Amid growing concern, the group of four nations called –the Quad-- has begun to develop the counter strategy to enforce the sanctity of the international maritime laws. Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific is high on the agenda.
By Manish Jha
The Quad ensemble will release a maritime initiative for the Indo-Pacific. Amid growing concern, the group of four nations called –the Quad– has begun to develop the counter strategy to enforce the sanctity of the international maritime laws. Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific is high on the agenda.
The strategic significance of the Indo-Pacific needs no more reiteration. The region accounts for 65% of World GDP, 63% of World Population and a little over 50% of Global trade. The Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs) criss-crossing across the Indo-Pacific provide access to minerals, materials and markets that are the bedrock of every economy in the region and beyond. So long as Freedom of Navigation and Overflight and the established Rule based Order remains unchallenged this supply chain may not be disrupted.
Given the tussle in the geopolitics and increasing conflict in grabbing resources, the stakes are getting bigger in the maritime arena. The scale is burgeoning as pointed out by maritime expert and former adviser to Niti Aayog, Commodore Sujeet Samaddar: “given the fact that material requirements will jump from 79Gt in 2011 to 167 Gt by 2060, energy requirements will cross 24Gt, competition can be predicted since much of this requirement would be consumed by China and India.” He points out that while we could hope that this would not lead to conflict, however, hope is not a great strategy. Therefore some preparations and mitigation plans are a must.
Whilst the core principles of security, safety, regional stability and sovereignty over owned seas and to exercise freedom of navigation over the high seas have remained sacrosanct principles of fundamental maritime security, however, the players and their profiles have dramatically changed in the last few years.
For several decades it was a given that the Indian Ocean region and the SLOCs that transited here comprised the soft underbelly of China in the sense that it carried the majority of its requirements of hydrocarbons, commodities, ores and trade goods and was vulnerable to interdiction. So far, the Indian Navy has been projecting as the Net Security Provider for the region. But the tide has been rising in the Indo-Pacific where the China’s PLAN is beginning to break the boundaries of maritime laws here and there and also frequently. The power projection by the PLAN reflects its marine muscle which is planning to induct about 430 ships by 2030. China has developed a highly potent expeditionary fleet which is second to none today. On the other side, the Indian Navy may only peak at 140 ships in the same time.
“This is unprecedented,” observes Cmde Samaddar. “When combined with a clear intention to put that muscle to use, this makes it the foremost security threat to Indo-Pacific nations. This is so visible and its replication across the Indo-Pacific region has caused so much concern that an unprecedented grouping of 4 nations, viz., Australia, India, Japan and the United States” (QUAD) has taken shape which was virtually unthinkable even a year ago. Worse, though unstated, it is realised that the QUAD is unequal to the task of containing China in the Indo-Pacific. Other partners such as the EU and United Kingdom are being enrolled to join the QUAD. This is the magnitude of the challenge from China in the Indo-Pacific.
Beijing’s version of the ‘rule-based order’ can be imposed in the Indo-Pacific by 2026. This is feasible for China who can be certain to coerce nations by very strong messaging that any attempts to supply resources and commodities to India and in fact to the QUAD, could attract a very high cost including loss of ship and cargo, suspension of trade and aid and imposition of undeclared ‘sanctions’ and reversing credit commitments as we are now observing in some debt-ridden countries.
Further asymmetry is possible by China leveraging its excellent skill sets and capabilities in the cyber space and outer space domain as well, particularly disrupting Positioning, Navigation and Timing services provided by the US or European or Indian GPS/GNSS systems which can disrupt shipping, airways, banking, financial, transportation and commercial systems apart from military systems.
Unfortunately, this battle for supremacy between the near peer powers will not be played in Eurasia, The most likely play out would be in the Indo-Pacific since China’s geography requires access to the Indian Ocean for its continued requirements of hydrocarbons, ores, minerals, food and the markets of EU and Africa. Given the ASEAN member countries are unlikely to intervene in any conflict in the South China Seas and the Indo-Pacific and that the only other two bases for repair and recreation for the US Navy being in Bahrain and Yokosuka, it falls upon India to be the destination for providing the entire administrative, logistics, operational and maintenance support to QUAD maritime agencies deployed in the region. This requires substantial preparations and negotiations and a very fine diplomatic balance as this may be construed as inimical to China.
QUAD Maritime Cooperation
The QUAD is destined to be the long-term preserver of the peace in the Indo-Pacific. This means that the primary objective for the QUAD would be to secure the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) in the Indian Ocean that provides the markets, minerals, commodities for the Chinese economy as a quid pro quo to Chinese challenge to freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea or aggression against Japan and Taiwan or both. This is because the PLA has a huge asymmetry to successfully wage Anti Access and Area Denial operations even against a multiple aircraft carrier battle group of the QUAD in the South China Sea and the Pacific Ocean. Therefore It is highly unlikely that a force-on-force situation would be acceptable to the QUAD.
So, the strategic alternative within the realm of operations is to instead address value targets that may influence a retraction of aggression. Cmde Samaddar believes, “Disrupting supply chains that support the economy can be one option and defending it would require deployments of forces in the area of interest.” Possibly, the SLOCs may require a ‘convoy relay’ to ensure that goods and supplies continue to be market driven and not usurped by any one power or supra national forces.
“No one Navy of the QUAD member states can balance PLAN expansionism in the Indo-Pacific. By 2030, the PLAN potential deployment to the Indian Ocean can be 2 aircraft carriers, 30-40 submarines and 60-70 Destroyers and Frigates supported by cyber, spaced based ISR etc. Therefore, some sort of a consortia of maritime forces may be required to achieve a semblance of deterrence to ensure a stable Indo-Pacific.” Consequently, larger deployment of QUAD and EU forces in the region may be predicted. These forces would need to be periodically refitted and occasionally repaired. In addition, such deployments also need recreational facilities for the crew. Some ‘warehousing’ would be useful to replenish spares and war materiel.
This would require a Force Sustenance strategy and commensurate infrastructure for replenishment, recreation repair and refit during deployments to keep the peace. Should, battle develop in the future, prudence requires that the QUAD has interoperable facilities for replenishment logistics of food, ammunition and spares, repair and restoration of the battle-damaged fleet and to provide rest and recreation for sailors on long deployments in the area. Commodore Samaddar defines it as “4R support for the QUAD Maritime agencies.”
Given, India’s central position in the region a proposal to discuss the contours of a common and shared repair, refit, replenish and recreation infrastructure for ‘QUAD Plus’ naval ships and aircraft operating in the Indian Ocean region as a Force sustenance initiative should be discussed. This facility would mainly serve to build relationships, share seamanship skills, develop better interoperability and improve sustainable deployments.
Such a 4R facility is envisaged as an Economic Cooperation Partnership project, built at a suitable shipyard with existing facilities, airfield, appropriate access points and all required infrastructure of a modern city. This would reduce cost of deployments, increase period on patrol, faster crew rotation and regional maintenance and logistics support. Cmde Samaddar highlights that this international partnership would augur well for the long-term stability of the Indo-Pacific as a shared and common initiative under the proposed Economic Framework Agreement. This facility, should the call come, would also cater to restoring casualties arising from combat.
Given India’s locational advantages and its role in the Indo-Pacific such an international 4R facility would be ideally located on the western seaboard of India, financed, owned and operated by the QUAD and administered by QUAD professionals as part of the Economic Framework Agenda.
