The message the Rockets sent this past week was clear: The time for youth development with no guardrails is over, and the club is willing to put its money where its mouth is.
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Hiring coach Ime Udoka—who was quick to call out his young star players publicly in Boston when their efforts fell short—in late April was certainly one indication change was underway. But the team’s spending in free agency—agreeing to terms with point guard Fred VanVleet at $43 million a year for three seasons and outspoken wing Dillon Brooks for $20 million a year—signals that the NBA’s youngest team wants to be taken seriously after a haphazard 2022–23 campaign.
It’s not surprising when a team with that much youth falters in the standings. It’s largely expected. But aside from brief bright spots, Houston was unusually tough to watch much of the time. Defense was generally too tall a task, as the club finished second-to-last in defensive efficiency. The Rockets turned the ball over a league-high 16.2% of the time, even though they rarely logged assists (NBA’s second-lowest assist percentage) and almost never pushed the pace when they had clear opportunities. In fact, no team took longer than Houston, on average, to launch a shot attempt after securing a defensive rebound, according to Inpredictable. The league has become increasingly dependent on the three-ball in recent years, yet no team was worse from deep than Houston. Jalen Green and Kevin Porter Jr. possess undeniable talent as ballhandlers, but they often handle the rock for too long without there being a clear reason, particularly for how well 20-year-old center Alperen Şengün does when he gets opportunities.
One way to sprinkle seasoning on the team’s young core, of course, is to add high-priced veterans like VanVleet and Brooks, who have been in winning environments and play hard-nosed, hustle-oriented defense. Backup center Jock Landale was an underrated pickup, with just the first season of his four-year, $32 million contract fully guaranteed. There are other things to wonder about with the team’s acquisitions, though.
For starters, neither VanVleet or Brooks is coming off the most efficient campaign. In fact, among the 56 players who took at least 950 shot attempts last season, VanVleet and Brooks finished with the lowest and second-lowest field goal percentages in the league, at 39.3% and 39.6%, respectively. When using effective field goal percentage, which takes into account three-pointers, their rankings improve only slightly: Brooks’s 46.8% still ranks second-worst, while VanVleet’s 48.6% is ninth-worst. (Also of concern: Green’s 48.5% ranks eighth-worst.) And these numbers were compiled with more-established clubs, with presumably better-fitting talent around them. It raises the question of exactly what next season’s Rockets will look like on offense, given that they already had the NBA’s worst effective field goal percentage as a team in the clutch.
Other question marks exist, too. What about the glut of forwards—Brooks, No. 4 pick Amen Thompson, No. 20 pick Cam Whitmore and 2021 All-Rookie team member Jae’Sean Tate—and how their playing time will be separated? How will the youngsters take to Udoka’s coaching after growing accustomed to the more mild-mannered Stephen Silas?
Still, the biggest question is in plain sight, even if it takes some time to get the answer: Did the Rockets pay far too handsomely to help this young team mature faster?
It’s fully possible they did. But after a season of clear failure—and without a generational payoff in the draft lottery to show for it—another campaign of static play wasn’t an option. Houston wanted to be taken far more seriously, and now it will be, even if the team remains far from perfect.
