The first major space decision undertaken by the incoming second Donald Trump administration was to pick billionaire entrepreneur and private space traveler Jared Isaacman as NASA administrator.
According to Ars Technica, a five-person committee within the Trump transition team is mulling over policy suggestions that represent major changes to the way the space agency operates.
The policy changes being contemplated include:
The ideas are breathtaking in their scope and boldness. However, some of them are likely to run into political headwinds should they be undertaken, either as executive orders or legislation.
The most politically difficult would be closing down NASA Goddard and NASA Ames and folding in their functions at NASA Marshall. From an organizational standpoint, the idea makes sense. NASA has too many centers spread out over the country doing too many redundant functions. Consolation would save money and increase efficiency,
However, the reason NASA has several centers spread out across the country is that it increases congressional support for its programs. If a House member or senator is not moved by a love of science or beating the Chinese back to the moon, he or she might be motivated by the jobs and contracts created by a NASA center in their district or state. They will fight tooth and nail against closing such a source of votes.
Perhaps the best that can be done is to reduce redundancies across the field centers as much as possible. Also, NASA could make its centers more attractive to commercial space investment, such as what already is taking place at NASA Stennis, the Johnson Spaceflight Center and the Kennedy Space Center.
The idea of relocating much of NASA headquarters from Washington to one of the field centers seems odd. What would be accomplished by such a move except to have the various centers fight over which gets the new function? Having the headquarters in Washington, close to Congress and the White House, where space policy decisions are made, would seem to be an advantage.
That leaves the proposals related to the Artemis program. We have already covered the dangers of a pivot to Mars, that attempting to get there by the end of Trump’s second term risks compromising the return to the moon. In any case, Mars in four years is likely impossible.
It is likely not a question of when the Space Launch System and possibly the Orion spacecraft are canceled, but when. Does NASA use already-built hardware to fly the Artemis II lunar flyby mission and the Artemis III lunar landing and then transition to commercial rockets, or does it terminate the legacy hardware immediately and go commercial from the start?
It should be noted that as of this writing, the maiden flight of the Blue Origin New Glenn draws nigh. Also, the seventh test flight of the SpaceX Starship is scheduled to follow soon after. Both will be valuable assets in the quest to return to the moon and, in the fullness of time, send humans to Mars.
Making Artemis more efficient encompasses a lot. It would include collapsing levels of management and streamlining decision-making. Elon Musk’s and Vivek Ramaswamy’s DOGE should get on it with due speed.
Artemis lacks a rationale that everyone can easily understand. Why are we going back to the moon? Why are we going to Mars? What does an Artemis mission statement look like?
We are going back to the moon and on to Mars to advance the frontiers of science, create technology that will be useful in space and on Earth, access natural resources, create new industries, and enhance the political soft power and security of the United States and its allies.
Everything we do must flow from that mission statement.
To put the matter more succinctly, we are returning to the moon, then going to Mars and beyond to make a future that is better than the past, for the benefit of all humankind.
Mark R. Whittington is the author of “Why is It So Hard to Go Back to the Moon?” as well as “The Moon, Mars and Beyond,” and, most recently, “Why is America Going Back to the Moon?” He blogs at Curmudgeons Corner.
