The end of new START can be a new beginning
Newly declassified volumes in the Foreign Relations of the United States series show how.
Recent press coverage of the expiration of the New START Treaty distorts the historical record of late Cold War nuclear diplomacy. “For the first time in decades,” reads one headline, “the U.S. and Russia have no limits on nuclear weapons.” That statement is misleading—at best.
From November 28, 1986, until December 5, 1994, no constraints limited U.S. and Soviet strategic offensive forces that could span oceans and hit the homeland of each other. From June 1, 1988, onward, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty set Moscow and Washington on a path toward eliminating Soviet SS-20s, SS-4s, SS-5s, as well as U.S. Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles stationed in NATO countries. Yet none of those Soviet missiles could reach the United States.
This distinction is meaningful. So is the history that preceded and followed November 28, 1986. Recently published Foreign Relations volumes show how presidents achieved arms control breakthroughs even without existing constraints.
For nearly six years, President Ronald Reagan took no actions to undercut the expired 1972 Interim Agreement (SALT I) and unratified 1979 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II). The United States was retiring obsolete Titan missiles faster than it was delivering on President Reagan’s Strategic Forces Modernization Program of deploying advanced MX “Peacekeeper” missiles, affixing air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) to B-52 bombers, perfecting the B-2 Stealth Bomber, and sending to sea SSBN submarines equipped with the Trident II D5 missiles. So, keeping SALT limits made sense.
In March 1985, Reagan ordered a review of his policy, termed “Interim Restraint,” because upcoming sea trials of a new Trident submarine meant he had to decide whether to retire an older Poseidon submarine to stay within SALT limits. Kicking off this interagency review, National Security Advisor Robert “Bud” McFarlane made clear that the Soviets were cheating across the board.
As they grappled with options in a National Security Council meeting of June 3, 1985, Reagan’s advisors concurred on the merits of sticking with SALT II until December 31—when the unratified treaty would have expired anyway—yet disagreed on next steps. In this meeting and elsewhere, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) underscored this point that the U.S. needed modernized forces—not just higher numbers of older ones.
“I am prepared to go the extra mile in the direction of trying to establish an interim framework of true, mutual restraint,” read the National Security Decision Directive that Reagan signed. While committing to staying with SALT limits throughout the rest of 1985, the president also requested tailored options for how to respond to Soviet violations.
His advisors obliged. “We believe modernized strategic and conventional forces and vigorous SDI [Strategic Defense Initiative] research present the strongest message to the Soviets in response to their treaty violations,” Secretary of Defense Weinberger wrote Reagan on the eve of his November 19–20 meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev in Geneva. After Reagan returned home, Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs James Watkins sent Secretary Weinberger options for tailored responses using older technologies with the caveat “that continued, balanced force modernization provides the most effective military response to Soviet noncompliance.”
In a March 25, 1986, meeting of the National Security Council, President Reagan “suggested that we replace the interim restraint framework with our new START position and failing that the U.S. would undertake further programmatic options.” With ongoing arms control negotiations in Geneva, a new Soviet leader, and momentum toward rebuilding U.S. strength across the board, Reagan contended that his administration was well positioned to sunset Interim Restraint.
That month 53 Senators wrote President Reagan asking him to maintain Interim Restraint through the end of 1986. When the NSC next gathered, JCS Chairman Admiral William Crowe reiterated: “The [SALT II] treaty does have flaws but not overriding ones. We are in a chess game between the Allies, the Soviets, etc. We want the President to be in the best position to get the money he needs on the Hill.” The danger was that these 53 Senators would retaliate against Reagan by not funding MX.
Maneuvering around Shultz and Weinberger, NSC staffer Robert Linhard led the crafting of a National Security Decision Directive that extended Interim Restraint throughout that year. Reagan signed the directive. The United States would dismantle two Poseidon submarines before May—but not commit to dismantling more. Instead, Reagan announced this plan on May 27 which also included equipping the B-52 bomber with air-launched cruise missiles.
Following the whirlwind Reykjavik Summit between Reagan and Gorbachev in October, the NSC gathered for its final meeting about Interim Restraint on November 25, 1986. “I basically agree with Cap,” George Shultz conceded. “SALT is behind us.”
The top priority remained getting Congress to deliver on the administration’s strategic modernization initiative—especially as the Senate was cutting defense spending even before the Democrats regained control of that body in the November elections. The Reagan administration prepared to announce the 131st Bomber plan, yet the Iran-Contra scandal overshadowed its coverage.
The United States and Soviet Union entered 1987 without any strategic offensive arms limits. It proved to be a new beginning. Gorbachev relented his position at Reykjavik linking arms agreements to restrictions on Strategic Defense Initiative research and testing. On December 8, 1987, he and Reagan met at the White House to sign the INF Treaty.
President George H.W. Bush and Gorbachev signed START I on July 31, 1991. The subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union delayed its entry into force until December 5, 1994.
The potential for three nuclear peers makes the future more complex than it was in the past, when there were only two. Still, we have something that Cold Warriors lacked: a freely available, declassified historical record of successful nuclear agreements. Let us employ it.
James Graham Wilson is the author of America’s Cold Warrior: Paul Nitze and National Security from Roosevelt to Reagan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2024) and The Triumph of Improvisation: Gorbachev’s Adaptability, Reagan’s Engagement, and the End of the Cold War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014).
The views expressed here do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Government or the U.S. Department of State.