The completion of Nord Stream 2 creates a new geopolitical reality in Europe and the world

МОСКВА, 14 сентября 2021, Институт РУССТРАТ. On September 10, 2021, at an operational meeting of Gazprom's management, Aleksey Miller, Chairman of the Management Board, reported on the full completion of the construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. In the article "Steel staples of Eurasia” experts predicted back in 2009 the fact that this project will be completed, whether it’s liked or not: "The entire short history of the existence of Eastern Europe after the collapse of the socialist bloc once again shows that the elites of these countries are limitrophes by definition and will never pursue an independent foreign policy. In this regard, for Russia these countries cannot be equal partners which can be treated with respect. Therefore, the approach to them should be exclusively consumer-oriented, similar to how the United States treats them. In this regard, in the context of the decline in the geopolitical importance of Eastern Europe, the importance of the Southern and Northern streams is extremely high, since it will help to destroy the emerging limitrophic bundles in the Belarus-Poland-Ukraine triangle. In this regard, it can even be assumed that the ultimate goal of the Nord Stream could be several transit innovations at once, which would significantly streamline the geopolitical picture of Eastern Europe. Firstly, the termination of gas transit to Eastern Europe through the territory of Belarus and Poland, i.e., Belarus receives gas exclusively in the volume of the internal needs of the republic (if maintaining the current negative trends in the construction of the Union State). As a result, secondly, Poland would receive Russian gas not through the territory of Belarus, but from Germany, i.e. it would make Poland not a transit country, but the final recipient of Russian gas. Such a scheme for Poland of receiving Russian gas would contribute to a more adequate understanding of the geopolitical and geo-economic realities of the modern world by the Polish elite. Thirdly, and accordingly, the Nord Stream will allow Germany to become not only the final recipient of Russian gas, but also, in fact, the main transit country, which will significantly strengthen the geopolitical link between Russia and Germany and will serve the cause of the real unification of Eurasia into a single financial and economic organism." Of course, it has still to pass the final defect testing, regulatory control and final certification in various "supervisory and controlling" bodies, but in general, the laying stage can be considered successfully completed. We can say that Russia has won the battle "for the second northern gas pipe" to Europe, and it's time to think about what will happen next, because this war itself is still very far from being over. There are at least two key nuances here. First of all, we did manage to make it, but not yet to the end. The Ministry of Energy, Infrastructure and Digitalisation of the German state of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern says that it is possible to issue a permit to the Stralsund mining department for receiving gas from Nord Stream 2 only after receiving the appropriate documentation from the pipe operator company confirming "the robustness, strength and availability of the necessary safety devices on two lines of the gas main", which have not yet been provided. And even if this happens literally tomorrow, then just two weeks before the election of a new Bundestag chancellor - a position the German "greens" and trying to claim and who are categorically opposed to the Russian pipe, no one in Germany will make any sudden movements. And since the inspections themselves will also take time, Gazprom has yet to participate in another big battle with the highly politicised German bureaucracy. Secondly, the issue of subordination of Nord Stream 2 to the norms of the Third EU Energy Package remains open. At the moment, it has not been possible to achieve recognition of the pipeline as not falling under it. So Gazprom will have to divide itself somehow. There is an option of the registration of Nord Stream 2 AG, the company implementing the Nord Stream 2 project, as an independent operator, legally separated from the Russian gas monopolist. But it is still unclear at what point it will work. And then, if successful, Gazprom, as a gas supplier, will have to agree to a standard for the volume of loading of the "pipe" by no more than half. It is too early to assume exactly how these problems will be solved further. At least, because of the excessive number of different influencing forces and their own discretion in this matter. But it is quite possible to speculate about the options. For example, theoretically it is possible to withdraw the "second Russian Northern gas pipe" from the battle with a simple and elegant solution to transfer the point of sale of gas from Germany to Russia. Formally, the electronic trading platform required for this is already functioning at Gazprom in St. Petersburg. However, it is still being sharpened for smaller transactions, but this is a trifle. If one wants to buy gas on spots, one is welcome, Russian gas is now purchased here. This means that it will go through the pipe as the buyer's product, and not as the seller's. In addition, there will be much more than two of such buyers, and the "50% rule" will be observed automatically. Rosneft is also able to act as an alternative. To put it quite simply, it will buy gas from Gazprom and will supply it further to Europe with a minimum profit, filling the second 50% of the pipe. In short, possible tactical moves are present "in an assortment". Another question is which of them can work and in which configuration. However, the opponents' positions are also not without flaws. If to take, for example, the situation with the OPAL gas pipeline connecting Nord Stream 2 with the GTS of Europe. Under the pressure of Poland, the "50% rule" was also introduced there, and until the Poles change their position, it is hardly possible to cancel this decision. But here's what is interesting. To fulfil its own contractual obligations in Europe (and the problem of the availability of "goods" on the spots does not concern us at all), Gazprom needs to sell about 200 billion cubic meters of gas per year to the EU. And the "own" infrastructure built by it, taking into account the current restrictions, provides only approximately 160 billion rubles. The remaining 40 will have to be directed through someone else’s territory. There are two options here – either through Poland or through Ukraine. Moreover, it is precisely "or", since there is no need for Gazprom to sell gas to Europe in excess of this volume, and especially "through other people's pipes". From here, the interesting things begin. If the Poles continue to insist "on observing the interests of Ukraine", then Russia will have to "supply gas through Kiev", because it is 40 billion cubic meters per year that are "guaranteed" under the agreement with Ukraine. In this case, the Polish “Gaz System” solemnly, and wishfully in presence of the sounds of the anthem, tightens its belt and Warsaw loses the transit income it needs so much. This can partially be returned if a certain share of the 40 billion cubic meters along the Yamal-Europe highway somehow goes through its territory. But for Gazprom, this option is associated with additional costs due to the obligation to comply with the "pump or pay" rule prescribed in the contract with Ukraine. Therefore, the Poles will have to compensate them with something. Discounts on the transit price alone are clearly not enough. And here Russia at the next negotiations will be quite able to say thoughtfully, “you know, we have some difficulties with OPAL…”, thus, putting the Polish leadership in front of a choice: either foreign policy and support of the Ukrainian partner or its own wallet. By the way, there is a third option, as it was indicated in the article quoted above from 2009: Poland's purchase of Russian gas from Germany. But here Warsaw will have to try very hard. In general, the upcoming autumn and winter of this year promise a lot of interesting things. But, as is known, our cause is right… And if anything, then our battleship, polished, shined and "hyper-reactive", is on the siding.