pa href=https://www.cato.org/people/ted-galen-carpenter hreflang=undTed Galen Carpenter/a
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pFor more thannbsp;a href=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/nov/27/kim-jong-un-daughter-inspects-another-icbm-as-leader-hails-north-koreas-nuclear-power target=_blankthree decades/a, the United States has sought to make the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) annbsp;a href=https://www.nknews.org/2022/11/kim-and-daughter-meet-icbm-launch-teams-as-nukes-declared-irreversible/ target=_blankinternational pariah/a. The primary goal of that strategy of isolation has been to force Pyongyang to abandon its ongoing nuclear weapons program, but an important secondary goal is to throttle the country’s ballistic missile program./p
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pIt is increasingly clear that Washington’s strategy has failed on both counts./p
pThe DPRK’s small but steadily expanding nuclear arsenal renders the first objectivenbsp;a href=https://www.cato.org/commentary/washingtons-stagnant-north-korea-policy-needs-change target=_blankutterly obsolete/a. North Korea’snbsp;a href=https://www.cato.org/commentary/failure-launch-why-america-cant-stop-north-korean-missile-tests target=_blankmounting number of missile tests/anbsp;demonstrates the increasing irrelevance of the second objective./p
pLike it or not, North Korea is fast becoming anbsp;a href=https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/11/why-joe-biden-wont-embrace-arms-control-with-north-korea/ target=_blankfull‐fledged nuclear weapons power/anbsp;with anbsp;a href=https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/11/north-korea-keeps-testing-icbms-and-we-cant-stop-them/ target=_blankcapable missile delivery system./a/p
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pThe imminent prospect of North Korea having anbsp;nuclear arsenal in the form of warheads on ICBMs requires anbsp;drastic, immediate policy transformation./p
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pThe latest ICBM test is anbsp;game‐changer in two respects. First, it underscores the futility, indeed absurdity, of Washington’s isolation strategy. The United States is now in the untenable and dangerous position of havingnbsp;a href=https://www.cato.org/commentary/north-korea-nuclear-weapons-state-america-needs-new-strategy target=_blankno formal relationship/a—much less anbsp;tolerably cordial one—with the world’s latest nuclear weapons power. Second, the prospect of anbsp;DPRK fleet of ICBMs in the next few years significantly alters the risk‐benefit calculation of the U.S.‘s extended deterrence commitment to the Republic of Korea (a href=https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/11/why-south-korea-could-build-a-small-nuclear-weapons-arsenal/ target=_blankSouth Korea/a). Soon, North Korea will be capable of launching anbsp;a href=https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/03/north-koreas-icbm-test/ target=_blanknuclear strike/anbsp;against the American homeland in the event of anbsp;conflict that has spiraled out of control./p
pWashington’s strategy needs to change on both fronts. It is now imperative to conduct anbsp;comprehensive dialogue with Pyongyang to normalize diplomatic relations between the two countries. Among other steps, that process must include anbsp;peace treaty (replacing the 1953 Armistice), finally ending the state of war on the Korean Peninsula, the lifting of U.S. and international sanctions against Pyongyang, and the establishment of formal, bilateral diplomatic ties./p
pThe United States also must transform its security relationship with South Korea.nbsp;It was anbsp;relatively low‐risk venture to provide anbsp;military shield to anbsp;weak client state in the context of the Cold War. Whether correctly or not, U.S. viewed the DPRK as little more than anbsp;puppet of thenbsp;a href=https://www.19fortyfive.com/2021/12/china-is-becoming-the-soviet-union/ target=_blankSoviet Union/anbsp;andnbsp;a href=https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/11/america-needs-a-real-ambassador-to-china-not-to-the-ccp/ target=_blankCommunist China/a. In that context, anbsp;new war on the Peninsula would have had far wider importance than being merely anbsp;fight between two small, rival Korean states. It would have been the opening salvo in an escalating East‐West confrontation. Such anbsp;stark ideological struggle no longer defines anbsp;far more complex geopolitical environment. Although its economic importance to the United States has grown, South Korea’s strategic relevance has declined./p
pUntil recently, U.S. leaders also felt comfortable offering anbsp;military guarantee to the ROK to deter an attack from Pyongyang, secure in the knowledge that the DPRK could not strike the U.S. homeland. We no longer have that luxury./p
pIt is time to phase out the “mutual” military alliance with South Korea. At the time that alliance was established in the early 1950s, the ROK was anbsp;war‐ravaged, poverty‐stricken country incapable of providing for its own defense. Today it is one of Asia’s most successful and prosperous “economic tigers,” with an economy estimated to benbsp;a href=https://www.statista.com/statistics/1035390/south-korea-gdp-comparison-with-north-korea/ target=_blankat least 40 times larger/anbsp;than that of its communist rival. South Korea is now fully capable ofnbsp;a href=https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/11/poland-is-building-a-military-machine-to-fight-russia-if-it-has-to/ target=_blankbuilding whatever military forces/anbsp;are needed to defend its security—a href=https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/11/blame-north-korea-and-china-if-south-korea-builds-nuclear-weapons/ target=_blankincluding anbsp;nuclear deterrent/a. Seoul’s continuing military dependence on the United States has been anbsp;policy choice to save money. It is not even remotely anbsp;policy necessity. U.S. leaders need to inform their South Korean counterparts that the defense gravy train will no longer operate/p
pEven more important than ending the ROK’s free‐riding ways is to drastically change Washington’s stance regarding an independent nuclear arsenal for that country. Generations of U.S. officials have robotically embraced an insistence on nuclear nonproliferation as anbsp;global policy,nbsp;a href=https://www.cato.org/commentary/not-all-forms-nuclear-proliferation-are-equally-bad target=_blankregardless of circumstances/a. Washington insists the membership in the global nuclear weapons club must remained closed—despite India’s and Pakistan’s forced entry in the 1990s and North Korea’s steady emergence as anbsp;de facto nuclear weapons power. It is anbsp;policy that is detached from reality. To the extent it works at all, it guarantees thatnbsp;a href=https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/09/the-sneaky-way-iran-could-build-an-icbm/ target=_blankrogue states/anbsp;will have such weapons, while stable, nonaggressive democratic countries remain nonnuclear—and heavily dependent on the United States for their defense./p
pIt is an unhealthy situation both for the United States and its security dependents. It is especially unhealthy in the case of South Korea. The ROK is betting Washington will honor its security commitment even at the risk of anbsp;North Korean strike on the American homeland. But such an extended deterrence promise is inherently less credible than anbsp;robust primary deterrent. Anbsp;South Korean nuclear arsenal would be far more likely to deter North Korea than anbsp;fraying promise from Washington that the United States willnbsp;a href=https://www.cato.org/commentary/us-celebrates-alliance-seoul-south-korea-worth-nuclear-war target=_blankrisk/anbsp;mushroom clouds sprouting above multiple American cities to deter DPRK military aggression against the ROK./p
pWe must not dither and then try to adjust Washington’s obsolete Korea policy in the midst of anbsp;crisis. The imminent prospect of North Korea having anbsp;nuclear arsenal in the form of warheads on ICBMs requires anbsp;drastic, immediate policy transformation./p
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