Few will deny that Israel faces threats from its enemies. But what goes unsaid is that the greatest dangers to the Jewish state are self-inflicted, and that its dysfunctional politics have set the country on a path to self-destruction.
Few will deny that Israel faces threats from its enemies. But what goes unsaid is that the greatest dangers to the Jewish state are self-inflicted. Its dysfunctional politics have set the country on a path to self-destruction in a few decades’ time for reasons that have little to do with the current disaster in Gaza.
This reality has been obscured by some spectacular successes. Israel posted a per capita GDP higher than that of France, Germany and Britain in 2022 (about $55,000). Its tech sector drives incredible innovations, and it punches well above its weight in Nobel prizes, military prowess, television formats and more.
Yet all this may vanish, for two reasons.
The first is the occupation of Arab-populated territories during the 1967 war. Israel is now desperately enmenshed in the West Bank because it foolishly implanted over half a million settlers in the territory (and they have democratic rights, whereas their Palestinian neighbors do not). Though Israel pulled out of Gaza in 2005, the Oct. 7 invasion by Hamas has drawn the military back in,
The population of Israel plus those two areas is 15 million people, with a slight Arab majority. Many Palestinians are edging toward abandoning an effort at partition (the “two-state solution”) and instead demand annexation and integration into Israel. Were that to happen, many Jews — richer, more mobile and attached to a Western way of life — would flee. Jews would again be a minority. Millions of descendants of Arab refugees would be invited in, and the place would, eventually, be renamed Palestine.
Israelis tend to dismiss a one-state solution as an option, but they are thinking of what they’d choose. It is nonetheless the default outcome. When the Palestinians demand integration and equality, they will find tremendous international support. Israel will be shunned and impoverished if it tries to resist it — the cries of “apartheid,” despite the imperfect analogy, will be deafening. Export-oriented Israel, which depends on the U.S. for munitions and diplomatic cover, will have few places to turn (especially if today’s campus progressives are by then ensconced in Washington).
A two-state solution is not a favor to the Palestinians but critical to Israel’s survival — but the Israeli right wing is too dim to understand.
And barring a shift in voting patterns (which the calamitous Gaza war may actually cause) that Israeli right wing grows all the time. A key component of it is the Haredi population — the ultra-Orthodox Jews known by their black dress and devotion to religion — whose adherents have some seven children each on average and will soon be one in six Israeli Jews. They are the second time-bomb ticking.
This group presents a strange dualism, both detached from mainstream society yet dragging it inexorably into a revolutionary reality at odds with the modern world. Men and women have highly restrictive roles (women cannot serve in parliament for Haredi political parties and face gender segregation in many contexts). They generally refuse to teach boys math, science and English in their independent school system, and insist on lifelong religious study for them, which they expect the state to reward with stipends. Only half the men are employed; many of those are in religious services jobs funded by the state. They receive state subsidies per child and refuse to serve in the military, even as the rightist coalition they sustain embroils Israel in conflicts.
As their birthrate is triple that of other Israelis, their proportion of the population doubles every generation or so. This current dynamic, with low attrition and intermarriage, would make them a majority of Israel’s Jews by 2060. As the tipping point approaches, the flight of secular Jews can be expected to accelerate. This will be devastating to the country’s economy, wipe out the tech sector on which Israel’s prosperity depends, devastate Western tourism and impede the country’s ability to defend itself.
These two dynamics are creating the following scenario:
Israel’s enemies around the world may welcome this catastrophe. But others, including me, believe Israel is worth saving. It will require a series of difficult surgeries — decisive action that will entail undeniable risks and encounter predictable difficulties.
On the Palestinian front, Israel would have to force through a disengagement from the Palestinians, despite the security risk, and probably without a peace agreement (although a peace agreement is, of course, better and should be attempted). One saving grace is the fact that almost 80 percent of the Israeli settlers live close to Israel’s pre-1967 border, and therefore minor border adjustments could leave just 100,000 Jews living deep inside the West Bank. They would probably need to be removed.
Essentially, the border can become the security barrier that Israel built in the 2000s, after the Second Intifada.
Such a separation from the Palestinians would be logical demographically and offer some justice for the Palestinians. But to simply withdraw the military from beyond the new border would also be risky. The area is too close to Israeli cities to risk its seizure by Hamas or other terrorists bent on aggression. Israel may have to maintain the military status quo despite the removal of the settlers — at least, until the world figures out a better solution.
On the Haredi front, Israel would have to impose a core curriculum and end child subsidies, bloat in the religious services sector, stipends for religious study and draft exemptions. The hope would be that through such shock therapy the population would agree to slowly become employable and somewhat integrated into modern society, with reasonable birthrates being adopted.
None of this can happen in a right-wing coalition, because the right depends on Haredi and settler politicians to stay afloat. So political upheaval is essential for saving Israel.
Many members of the “modern” part of Israel (the sector that essentially built the country, drives its prosperity and to a great degree is responsible for its defense) have given up. Some are leaving already. Others muse about dividing current Israel into two countries — a mostly secular and liberal one, overwhelmingly Jewish, along the coast from Tel Aviv to Haifa, and a religious-nationalistic one everywhere else, free to squabble with the Palestinians. The population dispersal would be roughly even with 5 million people each, but it is hard to see how either could be defended.
Modern Israel can still be saved. But the danger is far bigger than outsiders tend to think, and averting it will require radical action.
Dan Perry was the Cairo-based Middle East Editor and London-based Europe-Africa Editor of the Associated Press. He also served as AP’s bureau chief and chairman of the Foreign Press Association in Jerusalem, and is the co-author of two books about Israel.
