At the beginning of the year, Africa was scheduled to have presidential or general elections in 19 (35%) countries. A total of 180 million eligible voters were expected to make their mark. This was a test for democracy and institutional capacity to successfully provide oversight and ensure smooth transitions, given that since 2020 Africa has experienced seven coups.
In 2020, there were military coups in Guinea, Burkina Faso and Mali. The following year, Chad’s army came to power. And in 2023 there were coups in Niger (July), Gabon (September) and a failed coup in Guinea-Bissau (November-December). These coups were supported mostly by the youth. The reasons for the rise of coups in places that had previously embraced multi-party elections include the failure of the governing elites to create an inclusive framework for development, France’s influence on fiscal policy in most of her former colonies and struggling economies. Over the past five years few countries achieved GDP growth higher than 5% and formal sector employment remains a rarity for youths graduating from universities. The number of Africans trying to migrate out of the continent in search of greener pastures is on the rise. Latest data from the World Migration Report suggests that there are about 43 million African migrants overall, with 21 million living in another African country.
By the end of 2023 it seemed as if electoral democracy had come to its premature collapse in Africa. Beyond the coups, several studies were beginning to point towards a waning influence of democracy, especially among the youths. Youths (people under the age of 25) make up 60% of the population, making them the biggest voting cohort. According to an Open Society Foundation study, African youths are less likely to vote, participate in community meetings or contact political leaders compared to those older than 35. According to research by Marjoke Oosterom (2023), young people are frustrated with their ageing leaders and that democracy has not delivered, in particular with respect to generating decent employment.
It is against this background that the elections of 2024 gave democracy another chance. Peaceful elections that led to change occurred in Botswana, Ghana, Senegal and South Africa, where the ruling ANC lost its majority for the first time. The elections in Namibia led to the ascension of a female president.
Election-related upheavals are to be expected in regions where governments have repeatedly failed to deliver on their promises. For example, Mozambique has experienced civil unrest since the election results were announced.
Democracy has its enduring supporters; there is a desire among African regional bodies such as the African Union and sub-regional bodies such as the Economic Community of West Africa States, Southern African Development Community and East African Community to ensure that multiparty democracy thrives. The AU and sub-regional bodies have invested significantly in developing best practice guidelines on the holding of free and fair elections. Election monitoring and observing has grown as a practice across Africa.
But democracy is costly. The average price of an election in Africa — $4.20 per capita — is twice the world’s average and higher than the $4 spent in Europe, North America and Australia. Estimates show that Sub-Saharan Africa spent almost $50 billion on polls from 2000 to 2018. Despite delivering very little in terms of change, the elections are also a huge drain on the fiscus.
But holding elections is not enough. According to Afrobarometer, the number of citizens in Africa with little or no confidence in their national electoral commission rose from 41% to 55% from 2011-13 to 2021-23. Elections should not be a ritual of changing power among elites; the electorate is impatient for change. In many instances voters have demonstrated their displeasure with incumbent parties for their failure to ensure economic growth and improve livelihoods.
At first glance it seems ideological differences no longer exist, given the collapse of Eastern Europe or the Soviet bloc in terms of the ideologies they used to pursue. It may seem as if there is a new consensus that development is going to be carried out using the tools of the West, which is capitalism. But further analysis beyond the surface suggests there are huge ideological concerns and differences across political parties, usually between incumbents and opposition political parties. Opposition politicians have mostly sold a new utopia of an effective government with adequate resourcing and autonomy to quickly transform economies. They make promises to wipe out corruption and state ineffectiveness. The new ideology spreading across Senegal all the way to South Africa is about a new and capable African state responsive to the needs of citizens.
There is an added dimension in the Francophone belt of “doing away with France”. France has had a huge post-colonial role in terms of the economies of former colonies, through managing the currencies and limiting fiscal autonomy of governments. For instance, the election in Senegal was not just about removing the incumbent, but also about freedom from the control of France.
Remarkably, personality politics is being replaced by a new issues driven framework. Incumbent political parties that have failed to address electoral promises they made in an earlier cycle, resulting in their disappointment in the polls. The electorate in South Africa did not consider the historical role that the ruling ANC played in the liberation struggle but rather focused on contemporary failures of service delivery, an under-performing economy and widespread corruption in the government. The new political discussions are now focused on performance issues, notably the extent to which governments can deliver on election promises.
Although there is evidence of the deepening of democratic practices on the continent, notably through the embracing of elections as an instrument for changing governments, there is a simultaneous increase of authoritarianism through clamping down of dissent and alleged rigging of election results. In Mozambique, violent protests erupted soon after the announcement of the results. Many dispute the victory of Frelimo’s Daniel Chapo. In Tanzania, a country will hold elections in 2025, opposition leaders have been incarcerated, their rallies have been banned and some 500 activists have been arrested, accused of plotting violence. In Zambia, opposition rallies have been banned and protesters against 17-hour power cuts were arrested. Even after elections, those who have opposed the government agenda and spoken out against authoritarianism have been arrested.
The belief that elections are a necessary but not sufficient condition for democracy rings true as we observe the events on the continent. There is the general thinking especially amongst the electorate, that the elections are a silver bullet, that the elections are going to lead countries to the promised land. This messianic view of elections crowds out other democracy enhancing practices such as broader citizen participation. Perhaps the more worrying trend is that many African countries are in perpetual election mode diverting time and attention from development and post-election citizen engagement practices. It becomes difficult even for the new government to focus on governing without being concerned about winning the next election.
Dr Tendai Murisa is the executive director of the Sivio Institute, a think tank based in Harare, Zimbabwe