New internal security order
THE Balochistan government’s decision to abolish the Levies force was part of a broader state strategy to “harmonise” internal security institutions in response to critical national security challenges. On similar grounds, a federal constabulary was established.
This restructuring process has been ongoing on federal and provincial levels, driven by the growing difficulty faced by premier security institutions in countering ‘foreign-influenced threats’, terrorism, and violent extremism.
What this process actually means for the future of law-enforcement agencies (LEAs) in Pakistan remains an open and pressing question. Will the centralisation and standardisation of security structures lead to more capable, accountable, and coordinated institutions, or will they further complicate the landscape of security governance? This is a question that will matter significantly in the coming years.
A few former police officers and security experts view this harmonisation process as occurring in parallel with global trends toward modernising security institutions, enhancing investigative capacity, strengthening responses to organised crime, and adopting new technologies.
Yet, Pakistan’s context remains burdened by deep structural problems, the police culture of moral policing, extortionist practices, and low public trust. These dynamics complicate any attempt at reform, raising concerns about whether organisational restructuring alone can transform entrenched attitudes and practices.
In this context, when state institutions burden LEAs with national security-related tasks, particularly those related to terrorism, violent extremism, and so-called foreign-influenced threats, the logic of security governance becomes more complex.
The term ‘foreign-influenced threats’ is vague, yet many among the security institutions increasingly interpret it through the lens of rising political mobilisation by movements such as the Baloch Yakjehti Committee in Balochistan, the Pashtun Tahaffuz Movement in KP, and the Joint Action Committees (JACs) in Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) and Gilgit-Baltistan (GB). These movements are often framed by security actors as being funded or influenced by foreign forces, including diaspora networks, and therefore as presenting risks to national security.
Political analysts and movement leaders reject this framing, arguing that the state’s anxieties are instead rooted in fears of popular uprisings similar to those witnessed in Bangladesh and Nepal.
Although Gen Z-led movements are gaining momentum globally, the uprisings in Bangladesh and Nepal were interpreted by segments of South Asian power elites as externally engineered, including by the US and Pakistan. Regardless of the accuracy of such interpretations, these narratives have contributed to shaping Pakistan’s internal security architecture.
Will centralisation and standardisation of security structures lead to more capable institutions?
For example, when the federal government announced the transformation of the Frontier Constabulary into a ‘nationwide federal force’, its intended mandate included operating across all provinces, Islamabad, AJK, and GB. One explanation for this expansive jurisdiction is the state’s perception that local police forces in AJK and GB have been unable to contain the JAC protests, necessitating a more centralised coercive capacity.
This harmonisation process was formalised with the establishment of the National Intelligence Fusion and Threat Assessment Centre under the National Counter Terrorism Authority. The creation of Niftac was described as a step towards realising Nacta’s original objectives. In practice, however, Niftac has eclipsed Nacta, undermining its status and institutional relevance, despite expanding its footprint across all provinces. The irony is that a wing of Nacta has become so large that it has effectively subsumed the parent organisation.
If state institutions had wished to establish Niftac as an independent body, they could have done so and subsequently merged it with Nacta.
But Nacta was created through an act of parliament, meaning that any restructuring would have required legislative amendment and public debate. The more expedient strategy, therefore, was to create Niftac as a ‘wing’ of Nacta — while granting it a mandate that far exceeded that of the original authority.
Another development is the government’s plan to establish a National Cybersecurity Authority under the Cybersecurity Act, 2025, recognising that cybersecurity has become an integral component of the internal security domain.
The merger of the Levies into the police in Balochistan has raised significant questions, as competing narratives continue to shape the debate.
Critics argue that the Levies, despite limited resources and personnel, have historically performed better than the police across a vast and difficult terrain. They point to home department data showing that crime rates in Levies-administered areas are lower than in police-administered zones. This performance gap is particularly striking given the disparity in force size: the Levies operate with roughly 28,000 personnel, whereas the police have more than 42,000.
Most political parties in Balochistan have therefore rejected the merger, insisting that effective local security structures should not be dismantled merely for administrative uniformity. They also fear that the decision is driven less by performance considerations and more by the state’s anxieties over a rising insurgency and its desire to centralise coercive authority.
As mentioned, the purpose of harmonising the internal security infrastructure appears to be countering terrorism and violent extremism-related threats. Beyond that, it is increasingly aimed at addressing broader national security risks, including espionage, identifying actors linked to foreign influences, whether political, regional, or otherwise, and responding to activities deemed harmful to national security.
However, significant grey areas exist within this domain. Under such an expansive framework, any political or social movement can easily be labelled as ‘foreign-influenced’ rather than a legitimate, locally supported mobilisation.
This approach extends across both kinetic and non-kinetic domains, yet what remains missing is recognition that many of these responsibilities traditionally fall within the core mandate of LEAs, particularly the police, whose primary functions are crime prevention and ensuring public safety and security.
The irony is that LEAs, especially the police, have drifted far from their foundational roles. Their increasing focus on moral policing and coercive enforcement has become more regressive, extra-constitutional, and marred by institutional corruption that continues to deepen.
The police have neither developed the capability to understand nor the capacity to implement their functions under evolving security paradigms. In the process, they have forgotten their core public-service mission.
While the roots of moral policing lie in the colonial era, its contemporary manifestation is influenced not only by state practices but also by the growing pressure of religiously motivated violent groups within society.
The writer is a security analyst.
Published in Dawn, December 7th, 2025