• ‘Own losses’ far outstrip the dent IBOs and other kinetic actions have put in militants’ operational ability
• Need to revisit the existing anti-terror strategies is apparent, but lack of political will and ‘Afghanistan factor’ complicate the quagmire
STANDING before a select audience in a small but imposing auditorium at the headquarters of Pakistan’s premier intelligence agency, the now-reviled former spymaster, Gen Faiz Hameed flashed slide after slide on two giant LCDs to establish that the Afghan Taliban insurgency — then just weeks away from capturing Kabul — was in fact a ‘Pashtun nationalist uprising’.
Shortly before wrapping up his monologue and opening the floor to questions, Faiz said something diametrically opposite to his long presentation on the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan: “Not many people agree with me, but I do believe that the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Afghan Taliban are two faces of the same coin.”
Weeks later, the beaming former ISI chief stood in the lobby of an iconic Kabul hotel, sipping coffee as he waited to meet Afghanistan’s new rulers — the Taliban. “Don’t worry, everything will be okay,” he famously told Channel 4 News’ Lindsey Hilsum.
Now holed up in his interrogation cell, facing a military trial over political meddling, the beleaguered general must be wondering how under his watch, Pakistan’s top spy agency — which has been overseeing so many other complex and complicated issues — got the Afghan Taliban-TTP nexus so horribly wrong.
With terror incidents rising and casualty figures mounting year-on-year since August 2021, his brief repartee with Lindsey will probably haunt him forever — a reversal of the hard-fought gains against militants in successive military operations in Pakistan’s troubled border regions.
A simple chart showing Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s descent into violence since the Taliban’s rise to power in Kabul would be enough to illustrate how quickly Pakistan’s optimism over the Afghan Taliban’s ability to rein in the TTP turned into a nightmare.
If the sharp spike doesn’t explain the trajectory of violent incidents and fatalities that has befallen KP, consider the percentage. There has been a whopping 279.8 per cent increase in the number of terrorist incidents from 2021’s 572 to 2,173 in 2024. Likewise, casualty figures shot up by a staggering 231pc, from 238 in 2021 to 788 in 2024.
Similarly, compared to 2023, the number of terrorist incidents in KP shot up by 54.89pc while casualties increased by 11.9pc. On average, the province lost two men per day, including personnel from the security forces, civilian law enforcement and ordinary citizens.
Overall, KP’s south remains quite troubled, with spikes in attacks in the two Waziristans, Dera Ismail Khan, Tank, Lakki Marwat and Karak. The Malakand and Hazara regions, meanwhile, have remained relatively peaceful — with a major exception being the attack on Chinese workers in Bisham, Shangla in March, 2024. Kurram, together with Khyber’s scenic Tirah Valley, saw a resurgence of militants, bringing renewed threats to the provincial capital Peshawar.
Contrast this with the security situation in Afghanistan in the period before and after the return of the Taliban. The Brussels-based International Crisis Group (ICG), in its August 2022 report, while acknowledging the “dramatic shifts in the security situation”, noted five-fold decrease in the rate of battles, explosions and other forms of violence per week during the first ten months of the Taliban rule, compared to the same period during Ashraf Ghani’s regime.
IBOs
Amid mounting concerns over the escalating attacks across KP, the military launched small-scale operations and intelligence-based operations (IBOs).
At a media briefing last week, the head of the military’s media department said that over 59,000 IBOs were conducted across Pakistan in 2024 — an average of 161 operations per day. Although KP-specific IBO figures were not available, official statistics suggest that a total of 384 militants were killed over the course of the year.
Meanwhile, the proportion of “own” casualties versus militant losses is huge.
This gap between the effort to hunt down militants and the damage they have sustained may be explained by the complex nature of guerilla warfare, but while the TTP and its affiliates have not been able to find a permanent foothold, their spread and presence has increased manifold.
“Clearly, the existing strategy is working to cause a significant dent. This is not sustainable. We need deliberations to take stock of the situation and frame a new strategy to overcome the problem,” an insider said, pointedly.
Opinions vary as to why, despite a huge effort, Pakistan’s counter-terrorism campaign has not been able to overcome its security challenges and cause a significant dent in the rise of militancy.
According to background discussions with security officials, there are many factors that have contributed to this.
Afghanistan
Pakistan’s western neighbour continues to be a problem. In recent diplomatic engagements, credible sources say the ruling Taliban have again sought time to fix the TTP issue, referring to their efforts to relocate militants and their families away from the border to Ghazni province in central Afghanistan.
The cost of construction of houses and relocation to the tune of seven digits in dollar terms, according to the source, was borne by a friendly state.
Islamabad has conveyed to the interim Taliban regime that it must control and rein in the TTP. Kabul, on its part, has sought some concessions in trade and visa regimes, and some agreements are ready to be signed.
But Islamabad has told the Taliban leadership it would evaluate Kabul’s response to its concerns in the coming weeks, before it contemplates delivering on the promises.
Pakistan has also urged the Afghan Taliban to recover sophisticated American weaponry from the TTP, discourage them from crossing the border and arrest those who do that.
Government officials continue to complain that the Afghans allow free cross-border movement and no punitive action is taken against those doing it.
Political ownership
The issue of political ownership of the ‘fight against terror’, or lack thereof, was hotly debated at one of the recent apex committee meetings, amid the provincial government’s ambivalent attitude. It was made clear to the KP chief minister, according to a senior official, that the armed forces were in the province at the request of the provincial government under Article 245 of the Constitution, and that it should step up and take full ownership and responsibility.
Besides, the government was urged to spare more resources to enable the Counter Terrorism Department to fight an enemy that was better armed and equipped with advanced US weaponry.
Owing to their grievances against the establishment, almost all political parties in KP are reluctant to lend support to large-scale military operations, while at the same time expressing concerns over the deteriorating security situation in the province.
Complicating the fight further is the overall political polarisation at the national level, which has not only impacted the political mood in KP, but has also brought about an informal alliance of divergent political views to oppose military operations, even in hotbed areas.
Clearance vs containment
Adding to the complexity of the challenges, the TTP has been able to successfully adopt the Afghan Taliban playbook by declaring it would only target men in uniform and avoid targeting civilians in an attempt to drive a wedge between the security forces and the citizenry. This is largely in line with group leader Mufti Noor Wali’s own strategy, outlined in a booklet he had authored before he became its head.
Officials and analysts believe that much of the state’s efforts were focused on containment rather than clearance, and that the issue could be sufficiently addressed if forces are deployed in sufficient number.
But while there is a general agreement to undertake military operations in a couple of regions in a phased manner, the lack of public and political support, and appetite for another round of displacement, is complicating the issue.
Officials and analysts believe it is time to re-visit the counter-terrorism strategy, and focus more on the use of technology to track, monitor, surveil and strike, coupled with a whole set of political, legal and administrative reforms.
Published in Dawn, January 2nd, 2025
