The sooner President Joe Biden acknowledges that Americans will likely be drawn into a fight to protect shipping traffic through the Suez Canal, the more time the U.S. military has to plan, and the less severe the harm will be to the global economy. For months, ever since a deadly Hamas incursion into Israel triggered a massive Israeli military campaign in Gaza, the United States has sought to deter Israel’s enemies, most notably Iran and its proxy Hezbollah, from spreading the conflict to other fronts in the Middle East.
The administration’s fears are warranted but also moot. The war is already expanding in a way that endangers the global economy—specifically, through attacks by Iranian-backed forces on the crucial shipping lane from the Indian Ocean through the Red Sea and the Suez Canal to the Mediterranean Sea. Whereas the U.S. military need not play any substantial role in the war in Israel and Gaza, keeping the path to Suez open and safe is a global priority, and no other country can lead that effort.
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Late last month, the Iranian-backed Houthi rebels in northern Yemen began targeting commercial ships in the Bab al-Mandab Strait, which connects the southern end of the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean. The Houthis claim that they are doing it to support the Palestinians as Israel and Hamas wage war. The Houthis’ first target was the Galaxy Leader, a Japanese-operated cargo ship reportedly owned in part by an Israeli investor. The attackers were able to capture the vessel.
This week, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin announced a 10-country coalition, led by the United States, to protect the Suez route. The initial plan is to park warships close to the coast of Yemen and use them to defend against any Houthi attack. But more may be required of the American military, including naval escorts for vulnerable ships and air strikes against Houthi military infrastructure.
About 12 percent of global trade, and 30 percent of the world’s container shipping, passes through the Suez Canal and the Red Sea, the quickest route between Asia and Europe. Subsequent missile attacks have so far caused shipping companies to divert more than 100 vessels from the Suez route, redirecting them around the Cape of Good Hope, at the southern tip of Africa—where the waters are so treacherous that the area is called the “Graveyard of Ships.” That response adds 6,000 nautical miles and perhaps three to four weeks to the journey, thus tying up vessels and disrupting shipping all around the world. Past disruptions in Suez—including an eight-year stoppage after the 1967 Six-Day War and the 2021 stranding of a large vessel that blocked others from passing—show both that shippers can do without Suez and that doing so involves enormous cost and risk.
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The mission to protect ships on the Suez route is called Operation Prosperity Guardian—a provocation, arguably, to Western progressives who bristle at the use of military force to protect economic interests. But framing the mission purely as a defense of global commerce is wise. Safeguarding the seas is essential to countries far less wealthy and powerful than the U.S., and denying a small band of rebels the power to choke off a crucial shipping lane is a long-term investment in global security. Until the maritime industry is convinced that the Suez route is safe, the rest of the world will suffer, meaning the United States and its allies will have to strike harder.
The Houthis and, by extension, their Iranian sponsors have had the ability to attack global shipping for years, but presumably refrained for fear of provoking a military response from the United States. Their bet seems to be that the war in Gaza has given them more freedom of action in the Red Sea because Washington is nervous about stepping in.
The Houthis are unlikely to be dissuaded by a perfunctory U.S. effort now. Why would they be? The group thrives at a choke point for the global economy, and for relatively little investment, the Houthis have given themselves leverage in diplomatic talks to end Yemen’s civil war.
Any U.S. strikes on Houthi launchpads in Yemen would carry some possibility of direct conflict with Iran, but the risk is probably overstated. Iran is, after all, already engaged against the interests of the United States and allies such as Israel and Saudi Arabia. “Compared to the risk of increased engagement between Israel and Iran through Hezbelloh in Lebanon, we aren’t likely to go to war with Iran over U.S. offensive strikes against Houthi launch sites in Yemen,” Eric Rosenbach, a former Pentagon chief of staff during the Obama administration, told me. “The risk is far outweighed by the need to end this nonsense fast.”
Right now a rebel group is dragging down a global economy. A maritime conflict has begun, and the U.S. has little choice but to fight.
