Summary and Key Points: The U.S. Air Force’s decision to pause the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) program, which aims to develop a sixth-generation stealth fighter, has raised concerns about the future of American air superiority.
-Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall announced the pause to reassess the program's cost, operational concept, and next steps, even as the Air Force had planned a significant $2.5 billion investment for next year.
-Critics argue that halting the NGAD would be a mistake, as it is crucial for maintaining air dominance, especially against technological peers like China. Manned platforms, despite the rise of unmanned drones, are still essential for complex missions that require real-time decision-making and advanced capabilities. The pause also risks falling behind international competitors and weakening the U.S. military aircraft industrial base.
Once upon a time – meaning just a few months ago – the U.S. Air Force was all-in on acquiring a sixth-generation stealth fighter. Now, Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall has announced he will “take a pause” on the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) program to re-evaluate the cost, operational concept and next steps in the process.
Kendall said the service is still “going to do a crewed, sixth-generation platform” but this is a major moment considering the Air Force has been working on this program for years and planned to invest $2.5 billion next year in this new fighter. Suddenly, the Air Force appears to be backtracking on its commitment to NGAD and to the central role for advanced, manned fighters in general.
There is a meme running through defense circles that recent conflicts demonstrate that modern air defenses are too lethal for manned platforms and that drones can pursue the same missions alone. While NGAD is still in its formative stage, and there are trades to be made between different capabilities, it would be a mistake of colossal proportions for the Air Force to halt the program. Here are five reasons why the Air Force must continue to develop a sixth-generation, manned tactical platform.
First, the U.S. Air Force needs a new, specialized air superiority platform.
NGAD is intended to be a next-generation air superiority platform, replacing the F-22, and allowing the U.S. Air Force to dominate the air domain for decades. It is a system of systems with many pieces, including a key role for unmanned capabilities, particularly the highly capable, largely autonomously operating drones called Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA).
However, the centerpiece of NGAD is a manned platform. This new fighter would be equipped with highly advanced avionics, multiple sensor systems, unparalleled electronic warfare capabilities, and a host of weapons. It is expected to have a new power plant supporting both long-range, fuel-efficient cruising and a high-speed dash. Finally, the NGAD platform would have the computing and communications capabilities to act as the quarterback for a team of unmanned systems and other air-launched effects. NGAD is being designed, in particular, for the expected intense and lethal air environment in the Pacific theater and a future conflict with a technological and industrial peer, specifically China.
Second, there remain unique roles for manned aerial platforms. The more complex the mission, the greater the need for a manned platform. Modern air warfare requires a mix of capabilities and the ability to shift from one type of engagement and one capability or weapon rapidly to another. Drones and CCAs are conceived of as single-mission platforms. Moreover, they must either be pre-programmed before launch or have secure communications with an operator. Only a manned platform will have access to the range of capabilities needed to respond to rapidly changing circumstances and the presence of a pilot who can make the necessary decisions in the moment despite an intense electronic warfare environment.
Third, drones may not be as effective as proponents assert. While a great deal of attention has been devoted to the potential of drones and other unmanned aerial systems to change or even dominate the future of warfare, the reality so far is less impressive. The great change has been the proliferation of relatively simple and, hence, cheap tactical drones. Yet the Iranian air assault on Israel saw more than three hundred drones, cruise, and ballistic missiles shot down. With most nations investing heavily in counter-unmanned aerial systems (CUAS) capabilities, it is unclear whether the future favors drones for every mission. Beyond this, the more capable the drone, the more sophisticated the CCA, the greater their cost and the smaller the number that can be procured. The Air Force is looking at a mix of expendable, attritable, and exquisite drones, with most being in the first two less expensive categories. The question is, where should the most sophisticated, high-end capabilities be deployed: in the drone or in the manned aircraft quarterback? Experience suggests that the most exquisite capabilities should reside in a manned platform.
Fourth, the U.S. is not the only nation working on sixth-generation tactical aircraft and unmanned adjuncts. The Global Combat Air Program (GCAP), a program involving the United Kingdom, Japan, and Italy, and the Future Combat Air System (FCAS), are being developed by France, Germany, and Spain. China is moving forward quickly on a sixth-generation platform; Russia claims to have flown such a platform, as well. Without NGAD and its Navy counterpart, the U.S. will be left behind in the race to deploy a sixth-generation fighter.
Fifth, pursuing NGAD is vital to maintaining a robust U.S. military aircraft industrial base. The range of technologies that will go into the NGAD is truly breathtaking. So, too, are the technical accomplishments required to build such an aircraft and its systems, including power plants, avionics, sensors, computers, and hardware. Some of these innovations will be migrated to the commercial aircraft world. Most of all, investing in NGAD will help ensure a robust U.S. aircraft design and production base for the future.
Dan Goure is a non-resident fellow with the Lexington Institute, a nonprofit public-policy research organization in Arlington, Virginia. He has held senior positions in both the private sector and the U.S. government, including as a member of the 2001 Department of Defense transition team. Follow him on Twitter at @dgoure and the Lexington Institute @LexNextDC. Read his full bio here.
This article was first published by RealClearDefense.
All images are Creative Commons.
