nowholding a majorityin the legislative branch andadvocating for improvingcross-strait relations, Beijing may pursueasymmetric engagements. This could involve direct dialogue with pro-mainland parties to bolster their political standings and weaken the legitimacy of the Democratic Progressive Party administration.
While the outlined risk factors theoretically remain under control, there are significant concerns, particularly regarding the United States’ domestic political climate. With an overwhelming anti-China sentimentamong US voters, both major parties are likely to adopt increasingly anti-China policies. If these policies include stronger support for Taiwan, this could introduce new variables into the cross-strait relationship.
If civilian exchanges continue to stagnate or even regress, this could also exacerbate societal and civil concerns within cross-strait relations and raise more doubts about integrated development policies.
Cross-strait relations remain complex and fraught with potential risks, but the strategic goals and basic frameworks have not fundamentally shifted under Xi. By distinguishing between strategic objectives and tactical manoeuvres, it is possible to navigate these relations without succumbing to alarmist interpretations. The primary task is to manage existing risk factors while remaining vigilant against emerging threats, ensuring that the relationship does not deteriorate into open conflict.
