Summary: The U.S. may have benefited from prioritizing battlecruisers over battleships in the interwar period to enhance its naval agility against Japan in WWII. The Lexington-class battlecruiser's transformation into an aircraft carrier under the Washington Naval Treaty left the U.S. Navy lacking in speed and flexibility. Critics argue that battlecruisers would have supported faster carrier groups more effectively, providing crucial anti-aircraft and surface protection early in the war. Despite this, the U.S. Navy's focus on heavily armored battleships reflected contemporary shipbuilding trends, potentially missing an opportunity to adopt a more balanced and versatile naval strategy from the outset.
Arguably, the US should have prioritized battlecruisers over battleships during the interwar period, as doing so may have better prepared the US for the speed with which the naval conflict with Japan unfolded.
Battleships vs. Battlecruisers
The US had plans to build a battlecruiser, the Lexington-class. But World War I intervened and plans for the Lexington were delayed – and then morphed, under the Washington Naval Treaty, leading the Lexington battlecruiser to be redesigned as an aircraft carrier. As a result, by the time Imperial Japan hobbled the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, the US Navy was already without the speed or nimbleness needed to blitz from island to island, across the Pacific, in support of fast carrier groups.
“Had the U.S. Navy made different, better choices at the end of World War I, it might have begun World War II with battlecruisers that could have support its fast carrier groups,” Dr. Robert Farley argued in this publication in the past.
In the early twentieth century, warship design trends favored size and power. The Dreadnought Revolution, as it was known, inspired the world powers to build big ships with big guns. Britain, American, Germany, Japan – everyone followed the trend, building bigger and more powerfully armed battleships capable of barraging enemy shorelines. But most navies supplemented their battleships with faster and less heavily armed battlecruisers, capable of scouting, cruising, and raiding. The US, however, neglected battlecruiser development, focusing primarily on their battleships.
The US did take a crack at the battlecruiser, however. The Lexington design earned serious consideration. But the Lexington efforts were “sketchy, resulting in huge, fast, poorly protected ships with bizarre configurations,” Farley wrote. “The 1916 design specified a displacement of thirty-five thousands tons, a speed of thirty-five knots, and main armament of ten fourteen-inch guns in four turrets.” Yet, the quirky design was never produced.
Failing to commit to a new battlecruiser design during the interwar period, the US entered World War II relatively flat-footed.
Had the US had battlecruisers on day one of World War II, circumstances would have been different, opportunities to attack the Japanese different. The US would have an enhanced ability to provide anti-aircraft and anti-surface protection for their carrier fleet. Instead, the capabilities that a battlecruiser provided would not be available until mid-war.
What the US Navy did have were battleships.
“The USN prioritized slow, well-armored battleships that could operate together in a line-of-battle,” Farley wrote. “Had the Navy paid more attention to European trends in shipbuilding it might have gone ahead with the Lexington-class battlecruisers, which would have offered U.S. commanders in the Pacific better tools for fighting the war.”
Of course, it’s all just speculation. The Japanese had battlecruisers, the Kongos, which certainly didn’t allow for victory. Actually, the Kongos faired poorly, with two of the four vessels sinking during the Guadalcanal campaign. Perhaps a Lexington battlecruiser would have shared a similar fate – it’s certainly possible, given how in demand the versatile vessels would have been.
Regardless, battlecruisers or no battlecruisers, the US objectively won the war. Hindsight is always 20-20. Even without battlecruisers, the US earned Japan’s capitulation, gained control over the Pacific, and over Japan itself.
Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.
