To address readiness issues for hundreds of thousands
Combining the National Guard and Reserve is a debate with over a century of precedent. While previous attempts failed, it is a concept worth revisiting for three reasons – operational readiness of the reserve components, greater efficiencies in employment of reserve capabilities, and streamlining the budget based on redundant functions. It is time to merge the Guard and Reserve in both the Army and the Air Force.
Several essays and articles have debated this. Usually, the arguments echo the reasons raised above, however the arguments focus on why to merge them and less on how. The details of how to do this become murkier and provide the bureaucratic chaff that stalls further discussion. Furthermore, the political acumen of the National Guard quells serious thought on this combination. The fifty elected Governors of each state, as well as members of Congress, some with service in the Guard, provides a formidable political barrier to a merger.
With a growing gap between our Armed Forces and the public, all Reserve Component forces serve as the hometown representation of our military. Since the implementation of the Abrams doctrine, no large-scale military response will occur without mobilization of Reserve Component forces. Despite this, the average American cannot explain the difference between the National Guard and the Reserve.
Both the Guard and Reserve maintain large administrative Headquarters staffed robustly however at the hometown Armory or Reserve Center, units are minimally staffed with Active-Guard Reserve (AGR) personnel and Military Technicians (MILTECHs) for daily operations. The latter are Department of the Army Civilians (DACs) that must also serve in the Guard and/or Reserve to maintain their employment which provides more hurdles to filling and retaining talent. Meanwhile the headquarters at the National Guard Bureau, Office of the Chief of the Army Reserve, and U.S. Army Reserve Command contain hundreds of DA Civilians that do not require active membership in the Guard or Reserve. This doesn’t include the duplication of AGRs and MILTECHs representing either the Guard or Reserve at multiple headquarters like the Pentagon, Human Resources Command, First Army, etc.
What this means on overall readiness to the hundreds of thousands of Guardsmen and Reservists serving at echelons below Brigade is challenges in basic administration, supply, maintenance, and training. This is not a direct reflection necessarily on the AGRs and MILTECHs working every day to support their organizations. It is a reflection on the way the Army and Air Force have invested their Full-Time Support (FTS). Talk to a Reservist or Guardsman in a local unit sometime and ask what challenges typically exist in their organization. Combining the Guard and Reserve can reduce duplication of the basic Title 10 functions (staffing, training, equipping, etc.) and power down support to improve the readiness of warfighting units.
While this change would impact the Air Force as well, I will focus on the Army as an example of how this could work. The legal framework is the largest obstacle to combining the Guard and Reserve. The Militia Clause of the Constitution is the starting point for how our Nation ended up with both a National Guard and a Federal Reserve. This is further codified by Congress in Titles 10 and 32 in U.S. Code, the former for the Armed Services and the latter for the National Guard.
1. Instead of the current model, designate each state’s Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ), commanded by The Adjutant General (TAG), as the state militia. This headquarters will serve a similar role as an Army Service Component Command. They would provide a headquarters to focus on a geographic area, in this case a state, solely for Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) to assist with domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, etc. Each Governor could access all Army and Air Force Guard and Reserve capabilities for declared domestic emergencies or scheduled DSCA training events or exercises. Some states like New York, Texas, and California currently maintain state militias separate from their National Guard contingents. In normal inactive duty status, the direct chain of command for all Guard and Reserve elements would belong to U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) with a regional HQ to provide daily command and control of training, administration, and operational employment.
2. All Guard and Reserve Officers would receive a dual appointment for the Federal Government (Title 10) and for the state (Title 32). All Guard and Reserve Soldiers and Non-Commissioned Officers would enter a similarly structed enlistment. The dual contract would also allow personnel to fill billets at each state’s JFHQ.
3. Rebalance workforce requirements and authorizations against the redundant Title X requirements. Develop new allocation models for FTS to increase the performance and readiness at the unit level particularly in training management, administration, and maintenance. This will support the recruitment and retention of high-quality Soldiers, Airmen, and their Families. It can also provide faster integration with the Regular Army and Air Force during crises.
While tradition is important in the uniformed services, it shouldn’t provide an argumentum ad antiquitatem against maximizing readiness with U.S. taxpayer funding. The current construction is rife with competition for shrinking resources and wasteful with redundant functions. It pre-dates the Cold War and is not reflective of the threats and requirements in modernity. The pace of the changing international security landscape, combined with the mounting pressures of mandatory Federal spending necessitate creating America’s New Guard and Reserve.
Colonel Tony Vacha retired after 33 years of service including assignments in the Regular Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve. He served assignments in the Infantry, Civil Affairs, and Force Management.
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