Japan Should Steal a Strategy from China's Playbook
Grant Newsham, Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi, Koh Swee Lean Collin
Security, Asia
How Tokyo can build its own A2/AD network in the East China Sea.
Recent tensions in the South China Sea have been receiving an inordinate amount of attention, especially following Beijing’s island and infrastructure construction activities as well as missile deployments, the U.S. Navy’s freedom of navigation operations and incidents involving coast guard forces and fishermen.
By contrast, tensions in the East China Sea (ECS) appear to have abated. But the picture can be misleading; while Chinese coastguard intrusions into waters surrounding Japanese-administered Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands have appeared to decline in numbers, the present and foreseeable future situation remains far from comforting.
There is not merely the China Coast Guard’s introduction of armed patrol vessels off the disputed isles. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) continues to expand its air and naval force projection capabilities in the ECS, with an eye beyond into the Western Pacific open waters.
China’s Burgeoning A2/AD and Force Projection Capabilities
Beijing has nowhere in the ECS to build “islands,” except for the numerous offshore hydrocarbon platforms it has built—they ostensibly also have a surveillance role—to count as permanent structures to assert its claimed sovereignty over the disputed gas fields and the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.
However, even while the PLA Navy (PLAN) is still trying to get to grips with its nascent aircraft carrier capabilities, the PLA is already ramping up its ability to project force from China’s mainland bases, with two broad strategic objectives: firstly, to impose an anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) umbrella against American intervention and Japanese military operations in times of contingencies in the ECS; and secondly, to expand China’s access into the Pacific Ocean and safeguard its broader national maritime interests.
The steps undertaken to date have been incremental but no less significant. At present and into the foreseeable future, the PLA’s conventional military capabilities are set to continue improving. These have greatly narrowed the gap between Chinese and Japanese (and American) capabilities that existed a decade ago.
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