Sudan’s war broke out in April 2023 when the military tried to subdue the Rapid Support Forces.
Since then, fighting has ravaged much of the country, including the capital Khartoum. At least 15,500 people had been killed by June 2024. More than 6 million people have been displaced and over 25 million pushed into acute hunger, according to the United Nations.
The Rapid Support Forces followed a strategy which is similar to those of other militia groups aiming to infiltrate and co-opt state institutions. Such strategies have military, economic and political dimensions.
These groups tend to exploit conflict to enlarge their areas of influence, weapon stockpiles and numbers of fighters.
They generate revenues from business lines created by conflict. Partnerships with foreign states and international smuggling networks are most often involved.
They provide jobs and patronage to get political support in key constituencies and seek institutional roles.
As a political scientist specialising in conflict studies and irregular warfare, I have spent over a decade researching insurgents, paramilitaries, militias and other armed groups. In a recent article, I examined armed actors pursuing “state capture” – the covert and gradual infiltration of state institutions to influence policy. In addition to the cases of Hezbollah in Lebanon and Shia militias in Iraq, I looked at the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan.
The study involved interviews with a diverse group of participants. Academics, political analysts, government officials and individuals affiliated with armed groups were among them.
I found that militias bent on state capture initially pursue their objectives without openly antagonising the state. They often position themselves as pro-government. But they also signal that any attempt by the state to neutralise them would lead to a devastating confrontation.
Over time, these strategies enable armed groups to gain political influence and formal institutional roles. This allows them to shape public policies to their advantage. When armed groups achieve a measure of state capture, they undermine governmental effectiveness, contributing to institutional breakdown and state failure.
In Sudan, the Rapid Support Forces now controls vast swaths of territory, though it’s not yet in full control of the country.
Growing influence
The Rapid Support Forces emerged from the Janjaweed militias, which spearheaded al-Bashir’s genocidal counterinsurgency in Darfur in exchange for funding and arms.
In 2013, al-Bashir restructured the Janjaweed into the Rapid Support Forces to counterbalance the army and preempt potential coups. To lead this new force, al-Bashir chose a former highway robber turned Janjaweed commander, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, also known as Hemedti.
Al-Bashir’s support enabled Hemedti to deploy tens of thousands of battle-hardened fighters across Sudan to secure strategic locations for the regime. These included the capital, troubled borderlands and economic hubs like gold mines.
Capitalising on this positioning, the Rapid Support Forces expanded its involvement in gold mining, smuggling and trading. It also generated income by supplying mercenaries for conflicts in Yemen and Libya.
Bashir’s government tacitly endorsed these activities, possibly calculating that the forces would be cheaper to maintain if self-funded.
For a time, the Rapid Support Forces collaborated closely with Sudan’s army. When the military’s leadership decided to oust Bashir in 2019 amid anti-regime protests, Hemedti didn’t oppose the decision.
During the subsequent political transition, Hemedti became vice-chair of the Sovereign Council. The institution was tasked with guiding the country towards democratic elections.
This institutional role shocked and dismayed many within Sudanese civil society. Some, however, argued that attempts to dismantle the Rapid Support Forces or sideline Hemedti would spark armed conflict.
Both the army and Rapid Support Forces had established secretive business networks generating billions of dollars. They shared a short-term interest in protecting their power and economic assets from any civilian encroachment.
This alignment of interests formed the foundation of their partnership and paved the way for the October 2021 military coup – which abruptly halted Sudan’s democratisation process.
As a new regime took hold in Sudan, the Rapid Support Forces grew more powerful. The forces profited from gold mining, smuggling and business deals with the United Arab Emirates, Russia’s Wagner Group and Libyan warlord Khalifa Haftar.
Hemedti’s forces bolstered their arsenal and expanded their ranks. They presented themselves as champions of ordinary Arabs from Sudan’s rural provinces and borderlands.
Concerned by these developments, the Sudanese Armed Forces attempted to forcefully integrate the Rapid Support Forces into the military chain of command. But by the time the military launched its ill-fated offensive in April 2023, the Rapid Support Forces had fielded 100,000 fighters equipped for highly mobile urban warfare.
They quickly inflicted heavy losses on the military and seized control of most of Khartoum. They also took over the adjoining Gezira state, Darfur in the west and Kordofan in the centre, shattering both the Sudanese state and society.
In areas under their sway, the Rapid Support Forces have perpetrated crimes against humanity and war crimes, including ethnic cleansing, massacres, rape, torture and widespread looting.
The Sudanese army, which retains control of Port Sudan, has blocked humanitarian aid from reaching territories under the Rapid Support Forces. This has contributed to an impending famine.
Bleak prospects
The prospects for a peaceful resolution to Sudan’s conflict currently appear bleak. Even a temporary ceasefire to facilitate humanitarian aid remains improbable. The United Nations Security Council remains deeply divided, and the African Union has yet to propose a workable plan.
The United States and its European allies have squandered their political capital in Sudan. They failed to adequately support the 2019-2021 democratic transition and to reverse the 2021 coup.
Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Russia bear significant responsibility for the current situation. Their support for opposing sides has deepened divisions, contributing to the failure of initiatives like the Jeddah peace talks.
Local neighbourhood committees, once pivotal in grassroots democratisation, have been marginalised by armed actors.
International actors aiming to help Sudan should recognise that these civil society groups still represent the country’s best hope. They possess a deep understanding of the country’s most pressing needs. These include unimpeded humanitarian aid, as well as exposing and curtailing the military and financial lifelines of leading armed actors. This could help foster a political transition free from these actors’ influence.
Federico Manfredi Firmian, Lecturer in Political Science, Sciences Po
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.