On June 11, United States intelligence made a startling claim: Yemen’s Houthi rebels are looking to cooperate with Al Qaeda’s Somali affiliate al-Shabaab and are discussing a deal to provide the Somali fighters with weapons.
The potential agreement would reportedly provide advanced weapons systems to al-Shabaab in return for much-needed revenue for the Houthis. Still, the deal would also mean a new strategic relationship that could benefit the rebels. While it is unclear exactly what kind of weapons would be exchanged, al-Shabaab already has access to small arms and surveillance drones through its prolific smuggling network and the black market in Somalia. Thus, the Houthis are most likely offering attack drones or surface-to-air missiles because more advanced systems like anti-ship ballistic missiles and cruise missiles would require significant training and logistical assistance that would be difficult for al-Shabaab to obtain, given the risks associated with Houthi and al-Shabaab militants traveling.
Although United States officials have not discovered any direct evidence of weapon exchanges occurring at this time, even the possibility of these two groups putting their sectarian differences aside to cooperate should be a concern. Al-Shabaab is trying to establish jihadist rule over territory in Somalia. The Houthis, a Zaydi Shia rebel group backed by the regime in Tehran, are fighting the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen and, since November, have been focused on maritime attacks targeting vessels they see as allied with Israel. Nevertheless, the Houthis are following in the footsteps of their backers in Iran, who have, on occasion, worked with Al Qaeda and its affiliates pragmatically, even harboring some of its most senior leadership.
Although Yemen’s local Al Qaeda branch, known as Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), has built its reputation on fighting the Houthis and denouncing them as infidels, some analysts and Southern Transitional Council (STC)-affiliated officials claimed last year that rebels provided AQAP with one-way attack drones. If true, the nexus of Houthi-Al Qaeda cooperation expanding to include al-Shabaab would not be surprising, as the two Al Qaeda affiliates have long-standing ties that have led them to cooperate and even transfer explosives capabilities in the past. Such reports build on more recent claims that the Houthis have begun providing AQAP with limited military support in an effort to weaken the Emirati-backed STC in south Yemen.
If a deal were to come to fruition, it could be a harbinger of a new Houthi strategy to expand relations with other militant groups throughout the region, fueling their campaign to disrupt global shipping operations. That campaign, which has already affected an estimated sixty-five countries and forced at least twenty-nine major energy and shipping companies to alter their routes, does not appear to be slowing down anytime soon. In fact, only one day after reports of the al-Shabaab-Houthi negotiations surfaced, the Houthis launched a missile and drone strike on a Greek-owned coal carrier that would eventually sink the vessel.
Additionally, the agreement would give the Houthis access to capital that the group could use for recruitment and financing their military activities, which is more critical than ever as the United States and its allies are cracking down on funds reaching the Houthis due to their maritime campaign. Al-Shabaab has the financial assets to pay for such a system. According to the United States Treasury, the militant group generates over $100 million a year through multiple funding streams, such as extortion from local businesses and individuals, taxes, road tolls, and illicit trade, as well as investing in charcoal and sugar trading. Moreover, the group has proven to be increasingly immune to international sanctions that target their senior leaders and financiers due to the sheer number of al-Shabaab’s business entities, their ability to deal in cash or launder funds through purchasing gold, and limited government oversight of the Somali financial sector.
But such an agreement would, in fact, have a negative impact on the Houthis, who have had a major boom in support on both the domestic and international level as a result of their maritime attacks being seen as supportive of Palestinians in Gaza. Locally, cooperation with a Sunni jihadist group could be problematic as the Houthis have built their identity on the basis of countering encroaching Sunni ideologies. A shift like this could ignite long-simmering discontent in Houthi-controlled areas due to the group’s mismanagement, long-delayed payment of civilian salaries, and widespread repression. Moreover, partnering with an Al Qaeda-affiliated terrorist organization undermines the Houthis’ efforts to portray themselves as the legitimate governing body in Yemen, potentially cutting off long-sought support from other Arab countries and from some of those in the international community sympathetic to Palestinians ahead of a potential peace agreement with Saudi Arabia.
Either way, the possible deal underscores that although sanctions and strikes on Houthi targets have been able to degrade the rebels, they will continue to find creative ways to evade offensive operations—as seen already by the group’s efforts to expand their underground bases and tunnels to hide weapons and operatives—and gain access to funds and weapons. With the realization that the Houthis may intend to export weaponry, international maritime coalitions like the U.S.-led Operation Prosperity Guardian and EUNAVFOR Aspides will now need to also focus on ships traveling from Houthi-controlled ports.
Additionally, the United States needs to prevent al-Shabaab from accessing funds that could be used to pay the Houthis by supporting the Somali federal government in expanding regulatory oversight of the banking system in Somalia. Such a crackdown should include increased monitoring of banks partially owned by al-Shabaab-associated companies, seizing bank accounts associated with the group, and closing electronic banking facilities used to handle taxation payments. Additional measures like identifying and raiding safe houses used to hide cash collected from taxation and preventing operatives from accessing international gold and precious metal markets should also be enacted.
Emily Milliken is the Associate Director at the Atlantic Council’s N7 Initiative. Follow her on LinkedIn and X @EmilyMPrzy.
Image: David G40 / Shutterstock.com.
