The two competing narratives – unity or self-determination – have reached an impasse, with the future of the Horn of Africa hanging in the balance.
Originally published on Global Voices
Picture by somalilandstandard, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons.
By Mohamed Osman Guudle
The political landscape of the Horn of Africa is one of the world's most complex and contentious. Its epicenter is the longstanding conflict between Somalia and Somaliland with roots in history, colonial legacies, and competing national identities.
In January 2025, Somalia will be taking its seat at the UN Security Council for two years.
But while the world has been talking about Somalia and its problems with terrorism, governance, and security, very little attention has been paid to the Republic of Somaliland, recognized internationally as part of Somalia, although the latter reinstated its lost independence of June 26, 1960, on May 18, 1991.
To understand the conflict between contemporary Somalia and Somaliland, one has to consider the colonial legacy that was wrought upon the two. During the late 19th and early 20th centuries, European powers divided the Horn of Africa into five distinct areas. The northern part of it was under the administration of Britain, forming a protectorate named British Somaliland, while Italy ruled the southern portion of Somalia.
Whereas British Somaliland had a more hands-off system, Italian Somalia experienced more direct colonial administration; the two united upon gaining independence in 1960 (June 26 for Somaliland, July 1 for Somalia) into the Somali Republic through the pan-Somali ideal of an integrated nation-state bringing together all Somali-speaking peoples, also including those in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti.
This unity, however, was fragile from the outset. The northern region, having fallen under British rule, felt politically and culturally detached from the southern-dominated government in Mogadishu. Quite simply, Somaliland's colonial history sharply contrasted with that of the south, leaving a legacy of distrust.
The Somali Republic was relatively stable until the 1970s, when Siad Barre‘s military regime seized power in a coup. Barre's government initially espoused a sort of “scientific socialism” and national unity but quickly fell into rank authoritarianism, driving growing discontent among the people of Somaliland.
In the late 1980s, in the north, an opposition movement was formed: the Somali National Movement (SNM). It demanded autonomy in the wake of ruthless government repression. Between 1987 and 1989, an estimated 200,000 people were massacred by Barre’s forces, and millions fled to neighboring countries. The conflict raged on, and, by 1991, when the central government fell and Barre was ousted, the northern region unilaterally restored its independence under the name of the Republic of Somaliland. Since then, Somaliland has operated in relative stability, forging its own government, military, and institutions, but it has never been recognized by the international community.
The genesis of disagreement between Somalia and Somaliland finds its basis in two opposing narratives: the status quo of a territorial integrity that Somalia ascribes to, juxtaposed with Somaliland's claim for independence based upon a unique identity with historical autonomy.
To Somalia, Somaliland's separation means a violation of its territorial integrity. The government of Somalia still considers Somaliland an “integral part of the Somali Republic” and says that recognizing Somaliland would create a dangerous precedent on the whole African continent for “separatist movements.”
The government of Somalia, with support from the African Union (AU) and United Nations, prioritizes national unity to ensure regional stability. It advocates for reconciliation and peaceful conflict resolution within Somalia’s recognized borders, emphasizing cooperation against threats like al-Shabaab, piracy, and clan conflicts. The government promotes a federal system granting regional powers while rejecting any secession.
For Somaliland, its desire to be recognized comes from a history that makes it a separate entity prior to unification in 1960. The restoration of independence in 1991 was driven by a desire to escape the chaos and violent conflict that raged in southern Somalia after the collapse of its central government.
For Somaliland, its stability is proof of its ability to govern itself, ensuring peace and order. It has developed its own functioning political system, held several free elections, and developed a relatively strong economy based on trade, livestock, and remittances from the Somaliland diaspora.
The leaders of the Somaliland government insist that the Somali Republic did not defend the north, and therefore Somaliland's people have every right to self-determination, just like any other nation. They refer to the international recognition accorded to other self-declared states, such as Kosovo, and argue that their case should be treated no differently.
Somalia's UNSC seat solidifies its monopoly on representing all Somali people, including Somaliland, on the world stage and enables it to advance its diplomatic agenda against Somaliland's independence. This presents a nightmare for Somaliland, given that the international community is unlikely to move toward recognizing Somaliland while Somalia is actively engaged in global diplomacy.
The global community is sensitive to the explosive situation in the Horn of Africa and the growing need to find solutions to the many conflicts across the region. However, it remains divided on the issue of Somaliland's independence. While informal diplomacy by countries such as Ethiopia and Kenya has been exercised with Somaliland, supporting its autonomy in various ways, they have held back from formally recognizing it, due to apprehensions over the wider regional implications of supporting secession.
It is for this reason that the AU has always stuck to the letter on the issue of territorial integrity in Africa and is apprehensive that recognizing Somaliland would promote more “fragmentation” in Africa-especially where other “secessionist” movements occur.
However, Somaliland's leaders argue that their case is not secessionist and should not be put within the context of larger continental politics. They underline the fact that this matter for them has to do with self-determination and a government of Somalia that has failed to provide stability and inclusivity representative of all its peoples.
While much of the Horn of Africa faces political and security problems, the dispute between Somalia and Somaliland still represents a fundamental divide that has not been overcome. The absence of relevant initiatives for recognition on the part of Somalia or a commitment to a reconciliation process that would take into consideration the aspirations of both regions, means the international community is unlikely to make a move in this regard.
Somaliland’s pursuit of independence is steeped in a separate identity, traumatic war, and an experience of repression under the central government of Somalia. For Somalia, the goal is unity in a region prone to instability and ensuring sovereignty.
For now, these two narratives — unity or self-determination — have reached an impasse, with the future of the Horn of Africa hanging in the balance.
Dr. Mohamed Osman Guudle is a Somaliland scholar specializing in Economics, Political Science, and International Relations. He holds a PhD from Istanbul University (2019) and is a researcher based in Hargeisa, Somaliland. His focus is on the political and economic issues of the Horn of Africa, particularly Somaliland, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and the Red Sea region. Additionally, he serves as the president of the Somaliland Society of Political Scientists (SSPS), a nonprofit organization dedicated to advancing the study and research of political science.
