Dan Goure
Security,
A large portion of the U.S. defense establishment is operating under the mistaken belief that a future conflict involving a great or middle power in the Pacific will be a long-range missile duel.
China is building a formidable conventional military with a heavy reliance on a mix of air and missile defenses and long-range conventional and nuclear missiles. There are growing concerns that large U.S. naval platforms, particularly aircraft carriers, will be excessively vulnerable if they attempt to enter the range rings of Chinese anti-ship cruise and ballistic missiles. This so-called Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) threat has senior U.S. defense officials looking to fight Chinese threats to American friends and allies in the Western Pacific from stand-off distances, 1,000 miles or more from the contested territory. Adopting such a strategy would be a profound political and operational mistake.
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