How the numbers could play out with various parties when the ANC is 42 parliamentary seats short
Back in January 2023, I mooted the possibility of the ANC losing its majority and reported the example of Australia’s 2010 minority government, in a form that is now being widely touted under the label “confidence and supply”, which is pretty much what happened in Australia.
Why this arrangement and not a coalition?
US president Lyndon B Johnson, asked about keeping troublesome members inside his party, famously said it’s better to have them inside the tent pissing out, than outside the tent pissing in. With the attitudes of the bigger opposition parties to the ANC, a coalition here would be more like inside the tent pissing in.
A coalition differs from a minority government agreement in that a coalition gives minority players cabinet positions. It’s interesting to contrast the 2010 Australian minority government with the UK coalition formed the same year.
In Australia, Julia Gillard’s Labor Party formed a minority government with the support of The Greens and independents. The deal was simple — in exchange for a short list of demands, the smaller participants agreed to support the government against no-confidence votes and not to oppose the budget vote. Objectively, this was a successful government though Gillard was undermined by the Murdoch media who attack any deal with the Greens. This is a form of confidence and supply agreement. The key to it was that the demands of the minority players were clear, quantifiable and deliverable. For anything requiring a parliamentary vote on these issues as well as on supply and confidence, the Labor Party and its partners voted en bloc. For anything else that the government wanted to get through parliament, the parliamentary committee system had to work as a true democratic process — not as a government rubber stamp.
By contrast, the 2010 coalition in the UK, formed by Tory leader David Cameron and Liberal Democrat leader Nick Clegg, resulted in the Liberal Democrats having five out of 21 cabinet posts. Part of the coalition deal resulted in the Liberal Democrats reneging on campaign promises. The results in the subsequent 2015 elections were grim. The party collapsed from 57 to eight seats. This does not always happen with coalitions — particularly not in countries where coalitions are the norm and voters are used to compromises. However, in our situation of bitter divisions, it is hard to see how a coalition deal would avoid tainting one or more of the parties. The Democratic Alliance (DA) has hard lines on some issues such as affirmative action, which the ANC is not going to cross. The uMkhonto weSizwe (MK) party insists that Cyril Ramaphosa must go, which the ANC is rejecting, and so on.
If confidence and supply is the more likely model, it is worth exploring further how it works.
The 2010 Australian deal was quite simple. The Greens and independents negotiated a package of measures they would support, in return for not voting the government out of office on confidence or blocking the budget (supply).
The Canadian 2022 agreement is much more comprehensive. It arose from the 2021 election, which left Liberal Party leader Justin Trudeau 10 seats short of a majority, a bigger gap than the Labor Party deficit in 2010. His deal with the New Democratic Party was much more comprehensive, because the gap was bigger; Gillard was only four short of a majority. But the Canadian deal was simpler in one respect: the governing party only had to make an agreement with one partner, whereas Labor made a deal with the Greens and several independent MPs.
In our situation, with 159 seats, the ANC is 42 short of a majority so there will be a temptation from the opposition side, should a confidence and supply model be on the table, to negotiate a long, complex agreement — but that would be a bad idea. Ideally, such an agreement should be as short as possible to arrive at a stable government. The issues the partners disagree on can become the subject of debate in portfolio committees or parliament. As a consequence, the portfolio committee system, instead of being a rubber stamp for the governing party and a forum for opposition frustration, can become a genuine democratic process to hone legislation.
Who would be involved? The easiest in terms of numbers is the DA, with 87 seats, which easily makes up the deficit. But, with big gaps between the two sides, the ANC will be tempted to look elsewhere for at least 42 extra votes (ideally significantly more, so votes are not too tight). Next in line is the MK party with 58 votes; also enough, but given the enmity between the Zuma camp and the ANC, this is unlikely. The Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) alone with 39 is not sufficient but the shortfall of three could easily be made up with other smaller parties. If the EFF is out, next-biggest is the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) with 17 seats, 25 short of a majority. All of the smaller parties minus Freedom Front Plus (surely not a likely partner, but who knows?) add up to 34, too little to make up the required deficit. So expect some hard bargaining.
What should be in the agreement?
A commonly-touted option is offering the opposition the speaker position. The advantage of that is that the speaker is meant to be neutral. Another is negotiating who should chair portfolio committees. The standing committee on public accounts (Scopa) is already chaired by an opposition member. This could extend to other committees.
Another thing to consider is de-politicising the public service; this could start by putting an opposition MP into the chair of the portfolio committee on public service and administration, but the agreement could go further, to require reforms to professionalise the public service.
I could go on — but I have doubts that this will be about fundamentals; more likely what Americans call pork-barrel politics. Whatever a particular party wants for its constituency will be its bargaining chip.
At provincial level, some of this applies. Provinces without majority parties include Gauteng, where the ANC’s 28 seats is 13 less than a majority, meaning that unless it wants to partner with the DA, which has 22, it will need more than one partner. KwaZulu-Natal is the most interesting because the MK party is four short of a majority. The IFP, the second-biggest, has 15, which would be enough for a stable coalition. The ANC (14 seats) and DA (11) also have enough but neither is likely to work with the MK party. The EFF and the National Freedom Party (NFP) together only total three, so the MK party must partner with a bigger party. My money is on the IFP. The ANC in Northern Cape is one short of a majority; there, Patriotic Alliance (PA) is the most likely partner.
A key difference is that in provincial government, a premier does not give up their seat in the legislature, whereas the president ceases to be an MP. That adds a bit of incentive at national level to construct a stable governing alliance, whether coalition or minority-party agreement. That contrast should be compared with municipal coalitions that have proved to be unstable. As with provinces, collapse of a municipal coalition does not instantly result in the former mayor joining the ranks of the unemployed.
Over the next two weeks, while the parties work on deals to form government, there will no doubt be hard negotiations over prized planks in the party’s election platforms. But all parties should be aware that the strongest message from the votes is that no one is trusted by the majority to govern. Some humility is required.
Philip Machanick is an emeritus associate professor at Rhodes University and a Makana Citizens Front councillor.
