AN unprecedented wave of province-wide violence in Balochistan, launched by the banned Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), has raised significant concerns about the level of unrest in the province and the state’s response. The situation escalated further when passengers were forcibly removed from trucks and buses and shot after their identities were checked in Musakhel district. This incident sparked outrage in Punjab, as the victims were targeted due to their ethnic identity, being from Punjab.
In response, a few social media users from Punjab initiated a campaign against Quetta-based restaurants spread across Punjab, run mainly by Pakhtuns. These individuals also called for the expulsion of Baloch students from universities in Punjab. This reaction played directly into the insurgents’ hands. In conflicts, the identities of the real perpetrators and victims often become blurred, exacerbating the situation and widening the scope of the conflict.
The Musakhel incident has once again sparked debate about why Baloch insurgents specifically target labourers and travellers carrying computerised national identity cards from Punjab. The existing literature on the subject fails to provide a convincing and updated explanation of the insurgents’ motivations, typically focusing on the historical grievances of the Baloch against the federation, ethnic differences, and a sense of political disenfranchisement. To gain a more comprehensive understanding, it’s crucial to consult informed individuals on the ground and consider observations that offer a broader perspective on how insurgents and counterinsurgents view the issue.
A common perception is that Baloch insurgents target Punjabi labourers and travellers because they believe the Punjabi establishment is exploiting their resources. While this may be one factor shaping their narrative, it is not the whole story. The insurgents also target Baloch labourers and travellers from south Punjab, a region with a sizeable Baloch population and where Baloch nationalists lay claim to several districts. The insurgents argue that they target those whom they believe are serving in security services or are part of any state-led development project, regardless of their ethnic background. In the past, they have similarly targeted Sindhi and Pakhtun labourers under the same suspicion. However, most victims have proven to be ordinary citizens without ties to the security services. For instance, Sindhis working as private labourers or in fruit markets have generally not been targeted, unlike those employed by public contractors.
In conflicts, the identities of the real perpetrators and victims often become blurred.
Targeting civilians is a challenging decision for any insurgent or violent movement, as it can be counterproductive, damaging their image and raising questions about their ideological and political foundations. A similar situation occurred with the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) when they began targeting civilians, leading to divisions within their ranks. Internal discussions eventually forced them to alter their strategy of targeting non-combatants. A similar dynamic might occur within the Baloch insurgent ranks, where the BLA is more radical than other factions. The BLA justifies targeting non-combatant Punjabis by arguing that these are ‘retaliatory attacks’ in response to the disappearance and mutilation of Baloch individuals in the province. The BLA believes that targeting Punjabis inflicts the most harm on the military and stirs anger in Punjab against state institutions.
However, since the inception of the current phase of insurgency from 2002 to 2007, insurgents began threatening and killing Punjabi settlers in Quetta and later in other Baloch districts, despite Nawab Akbar Bugti condemning these actions and arguing that targeting innocents cannot be justified. In response to this criticism, insurgents developed the narrative that these settlers, particularly barbers, are the eyes and ears of intelligence agencies.
Beyond these justifications, targeting Punjabis is a well-developed strategy for the insurgent groups. By doing so, they can provoke the security forces into launching large-scale military campaigns, which often lack widespread acceptance among the population and generate more sympathy for the insurgents. Military operations reduce the space for political dialogue, which benefits the insurgents, as they feel more threatened by political initiatives than military action.
The insurgents are well aware of the consequences of attacking innocent Punjabi civilians, knowing it can provoke anger against the Baloch, particularly the youth studying and living in Punjab. However, Baloch insurgents, especially the BLA, believe that their survival depends on complete isolation from the rest of the country, particularly from Punjab. Hard-line Baloch nationalists also support this view, arguing that retaliation against Baloch students in Punjab and Islamabad is beneficial, as it will fuel anti-Punjab sentiments and deepen the divide, increasing hatred against Punjab.
State institutions can counter the insurgents’ designs through a well-crafted strategy rather than reacting impulsively. There is growing support for the idea that one of the most effective counterinsurgency strategies would be to sincerely address the issue of missing persons — unlike past attempts, such as the Justice Javed Iqbal-led Commission, which proved counterproductive and further eroded public trust in the state.
Engaging with figures like Mahrang Baloch could be a strategic move, as she has gained significant influence in the province, outshining nationalist parties, including Maulana Hidayatur Rehman. Rehman, who once championed the rights of the people of Gwadar, has remained silent since his election to the provincial assembly. If state institutions are unwilling to engage her in any political process, they must devise a policy to address the issue that earns the complete trust of the victims’ families. Such an initiative could involve trusted parliamentarians and civil society actors. In either case, it would help to pacify the anger among the broader Baloch community.
The state’s real challenge is to counter the insurgents’ propaganda, which claims that the state aims to eliminate Baloch identity by exploiting its resources and encouraging mass migration from other parts of the country, particularly Punjab. Only the Baloch themselves can help the state devise an effective strategy to combat this narrative — not those sharing power with the establishment and benefiting from the prolonged conflict.
The writer is a security analyst.
Published in Dawn, September 1st, 2024
