Iran’s neighbors, like Turkey and Pakistan, have vested interests in ensuring that Iran’s ethnic minorities don’t challenge the central state.

As Iran enters another day of escalating Israeli-US strikes, the scale and intensity of the military operation have raised questions about the strategic end-state of the conflict. Beyond dismantling Iran’s nuclear and ballistic programs, the ultimate objective has been framed as regime change. Analysts have argued that this primary goal remains unlikely to be achieved using air power alone. Iran’s security apparatus, led by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its subordinate paramilitary Basij forces, is decentralized and entrenched at both the national and local levels, making the full-scale collapse of Iran’s defenses improbable. 

However, another destabilizing scenario lingers: sustained military pressure and disruption to leadership may weaken central authority enough to allow non-state, ethnic militants to surface in more organized forms and serve as an alternative to US “boots on the ground” that air power alone cannot provide. 

Iran’s population of over 90 million is ethnically diverse. Persians constitute the majority, while Kurds, Azeris, Arabs, Baloch, and other minorities are generally concentrated in peripheral provinces—many of which have formed armed movements and carried out intermittent attacks on Iranian forces over the years. Kurdish armed groups have been the most operationally active and organized, and constitute the gravest militant threat to the Iranian regime. 

Days before the start of the conflict, five Iranian Kurdish groups based in Iraqi Kurdistan formed a coalition aimed at overthrowing the clerical regime. The coalition brings together the Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK), the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI), the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK), the Organization of Iranian Kurdistan Struggle (Khabat), and the Komala of the Toilers of Kurdistan.

While some have called for greater autonomy within Iran and others have demanded secession, the groups put aside their differences “in order to build a coordinated and effective political framework.” Notably, the Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan refused to join, with its leader, Abdullah Mohtandi, saying it lacked a clear framework for practical action and executive mechanisms for the transitional period, despite attending preliminary meetings.

Iran appears to have acknowledged this coordination as a credible threat, pre-emptively targeting the PAK and PDKI in the Kurdistan region of Iraq over the last few days. Tehran is attempting to limit its activity to Iraqi Kurdistan and avoid its deployment into Iran. This effort, however, may prove more difficult as the conflict escalates. The United States is reportedly in talks with Iranian Kurdish militias on whether, and when, to attack Iran’s security forces in the western part of the country. Trump has said he is open to supporting armed groups in Iran to “dislodge” the regime, after he reportedly held calls with leaders in Baghdad and Erbil.

Though at the forefront and the most likely to take up arms against the Iranian regime, the Kurds are not the only ethnic minority preparing for potential confrontation. The separatist Baluch militant group Jaish al-Adl joined forces with smaller Baluch groups to form a new coalition called “The Popular Resistance Front.” The coalition, notably, did not make any references to a separatist agenda and is attempting to rebrand as an umbrella group that fights for all of Iran’s minorities and religious sects with the goal of overthrowing the regime.

Whether the group retains this big-tent orientation or reverts to exclusive separatist demands remains to be seen. The new collective claimed its first attack since the start of the conflict on Tuesday, reportedly targeting a commander of an outpost. The coalition, unlike the Kurdish one, is unlikely to receive Western support at this time. Jaish al-Adl, the leading militia in the merger, was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) by the United States in 2019. Baloch insurgents are unlikely to play a notable role in any potential downfall of the Iranian security apparatus, though they may exploit security vacuums. The Baloch provinces of Iran are among the poorest, creating conditions ripe for new armed movements to emerge.

In addition to the Kurds and Baloch, the Azeri and Arab ethnic minorities, in the northwest and southwest respectively, have the potential to exploit the instability. Armed activity by both groups has been far more limited. There are currently no Azeri groups that would pose a threat to Tehran, though the region’s proximity to Turkey and Azerbaijan could enable localized unrest or coordination with external actors. Tehran reportedly targeted Azeris in their crackdown on “dissidents” after the 12-day war with Israel last June, accusing Baku of providing intelligence. Similar localized unrest could be observed in Arab communities, rather than a coordinated armed insurgency.

Strengthened militias in Iran would not be without regional backlash, most notably by Turkey, if the Kurds were to play a larger role in the conflict. The PJAK’s links to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) could cause pushback by Ankara and trigger tensions with the United States if Washington chooses to back the Kurdish coalition. Ankara would likely reinforce its border, as well as use the Kurds’ involvement as a catalyst to choose military involvement in the conflict.

Similarly, Pakistan is facing its own Baloch insurgency and would be wary of any spillover amid heightened instability. Tehran and Islamabad have historically coordinated border security and counterinsurgency operations. Islamabad fears that if Baloch insurgents fill a security vacuum along its border, it may become a staging ground for attacks in Pakistan’s Baloch region.

Despite the mounting pressure, territorial fragmentation or “balkanization” remains unlikely. While the varying ethnic groups are concentrated in specific regions of the country, they are socially woven into the broader state. Even among ethnic minorities, Persian nationalism crosses divides.

If any group were to secede, the Kurds would be the most plausible candidates. However, this would be met with stiff resistance from Turkey and Iran, regardless of what form its government takes in the aftermath of the conflict. Moreover, none of the existing armed factions possesses adequate manpower, a unified vision, a command structure, financing, or external support to sustain any durable secession. A more plausible scenario should Iran’s central authority erode is the emergence of insurgencies amid security vacuums, intensified cross-border tensions, and the prospect of civil conflict.

About the Author: Sammar Khader

Sammar Khader is an independent analyst and journalist focused on the geopolitics and security of the Middle East. She has a particular interest in inter-militia dynamics, extremist modes of operation, and governance in conflict-affected settings. She has written for local and international outlets and previously served as a senior researcher on the Levant desk of a Dubai-based risk advisory firm.

The post Why Iran Won’t Balkanize appeared first on The National Interest.