An independent South Yemen could be a force for stability and offer an end to the country’s decade-long civil war.

On Tuesday, Saudi Arabia announced that its fighter jets bombed arms shipments unloaded by two United Arab Emirates (UAE) vessels in Yemen. The shipments had been destined for the South Transitional Council (STC) forces. The strike marked a major shift in Saudi policy and aimed at preventing the STC from reviving South Yemen, a formerly independent nation that merged into greater Yemen in 1990. An independent South Yemen is the country’s best bet to weaken the Houthi insurgency in the northwestern part of the country that has disrupted global shipping and raised inflation since 2023. 

The STC’s drive toward independence also suppresses the Islah Party, a branch of the global Muslim Brotherhood that the US Congress is currently considering whether to declare a Foreign Terrorist Organization. 

Earlier in December, the STC, led by one of the Presidential Leadership Council’s (PLC) seven vice presidents, Aidarus al-Zubaidi, launched a campaign through which it seized control of most of the province of Hadramout—Yemen’s main oil reservoir—until then under the control of the militia of PLC president Rashad al-Ulaimi and his Islamist Islah allies. Globally recognized as Yemen’s government, the PLC was formed in 2022 and entrusted with managing a transitional period.

Ulaimi is allied with Saudi Arabia, and so are three of his vice presidents, two of whom are Islah members. Zubaidi and three other vice presidents are aligned with the UAE. The PLC is therefore locked in a stalemate.

Starting in December, thousands of Yemenis took to the streets, calling for secession and the revival of South Yemen. This internationally recognized nation existed between its independence from Britain in 1967 and its union with North Yemen in 1990. The STC and Zubaidi appear determined to pursue secession and seek international recognition for a revived southern state.

Saudi Arabia, Ulaimi, and the Islamist Islah Party oppose secession. After Saudi airstrikes on Emirati shipments, Riyadh demanded Abu Dhabi withdraw its troops, which had entered Yemen as part of the Saudi-led coalition to combat the Houthis in the north in 2015. Abu Dhabi obliged, but the southern Yemenite secession campaign continued.

In 1990, the North and South united into one country. A decade later, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) launched a terror campaign and controlled swaths of land. President Obama eliminated the group’s leader, Anwar al-Awlaki, a US citizen of Yemeni origin, as Washington gave a nod to the northern Houthi militia to help the government in Sanaa defeat AQAP. The Houthis seized the opportunity to take the capital in 2014, prompting Saudi Arabia to lead a coalition in 2015 to roll back the Houthis to their northern mountainous region and restore the government of Abdrabbu Hadi.

In the war on Houthis, the Saudis and their Yemeni allies underperformed militarily. At the same time, the United Arab Emirates and the STC emerged as the strongest Yemeni faction, building disciplined security forces focused on governance, counterterrorism, and the security of shipping lanes.

The STC successfully dismantled AQAP strongholds—like in Mukalla in 2016—and cut Houthi supply lines while preserving the flow of humanitarian aid. In 2018, STC forces were on the verge of taking the port city of Hodeidah, only for Washington to force the operation’s halt on the grounds that capturing the port would stop humanitarian aid flows into Houthi-controlled areas.

Seven years later, the STC has shifted its attention to consolidating its power by clearing non-Houthi territories of the Islamist Islah, perhaps reasoning that, since they could not reunite Yemen, it can at least build a successful state in the parts it controls.

The contrast between the STC and the Ulaimi-Islah alliance explains why the latter clings to the narrative of “unity [of Yemen] versus rebellion [secession of the south].” Framing southern aspirations as treasonous preserves the Islamists’ international legitimacy as defenders of a unified Yemen.

However, Southerners see their cause as redressing chronic injustice: decades of marginalization since unification in 1990 have fueled resentment and contributed to the outbreak of the conflict.

Despite the strong arguments for independence, Washington remains committed to Yemen’s formal unity, viewing secession as a threat to stability and the wider post-World War II order. But with President Donald Trump openly skeptical of said order, redrawing global borders might offer a better way for Yemenis to cut themselves out of a Gordian Knot-like civil war.

In fact, Yemen is already de facto divided. Clinging to outdated frameworks risks alienating a capable ally against Iran-backed militants in the north and Islamist extremists in the east.

A pragmatic US approach would recognize southern self-determination as a stabilizing force. A supervised, post-conflict, and internationally monitored referendum could formalize independence while respecting local diversity. Such a plan aligns with international law and would empower a partner committed to counter-terrorism, maritime security, and regional stability.

About the Author: Hussain Abdul-Hussain

Hussain Abdul-Hussain is a research fellow at The Foundation for the Defense of Democracies (FDD). He focuses on the Gulf region and Yemen. Hussain earned a degree in History and Archeology from the American University of Beirut, after which he worked as a reporter and later managing editor at Beirut’s The Daily Star. In Washington, Hussain helped set up and manage the Arabic satellite network Alhurra Iraq, after which he headed the Washington Bureau of Kuwaiti daily Alrai. Hussain has worked as a visiting fellow with Chatham House and has written for The New York Times and The Washington Post.

Image: Akramalrasny / Shutterstock.com.

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