Steven Overly
Welcome to today’s panel discussion on transatlantic approaches to semiconductor investments, hosted by the Center for European Policy Analysis and the Polish Embassy. My name is Steven Overly and I host Politico’s daily technology podcast, POLITICO Tech. At Politico, I’ve covered the semiconductor supply chain since the US and Europe became keenly aware of its vulnerabilities during the COVID-19 pandemic. I think we all remember how the global supply [shortage] of semiconductors disrupted a multitude of sectors and contributed to record high inflation. Solving this problem has been framed as both an economic and national security priority. And I look forward to checking in on the progress with today’s lineup of speakers. Let me briefly introduce them before we jump into our conversation. First, we have Hendrik Bourgeois, the Vice President of European Government Affairs at Intel; Lucinda Creighton, she’s a senior fellow in the Digital Innovation Initiative at the Center for European Policy Analysis, our host; we have Adrienne Elrod, who’s the Director of External and Government Affairs for the CHIPS Program Office of the US Department of Commerce; and finally, we have Jacek Hanke, the CEO and owner of Digital Core Design, which is based in Poland. Thank all of you for being here today. I’d like to start with just a quick state of play on the semiconductor issue. You know, the Commerce Department is expected to award billions in subsidies to companies standing up microchip fabs here in the United States. In September, the European Chips Act entered into force. Lucinda, how would you describe this moment that we’re in and the transatlantic relationship as it relates to semiconductor strategy and investment?
Lucinda Creighton
Good question to kick off, I think and thank you. I mean, in a way, the US and the EU have been on a parallel track, I think we all identified the challenges that you’ve just outlined, particularly during the pandemic. And that has, I suppose, come into sharp focus from a geopolitical as well as an economic point of view on both sides of the Atlantic. So I think the US administration and the European Commission began to mobilize at around the same time and began progressing the respect of Chips Act to try to respond to what was perceived to be significant supply chain insecurity. So they haven’t necessarily been I would I say, joined up in the approach. But the approaches haven’t been all that dissimilar in the sense that ultimately, to a large extent, it boils down to subsidies, something that the European Union has been really working very hard to deter for the past 30 years, but now is very much on board with trying to deliver in specific strategic areas of priority, obviously, particularly, semiconductors and chips, so in that sense, the two are aligned. But there are differences. And, of course, there have been tensions on occasion on both sides of the Atlantic, as they’ve sort of disagreed or maybe been nonplussed with the approach that has been taken on either side of the Atlantic. So there have been some political tensions, but perhaps not as much as might have been anticipated when this all kicked off.
Steven Overly
Excellent. Well, I definitely want to dive into some of those similarities and differences over the course of this conversation. Adrienne, I’ll come to you next. You know, because there’s been an expectation, I think, that the US CHIPS Act awards would begin by the end of this year, what can you tell us about the status of those awards and the implementation of the chips programs?
Adrienne Elrod
Well, I think to answer that question, I really want to talk about the progress that we’ve made so far. So Steven, you’re obviously very well versed in the progress of the CHIPS and Science Act. Congress passed it last year or last August in a bipartisan manner. We hired our first CHIPS staffer Mike Schmidt, he still runs the CHIPS Program Office. Three weeks later, we now have over 150 people on staff, and we’ve made a lot of progress. I also want to just talk about really quickly the number of applications that we’ve had come in and the [inaudible] that we put out. We released our first funding opportunity in February of this year and that was for large-scale, bleeding edge mature node companies; we expanded that funding opportunity in June to include large-scale suppliers of CapEx projects with over 300 million; and then we also released a funding opportunity in September for smaller suppliers with CapEx projects under 300 million. So we’ve made a lot of progress there, we have received over 530 Statements of Interest. So basically, when an applicant applies, we encourage them to file a statement of interest. It really gives our team sort of a roadmap and a good view of where the activity is, you know, are there clusters that are starting to emerge? You know, where is the growth here, besides just the like, natural hotbed areas of semiconductor activity like Arizona, Ohio, upstate New York, etc. And then if you choose to apply, then you don’t have to, but we encourage you to file a pre-application. And again, when when an entity files a pre-application that creates a relationship with our investments vertical and our strategy vertical, so they can have an ongoing dialogue on whether or not they recommend you apply for a full application. And then if they recommend that you file a full application, then you file a full application. We’ve received over 120 pre-applications and applications. So that just shows you how far we’ve come. And you know, the fact that there’s so much interest and the interest, by the way, is not just in these regions where there are clusters, it is across the country we’ve had SOIs from 42 states. So we’ve made a lot of progress so far. Now what is next? We will first issue a Preliminary Memorandum of Terms. That’s called a PMT for the acronym crowd here. Secretary Raimondo has said on several occasions that we will issue a PMT by the end of this year and I have every reason to believe that that is the case. A PMT is where we basically say to an applicant, you will receive funding as long as the due diligence process shakes out the way that we believe it will. So we will have at least one PMT by the end of this year. And obviously that will start an ongoing process of PMTs. And then again once a PMT and an entity that goes into a PMT, once that due diligence process takes place, then we will go to the award phase. We have not started that phase yet, because we haven’t even issued a PMT. But that will all come part of the rolling you know PMT award basis that will start very soon.
Steven Overly
So it sounds like in that process, then the awards and money actually going out the door, so to speak, is looking like next year perhaps. Is that fair to say?
Adrienne Elrod
Absolutely. And look, we want to get this money out the door as soon as possible. I don’t have to tell you or your listeners and viewers why that’s important. You know, there’s a competitive, you know, countries across the world are competing for this. We also understand because of the supply chain disruptions during the pandemic, we simply have to have more leading-edge companies here in the United States that produce chips on American soil. We produce 0% of the world’s leading-edge chips, right, now we design a lot of them, but we produce 0% of those chips here in the United States. So it’s in our best interest that we get this money out the door as quickly as possible. You know, a lot of it does depend on the strength of the applications that come in, the quality of those applications. Obviously, the higher quality of the application, the faster our team can work with that applicant to get to a PMT and then to get through the due diligence and get to an award phase. But we are moving as quickly as possible. I can tell you this team is working around the clock. And it’s in our interest, in the American people’s interest, to get this money out the door as quickly as possible.
Steven Overly
Well, common refrain that I’ve heard since the US and EU first started talking about semiconductor subsidies is this idea that governments need to avoid a race to the bottom; that they want to avoid a situation where different governments are basically bidding against one another to give companies kind of ever larger incentives. You know, Adrienne, I just quickly want to come back to you here. From the Commerce Department’s perspective, I’ve heard a lot of talk including from Secretary Raimondo about the need to sort of avoid that kind of competition; to avoid that race to the bottom. From your perspective, I kind of like to understand what that means on a practical level, you know, how you make your investment decisions with that in mind.
Adrienne Elrod
What Secretary Raimondo has made very clear and this is obviously an ethos that is believed by the entire CHIPS team here: that no single country can mine and manufacture semiconductors alone. It’s just simply the truth. This industry is too large and we in the United States never believe that we’re going to have a corner market on all the chips that we need. Semiconductor supply chains are going to remain global. So international collaboration is critical to our collective success. We’ve also made it very clear that we’ve appreciated the input and cooperation from our US partners and allies. We’ll keep working with our partners and allies to ensure that our strategies are aligned, and that we are advancing our collective economic and national security. It’s really, really important. And obviously, when we look at, you know, our allies in Europe, it’s really important that we have a symbiotic partnership that relies on each other for this. And by the way, with respect to Poland, we do welcome the announcement that will be a site for new semiconductor back-end packaging, which Poland announced, as that adds to the resilience and geographic diversity of this crucial part in the ecosystem. Our main goal here is to make sure that some of this advanced technology stays out of the hands of bad actors or actors who may not treat it with with the respect that it needs. But when it comes to our allies, we want to have a global partnership. It is critically important that we work hand in hand with our allies, and that we grow the semiconductor activity in our in our respective countries and regions together.
Steven Overly
Well, Hendrik, I’d like to bring you into the conversation now, you know, Intel is investing in the US and in Europe, how, sort of, clearly differentiated are the sort of subsidies strategies, investment strategies, between the US and Europe from where you sit?
Hendrik Bourgeois
Well, thanks for the question. I think there’s a different framework across the Atlantic. In the European Union, we basically have a two tiered review system or application system; you first have to apply with national governments for funds, subsidies, grants, incentives, because there is no EU budget for incentives for manufacturing. And so it is the national budgets that are being tapped to. And that requires, therefore private investors to make applications in national capitals in the European Union. And once that is achieved, then there’s a second tier of review with the European Commission and the European Commission needs to apply EU state aid law, which is basically legislation geared towards ensuring that the single market is not distorted, that the aid that a member state provides is indeed necessary that it’s appropriate that it’s proportionate, visa vie other member states. And so in that respect, there’s a difference, right, because my understanding is that there’s no type of equivalent of state aid legislation in the United States. And paradoxically, Europe has quite a bit of experience and long-standing experience in applying state aid legislation and regulation to ensure a level playing field within the European Union. And so in that respect there’s a difference. Obviously, you know, the overall objective is the same, I think. I think both the United States and the European Union, see that they have common challenges in ensuring that there’s, you know, that supply chain vulnerabilities are being addressed. You know, today, contrary to what was the case 40 years ago or 30 years ago, there’s a very high concentration of supply of semiconductor technology in Southeast Asia. And that creates vulnerabilities, and both the United States and the European Union are trying to address that by allocating scarce public financial resources to create the necessary incentives for manufacturing locally. And so in that respect, there’s total similarity, right. And the only difference I would say, is that, unfortunately, as a European, I must say that we’re, you know, in Europe, it’s more difficult because Europe doesn’t: it’s not a fiscal union, you know, there’s a lack of your scale at the European Union level, because we have to tap into various smaller national budgets. And the EU Chips Act, contrary to the US CHIPS Act, does not create new financial resources. There’s EU federal amount of money that can be dispersed to private companies, it remains a national issue. And so in that respect, I think, you know, the United States has a bigger firepower to allocate than the European Union.
Steven Overly
Well, Lucinda I’ll bring you in here real quick. You made your comment earlier that the US and Europe have differences in their approach, and I think really the mentality too when it comes to these subsidies. What stands out to you here as the biggest difference between the approach the US is taking and the EU is taking and does that create a conflict or a tension between the two?
Lucinda Creighton
I think if you go back to sort of even pre-pandemic when Europe was talking a lot over the past five, six, seven years about digital sovereignty and about strategic autonomy. Europe was very clearly giving the indication that this was going to be about focusing on subsidizing generally tech capability in Europe, that would be to the detriment of other regions, including the United States, and will be very much about favoring and supporting indigenous European business and industry. That sort of outlook has changed and the Chips Act, I mean, as we’re already beginning to see is manifest, even though the direct funding which Hendrik has said is relatively very small, the R&D funding that is directly coming from central EU funds. That is not necessarily excluding opportunities for American industry, for example, when you look at the huge potential member states subsidies, direct subsidies to industry, they are going to and they will go to the established players on the global stage the TSMC, Intel and others. And that’s already coming to fruition even before the Chips Act had been finally negotiated member state governments were doing renegotiating with those companies to secure investments in individual member states.Germany, of course, being at the forefront in that. So there is no discrimination against non-European industry. So that’s, obviously, by its nature essential because we don’t have big players in Europe. So I think there’s a little bit of a reality check, perhaps in how Europe has gone about this. I think the almost protectionist approach that was envisaged, you know, five or six years ago, that clearly has been completely dropped. There are some distinctions between the EU and US Chips Acts: to receive support for manufacturing in Europe, you are expected to have a first of a kind facility. So you know, the the EU Chips Act is really heavily focused on investments in next generation chips. That’s a little bit different to the US approach, which doesn’t have quite the same requirements. And there are similarities, of course, as well, the US requires, as I understand it, grant applicants to invest in workforce training, and the EU is trying to follow with that approach by supporting education training, and upskilling and reskilling and that’s certainly a part of the approach at the European level. But it’s not a requirement. It’s not a condition of subsidies. I think, you know, overall, and Hendrik has alluded to this as well, you know, the EU structure is probably more complex because it’s not a federal budgetary approach. So it’s just more complex, it’s more nuanced, and different member states have different approaches. So the one thing I would say, which, you know, is a challenge, I think, for the European single market, because the European single market has spent thirty plus years trying to create a level playing field for investment and innovation and industrial progress in Europe and has really tried to ensure that you know, peripheral member states, large core member states, small countries, could all sort of benefit from European prosperity and growth and innovation. You know, by its very nature, reintroducing subsidies to the industrial landscape and Europe on a big scale absolutely favors large member states, because they are the ones with the budgets, at national level to be able to provide and offer these subsidies, whereas the smaller and poorer and more peripheral member states are not. So that’s a new challenge for the European Union, which I think needs to be acknowledged and needs to probably be addressed.
Steven Overly
I think that’s a great segway to talk about Poland in particular, it’s sort of an interesting example of how this policy is playing out. The Polish government seems to be trying to put a stake in the ground when it comes to building out its domestic semiconductor industry and really sort of using this opportunity and all of this tension on this industry to expand its own sector. Jacek you’ve operated your company in Poland for a long time. How would you assess the approach that’s being taken right now to attract new chipmakers to Poland?
Jacek Hanke
You know, in Poland, we are building our semiconductor industry from scratch and then all the industries now under development. Everything what we are doing is quite new for our industry, for our academic, and the whole industry is important; it’s now under development. And we are developing from scratch starting from education through the design services. And finally, and hopefully, we will achieve the production ability at least in the fab scene located in Germany or other parts in Europe. What is strong in Poland is that we have very talented engineers able to design and focusing on the development of new innovative solutions. And from my perspective, the most important aspects in such cooperation would be the possibility of implementation of common norms and standards, especially in area of development of a new and broadly understood the cybersecurity or functional safety. It is especially necessary and needed in new technologies, in automotive industry, in any area of development of the new technologies and the new products. I represent the company from the SME sector. So from my perspective, the challenges and opportunities given by the Chip Act is a strong opportunity for our country and for our companies to start development of new technologies, new chips, and not only to make designs and provide the solutions for the biggest players on the market, but also to start development of our own technology, of our own products, under our own brand.
Steven Overly
Hendrik, I’ll come to you because you know, Intel announced earlier this year it would invest, I believe it’s 4.6 billion, in a new facility in Poland. And there was a quote from Intel CEO Pat Gelsinger that sort of caught my eye, where he said that Intel had not originally really been considering Poland, but was drawn to it by Poland’s persistence. And it’s sort of eagerness to get a deal done. I guess there’s a couple of ways to look at that. But, you know, the question I had was, you know, is this an example of what we were talking about earlier with a potential race to the bottom, where you have these countries all sort of bidding for Intel? And, you know, whoever puts the most money on the table wins?
Hendrik Bourgeois
I wish it were that simple. That’s obviously not the case. You know, first of all, the semiconductor industry is incredibly capital intensive. I don’t know of any other industry that is so complex, and so capital intensive. And so yes, it is very important to obtain partnerships from governments when a private investor wants to set up a manufacturing site. But those decisions are incredibly complex. And there’s a lot of other factors that are taken into account before an investment decision is made, before site selection is made. And it goes from you know, as you can imagine, you know, the availability of infrastructure, the availability of land, the amount of land of volume is just very significant. Semiconductor manufacturing is also very sensitive, it’s very complex, you need to take into account, for instance, the fact that you don’t have train stations that are near to avoid vibrations, there’s, you know, more important things like the availability of skilled workers and talents is incredibly important. Relationships with key research institutes is important because you need ongoing innovation to support going forward with the manufacturing operations that you’re investing in. And then last but not least, I think you also need, you know, a broader ecosystem that supports you. So, you know, when we looked at Poland, we looked at a wide variety of factors. And obviously, I think what my CEO Pat Gelsinger was alluding to was one of those elements, which is perhaps, you know, the eagerness of the administration that you’re dealing with to resolve, as you can imagine, very important bottlenecks and difficulties that occur in such a selection process because of its complexity, right. And so, you know, the more you have representatives of an administration that are proactive, that are trying to find solutions, that anticipate problems, and that are flexible and trying to find solutions around those problems, I think, is also, you know, a factor that private investors will take into account.
Steven Overly
Lucinda, you were saying earlier that there’s this concern around the EU approach where depending on the size of the national budget of a member, you know, they may or may not sort of be in a better position to, you know, get some of these semiconductor investments. I wonder where you see the developments in Poland sort of fitting into that, you know, on the one hand, you obviously have a country that is trying to take advantage of and seize this moment around semiconductors. On the other hand, I can’t say I know, Poland’s GDP, but I don’t think it’s quite the level of some other larger, you know, EU member states. How would you assess the Polish example in that context?
Lucinda Creighton
Yeah, I mean, I think Hendrik’s point is a fair one, it doesn’t I mean, subsidies obviously, are very irresistible, for global multinationals. At the same time, you have to have the other factors there, you have to have, you know, the willingness to solve problems, the bottlenecks, as mentioned, often, you know, for these types of large scale manufacturing operations, you have significant administrative and planning issues that can be really challenging in a lot of European member states, and you have the talent and labor force issues, you know, having that supply of workforce is really important, too. So there are different factors. But having said that, of course, you know, the wealthier, larger member states will have the edge because they can put put down, you know, billions and billions of Euro. And uncertainly, we have seen already that Germany is way ahead of every other European member state on the Chips Act and will continue to be because of its size. And because of its GDP it’s very difficult for others to compete, and France is number two, and that’s the way it will be so long as we’re in the business of dealing with subsidies. I think one of the interesting, and really important aspects of the European Chips Act is pillar one: it’s the research and development and innovation pillar, which is the direct EU funding, if you like. And that is, I think, under the current Chips Act too small. And I think there’s 3.3 billion allocated to R&D and a further 2 billion that’s part of the so-called Chips Fund, it’s relatively small, you know, as a proportion of the 43 billion that is overall part of the proposed package. And I think that that’s where the opportunity lies, for two things; one, to create opportunities for perhaps more geographically balanced approach for the European Union, to developing the semiconductor ecosystem in Europe; but secondly, and very importantly, for ensuring that Europe continues to be at that sort of high value end of the supply chain and, you know, Europe, as a part of the global semiconductor ecosystem, is only at 10% in terms of manufacturing capacity. The aspiration of the Chips Act is to achieve 20%. I’m not sure that anybody believes that Europe will achieve that by the target date of 2030. I mean, given the, you know, the slow nature of rolling out these massive, multi billion euro projects, I think it’s probably unrealistic. But there’s a huge potential and huge capacity for Europe. To continue to really add value and to develop intellectual property, and to develop that sort of value add to the supply chain. So it’s not just about, you know, developing these vast manufacturing facilities. They’re important, and it’s clearly a political objective of the European Union. But from an economic point of view, I think it’s important that we don’t sort of forget about where Europe actually really has its strengths, which is developing the new technologies and being innovative. And I think that’s where the opportunity that Jacek has talked about as well, in terms of for disruptor companies, for small innovative players to get on the pitch and to scale and grow in Europe. And that should really be a big part of the ambition for the Chips Act.
Steven Overly
Well, I kind of want to talk about, you know, the longer term business and investment environment for the US and EU when it comes to semiconductors. I mean, as we’ve said, you know, this is a very capital intensive business, and there are particularly a lot of upfront costs to building and establishing these fabs and the subsidies programs in the US and EU seem to be primed for helping with those upfront costs. But I guess the question to me, and Jacek, I’ll come to you first on this, which is, you know, what are the US and EU not doing now that perhaps they should be to sort of make the longer term, you know, investment and labor environment more appealing?
Jacek Hanke
Yeah, it’s a good question, you know, I have a quite good and long relationship with American companies. My company is focused on designing services. So we are involved in the process of creation of new integrated circuits, doing the projects for the global and major players. But so far, we didn’t have and we don’t have an infrastructure for production of semiconductors. So everything that is done by the companies like mine in Poland, is to provide a design services. I suppose that the long term relationship would be focused on creation of design centers here in Poland, and we can do and prepare some prototypes which could be scaled up for the mass production in the new facilities and the new fabs created in Europe. Yeah, but so far, we’re based on our human resources, on talented engineers, and the innovations created by our engineers.
Steven Overly
Hendrik, we mentioned Intel’s investments in Poland. I know there’s been another facility being built in Germany, I believe, a few in the US. I’m sure there’s others I’m missing. The point is, obviously, Intel is investing a lot and has talked about that quite a bit. Does that mean that the business environment is already appealing and ripe for investment as it stands now? Or is there more that needs to be done?
Hendrik Bourgeois
Well, certainly, we see a growing demand for the type of semiconductors that we manufacture, the advanced semiconductor, the leading edge semiconductors, because these are chips that are going to be used, or new technologies for artificial intelligence, or 5g, 6g technology for high-performance computing. And so we see the demand for these types of chips and for this type of technology growing and so that’s why we think this is an important and significant and smart investment decision. And yes, you know, we’ve been significantly engaging in manufacturing investments, particularly in Europe, and in the United States. I think that’s important. But one thing I wanted to do is get back a little bit to what Jacek and Lucinda were saying, you know, the semiconductor manufacturing space is very diverse, right? There’s no such thing as one single homogeneous type of or way of manufacturing semiconductors, it usually involves, you know, research and developments, then you go to design and after design, you have to think about, you know, front-end manufacturing, which is basically the manufacturing of wafers and after the wafers, you need to assemble; you need to test; there might be a need to package the chips. Other industries will create substrate that goes into the chips production. So there’s various pieces in the manufacturing supply chain. And I think it’s important to think about that when you think about subsidy races, and when you think about, you know, the strengths of this or that country or this economy and that economy. You know, there’s obviously, strength and diversity. And both from the European Union side, where Lucinda is basically saying, look, let’s be careful about, you know, a subsidy race within the European Union. I agree with that. But, you know, in reality, a company like Intel has been investing in various areas within the semiconductor manufacturing chain in the European Union; assembly testing in Poland; our planned wafer fabrication in Germany. And the important thing is, you know, I also have an example of why smaller European member states can benefit from investments, even without the Chips Act because we’ve been, you know, investing in Ireland since 1989, and in Ireland, we have a huge site in Dublin, and we’ve invested over 30 billion euros since we set up that site back in 1989. And so I’d say, look, you know, and that’s also true. I think, also, for the transatlantic relationship, I think it would be, you know, unsustainable for a company like Intel to pursue, you know, in a subsidy race to the bottom or to the top, depending on what your perspective is. Because, you know, I think it’s very important for both the US and the the European Union to think about complementarity aspects. And making sure that there’s a true transatlantic partnership in semiconductor manufacturing, to address a common challenge. You know, I think, when people talk about subsidy races, they think about, I think, “Oh, let’s make sure we don’t overcompensate, let’s make sure we don’t provide too many incentives.” Right, as a simple result of this competition. In reality, I think the real question is, you know, will the West be able to level the playing field? You know, if you look, for instance, at, you know, what China is doing in the Made in China 2025 program, I think they’re allocating, just the central Chinese government, $150 billion, or it’s equivalent just to semiconductor manufacturing. So, you know, this is the, I think, the optic that is important to, and the perspective, that is important to take in mind when thinking about, you know, subsidy races and thinking about also the diversification of investments in United States within the European Union and between the European Union and the United States.
Steven Overly
Well, two more topics, I’d like to get in with our remaining minutes, and one builds on exactly what you were just saying, which is this competition with China, you know, at large, and really, a lot of these investments sort of being viewed, I think, in that context. I think it’s important to bring in here, at least briefly, some discussion of critical minerals. Right. You know, this is a key part of the supply chain for semiconductors, it’s one that’s not directly addressed by the subsidies programs. And yet, it’s a challenge that both the US and EU have, where they’re still very largely dependent on China for critical minerals. Lucinda, I just like to come to you on this. You know, is there sort of a joint approach that the US and EU can take to really address that vulnerability of being dependent on China for these critical minerals?
Lucinda Creighton
Yeah, look, I think it goes absolutely hand in hand with our transatlantic approach to semiconductors and indeed, to green technologies, and the renewable economy and so on. I mean, all of these priorities are interlinked, and they are common priorities and common goals. So we’re probably not doing enough in terms of being joined up. Obviously, we have various channels between the European Union and I think we should not forget the UK in all of this as well. Unfortunately, no longer a member of the European Union, but still is an important European country that is part of this dialogue and has to be part of this dialogue as well. But there’s enormous, not just an opportunity, but I think an absolute necessity for Europe and the US to work together on this. The TTC is a platform for that to happen, I think it’s fair to say that the results have been underwhelming to date in terms of really building common approaches, really, to achieving an understanding of the priorities on both sides of the Atlantic: they’re not a million miles apart. But for some reason, it has proven, I think, to be difficult to sort of forge a common path together. And maybe because, you know, both European political leaders, and likewise, in the US, you know, and understandably and rightly, are focused on, you know, delivering and being seen to deliver, you know, jobs and investment domestically. I mean, we have all become a little bit more nativist in how we package and sell these things. But I think, when it comes to, you know, hugely important strategic priorities, like critical minerals, that we are looking at building new partnerships globally, that we are doing so together, and that we’re doing so you know, conscious of the threat that is posed by China and other authoritarian regimes around the world upon whom we do not wish to be dependent. So there is an absolute common objective here between Europe and the US. And maybe we need to just work a little bit harder to forge a common path.
Steven Overly
Well, Adrienne, I just like to come to you for the final word here: we mentioned the TTC, which is the Trade and Technology Council. I think one of the next moments we’re watching for in this US-EU relationship is the next meeting of the TTC, which is expected here shortly. Back in May, I know they announced sort of an early warning system on semiconductors. And there’s been some progress out of the TTC on these issues. I wonder if you might give us Adrienne a sense of either what to expect from this upcoming meeting or what we should look for, you know, in terms of how the US and EU can continue to align on these issues.
Adrienne Elrod
Yeah, absolutely. I mean the TCC is a very important convening, so that we can, the US and the EU, being top allies, can work together on making sure that it’s in our best interest and the growth of the semiconductor industry is taking place in both our country and in the EU. And you know, we’re proud of the work we’ve already done together on this; we’ve completed a joint early warning mechanism, as you just mentioned, for semiconductor supply chain disruptions; and a transparency mechanism for sharing of information about public support provided to the semiconductor industry. And the cooperation between the United States and the EU is reinforcing the success of our respective efforts to promote semiconduct supply chain. So I think we’re gonna be able to when we come together, we’re going to discuss common elements of our public support frameworks in order to improve effectiveness and shared lessons. But the bottom line is, we see our relationship with the EU, the United States as when it comes to semiconductor industries, and obviously trade across the board, as imperative. If the EU succeeds in terms of semiconductor growth, so does the United States and vice versa. So this is a really great convening. It solidifies that partnership and really provides a forum in which both the EU and the United States can come together and have these discussions.
Steven Overly
Well, that is all the time we have today. I really thank all of our panelists for being here. I’m sure we could revisit this conversation many times over the next year as all of these investments start to come to fruition. And I want to thank you all for tuning into today’s conversation on transatlantic approaches to semiconductor investments. This has been hosted by the Center for European Policy Analysis and the Polish Embassy. Be sure to visit cepa.org and follow CEPA’s social media accounts to stay up to date on their latest policy analysis, and upcoming events. And thank you again for being here.
Jacek Hanke
Thank you very much.
Hendrik Bourgeois
Thank you.
Lucinda Creighton
Thank you.
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