The Armed Forces of the Philippines needs to keep its eyes on the ball. While the key political families in the country are fighting for power and survival, China awaits in the wings as the unintended beneficiary of our current state of discord. It is in their interest for the Philippines to be divided at various levels and aspects; for the national government to be distracted by domestic issues, and for the general public to be agitated against its leaders. Under these circumstances, the AFP will be compelled to veer away its focus from the South China Seaagain and attend to potential scenarios of domestic instability.
The infighting between the Marcos and Duterte families is the current centerpiece of political discourse in the country. As the political alliance slowly broke up, we witnessed how the Dutertes “doublespeak” their way in public rallies and social media forays in trying to “incite” the AFP to break the chain of command and oust President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. From the other side of the fence, certain elements of civil society have joined the chorus of critics against the proposed national budget for 2025 and the overall quality of its governance in the country. They think a military uprising is a viable proposition, as a prelude to a “revolutionary government.”
The clamor for military intervention in domestic politics is not new. The AFP as an institution is historically one of the country’s consequential “political actors,” along with our political and economic elites, civil society, religious communities, and the media. However, after the EDSA Revolution of 1986 and the series of coup d’etats in the 1990s, the AFP has embarked on a journey of redemption. From one of the most vilified institutions during the Martial Law years, it is now one of the public’s most trustworthy bureaus in the government. The security sector reform program it underwent for about three decades was intended to align the institution’s values with that of a liberal democratic society, to strengthen professionalism in the military, to wean the officer corps away from domestic politics, and to inculcate respect for human rights across the rank and file.
It was not an easy journey, for interspersed in this transformation were acts of military adventurism, corruption among its top leadership, and the occasional discord in civil-military relations. There may have been a lingering distrust of the military persisting across the different administrations, perhaps causing the suppression of the AFP’s budget and capability development programs to ensure that it does not threaten their terms of office.
The Dutertes may have believed they retained residual influence in the AFP, just enough to summon the military’s support when needed. President Rodrigo Duterte astutely “piggy-backed” the AFP’s preoccupation with the counterinsurgency campaign to resurrect a faltering local communist movement. He wisely used the NPAs as a convenient “bogeyman” to rally the public to his side, “red-tagged” those opposing his policies, and securitized as much of his programs as possible. However, the AFP has calibrated its compliance to some of Duterte’s contentious national security policies. It did not buy into Duterte’s appeasement posture towards China, it has maintained the PH-US alliance despite his efforts to displace it, and it has insulated the rank and file from involvement in the controversial “drug war.”
On the other hand, the ranks of the outraged civil society, including retired members of the various uniformed services, have issued a manifesto calling on President Marcos to rectify the problems arising from the national budget bill submitted by Congress. The submission to President Marcos saw a significant budget reduction for education, public health, and defense. They may have lost faith in the way democracy in the Philippines has been bastardized, and have grown frustrated with the performance of the various institutions of government.
Given these circumstances, what could be a viable way forward for the Armed Forces to help pacify a disgruntled public, to quell the idea of extralegal measures from gaining traction, and to blunt potential interference by China in domestic politics?
Clearly, in the near term, the nexus of our regional and domestic security problems is the Dutertes. China will benefit from the restoration of the Dutertes to power in 2028. Considering that the presidency is the center of gravity of our national defense posture and foreign policy, we expect a return to a pro-China stance across the government, and the compromise of our maritime and economic interests in the West Philippine Sea in favor of Beijing.
On the domestic front, the Dutertes are fighting for their survival, and the only path to victory available is a regime change either through a very convoluted political jujitsu or by extralegal means. Both pathways can destabilize the body politic, and distract the AFP from focusing on the problems with China at sea and in the home front.
The logical move is for the AFP to cut all vestiges of its links with the Duterte family. The low-hanging fruits available are: (1) shutting down the Vice Presidential Security and Protection Group, (2) transferring back the responsibility for the security of the Vice President to the General Headquarters, (3) directing the Inspector General to investigate the dysfunction in the operations of the VPSPG, (4) directing the Internal Auditor to investigate how the confidential funds received by the VPSPG was liquidated and obligated.
This sends a message to China that the Dutertes are not “sacred cows” that the AFP will defer to easily; it conveys a message to the general public that it will honor the trust accorded to the institution by doing what is morally and ethically right; and, it will signal to our political personalities that the military is non-partisan and constructively neutral to the vagaries of Philippine politics.
The long-term view is more problematic. Here, the recurring lament of the late General Rodolfo Biazon when he was still in active service comes to mind, and to paraphrase: “Give us institutions that the soldiers of the Republic will find worthy of fighting and dying for.” Alas, we are confronted with political dynasties that currently rule our national and local governments, narco-politicians and criminals lording over our cities and provinces, and the decline of meritocracy in politics, among others. And sadly, our voters keep electing these types of leaders into office. Perhaps, what the AFP can do is to make voter literacy and education the flagship program of its civil-military operations efforts.
The AFP is facing an ethical dilemma that is not of its own making. Its prior entanglements in the past administrations compel it to avoid politics. Unfortunately, politics and its practitioners are interested in the AFP. During these times it should gently remind itself, and those with vested interests whispering in its institutional ears; that the military conforms to the guard rails placed upon it by the Constitution. And that at the end of the day, it serves and protects the interest of all the Filipino people, not just those vested with power and privilege. – Rappler.com
Retired Rear Admiral Rommel Jude Ong was formerly vice commander of the Philippine Navy.
