Seven years after the fire in Grenfell Tower took 72 lives, the final report into the causes of the tragedy has been published. The inquiry’s findings place damning blame on companies, the government, bodies responsible for building regulation and emergency services. It concludes the victims were “badly failed” by those responsible for their safety, and that all the deaths were avoidable.
The first phase of the report published in 2019, investigated the cause of the fire, how it developed and the role played by the London Fire Brigade and other emergency services. The final report had a much wider remit and focused on the design, construction and management of the building. This included the role of the government in relation to fire safety and the Grenfell fire.
I’ve drawn on my expertise in the management of emergency services to summarise the report’s key findings and recommendations.
The report highlighted the “systematic dishonesty” of those involved in testing and marketing the cladding panels and insulation present in Grenfell Tower. The inquiry accused companies of manipulating testing processes, misrepresenting data and misleading the market, to make the products seem safer than they were known to be.
It particularly named Arconic Architectural Products (who manufactured and sold the rainscreen panels used in Grenfell’s external wall), Celotex (who manufactured the foam insulation) and Kingspan (who manufactured insulation panels), among others. The prime minister, Keir Starmer, has said that these companies will be barred from winning future government contracts.
The firms named have responded to the report. Arconic said it did not conceal any information about its products or mislead, and “[rejects] any claim that AAP sold an unsafe product”. Celotex said it has changed some processes in marketing and quality management since 2017, and continues to cooperate with the inquiry and relevant investigations. Kingspan acknowledged “wholly unacceptable historical failings that occurred in part of our UK insulation business”, but noted that “while deeply regrettable, they were not found to be causative of the tragedy”.
The report criticised other organisations involved in testing, such as the Building Research Establishment (BRE), which held a trusted position within the construction industry and was recognised as a leader in fire safety.
The inquiry found serious flaws in how BRE tested and reported on the safety of products. For example, the report says the firm advised customers like Celotex and Kingspan on how to meet safety criteria rather than remaining independent.
The report noted: “In some cases we saw evidence of a desire to accommodate existing customers and to retain [BRE’s] status within the industry at the expense of maintaining the rigour of its processes and considerations of public safety.”
BRE said it will “be reviewing the report and its recommendations and will continue to work constructively with government to ensure the new building safety and testing regime delivers on the findings of the Inquiry’s report and is fit for purpose”.
These damning findings expose what some have described as a longstanding “culture of contempt” for people and due process on the part of those responsible for Grenfell. Starmer said that Grenfell raises “fundamental questions about the kind of country we are”.
The report concluded that the fire at Grenfell was the “culmination of decades of failure by central government” and others in the construction industry. Most notably, the government’s repeated failure to respond to the information available about the danger of combustible materials.
It also blames the Conservative-Lib Dem government’s “deregulatory agenda”, which it says led to “matters affecting the safety of life [being] ignored, delayed or disregarded”.
The report is also critical of the council landlord (the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea) and the tenant management organisation in relation to their approach toward safety and refurbishments at Grenfell Tower. The role of local councils and resident organisations in maintaining the safety of buildings and residents needs to change, to make sure fire safety concerns are responded to and acted on quickly.
A recent fire in Dagenham, another high rise building in London, suggests that the lessons of cladding risks from Grenfell have still not been fully learned. And thousands of buildings throughout the country are still fitted with unsafe cladding.
The new government’s resolve and commitment will be tested to both fully recommend the report’s findings, and to change the lackadaisical attitudes towards fire safety regulations in a tight fiscal climate. Starmer has told parliament that “this must be a moment of change”.
The first report criticised the London Fire Brigade for failing to identify training needs, particularly in responding to fires in high-rise buildings. The final report blames a “chronic lack” of leadership in the LFB, and recommends setting up an independent College of Fire and Rescue.
London Fire commissioner Andy Roe said the brigade had implemented the recommendations from the first phase of the report, including improved training and equipment, and would continue to do so.
While no timescale has been set, it would be done in consultation with the National Fire Chiefs Council and will be evidenced-based to cover all aspects of training, education and research. This should be welcomed by the sector, which has suffered for a lack of independent professional body like the College of Policing and the College of Paramedics.
Families and survivors of the Grenfell fire have expressed frustration with a “carousel of blame-pointing” by those who gave evidence to the inquiry.
The final report should provide some solace in this regard, firmly laying out the responsibility and complicity of national and local government bodies, the construction industry, regulators and first responders.
But bringing any criminal prosecutions will be a long process. The Metropolitan Police and the Crown Prosecutions Service say they must carefully study the report findings “line by line” before bringing possible charges at the end of 2026. These could include corporate manslaughter, gross negligence manslaughter, fraud, perverting the course of justice and misconduct in public office.
This is not going to be easy but will send a strong message and help find “seeds of hope” for the grieving families of the Grenfell tragedy.
The report’s findings – and future action to implement its recommendations – are a stark exposure of malpractice, and will hopefully help untangle the nexus between manufacturers and regulatory bodies in the interest of fire safety and preventing future tragedies.
Paresh Wankhade is affiliated with the Fire Service Research and Training Trust (FSRTT) as a trustee.
